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GAZETTE
JUNE 1996
Domestic Violence Act 1996
b y J o a n O ' M a h o n y , S o l i c i t or
On 27th February 1 9 96 the President
s i g n ed the D ome s t ic V i o l e n ce Bill
bringing it into law as the D ome s t ic
V i o l e n ce Act 1996. Th is A ct c ame
into operation on 27th March 1996.
The Act is d e s i g n ed to be the legal
r e s p o n se to d ome s t ic v i o l e n ce wh i ch
has increased s i n ce 1 9 76 on an
unprecedented scale. The Fami ly L aw
(Protection of S p o u s es and Children)
Act of 1981 is repealed in its entirety
but there are transitional p r o v i s i o ns in
section 23 of the n ew Act.
T h e principal features of this Act are:
It e x t e n ds protection b e y o nd the limit
o f the s p o u s e.
It creates a n ew type of Qrder to be
k n o wn as a S a f e ty Order.
It e x t e n ds the jurisdiction of the
District Court to grant Barring Orders
for periods of up to three years.
It p r o v i d es for interim and e x parte
Barring Orders.
It introduces the c o n c e pt of a
"Watching and Be s e t t i ng" o f f e n c e.
Ex t e n s i ve n ew p ow e rs are g i v en to
the Health Board to apply for Orders
under the Act.
T h e District Court is g i v en further
e x t e n s i ve p ow e rs to ma ke Orders
under the Child Care Act.
T h e District Court is also g i v en the
p o w er to ma ke Orders under the
Guardianship of Infants Act 1964,
The Fami ly L aw Ma i n t e n a n ce of
S p o u s es and Children Act 1976, The
F am i ly H o me Protection A ct 1 9 76
and the Ch i ld Care A ct 1991 without
the institution of p r o c e e d i n gs under
that Act b e i ng b e f o re the Court.
Joan O'Mahony
T h e penalties of various breaches are
increased.
The Garda p ow e rs of arrest without
1
warrant are a l so increased.
I In the definition section of the Act,
! "welfare" is n ow s p e c i f i c a l ly stated to
| include "physical and p s y c h o l o g i c al
welfare". Th is broadens the c o n c e pt
of "welfare" p r e v i ou s ly determined
by the S u p r eme Court in the
O'B
v.
O'B
case. It will be interesting to
f o l l ow the S u p r eme Court d e c i s i o ns
in the future to s ee h ow far the Court
are prepared to g o in w i d e n i ng the
parameters within wh i ch c l a i ms for
Barring and/or S a f e ty Orders are
ma de on the basis of the
p s y c h o l o g i c al we l f a re of the applicant
or the applicant's dependants.
1. E x t e n s i on of P r o t e c t i on
S a f e t y O r d e r s
Und er section 2 (1) (a) protection is
e x t e n d ed to four different c a t e g o r i es
of person:
(i) The S p o u se
(ii) Co - h a b i t e es
(iii) Parents
(iv) Persons of full a ge residing
with the respondent in a
relationship, the basis of
wh i ch is not primarily
contractual.
S e c t i on 2(1 )(a) (iv) appears to be the
catch-all category and its operation
will undoub t e d ly require careful
monitoring in the future. The Sa f e ty
Order is a stand-alone Order wh i ch
directs the respondent not to use or
threaten to use v i o l e n ce against,
mo l e st or put in fear the applicant and
not to watch or beset a place wh e re
the applicant resides.
B a r r i n g O r d e r s
S e c t i on 3( 1) creates three c a t e g o r i es
o f "applicants"
j
(i) The S p o u se
j
(ii) The Co - h a b i t ee
i
(iii) The Parent
| It is apparent that the S a f e ty Order
will h a ve a mu ch w i d er use as
! applying to a broader category of
applicant and the remaining
p r o v i s i o ns of section 3 in relation to
the b e n e f i c i al interest in the property
will also direct mo re p e o p le to the use
of the S a f e ty Order remedy.
Sub s e c t i on 4 (b) provides a unique
presumption in that wh e re the
applicant b e l i e v es that he or she has a
I legal or b e n e f i c i al interest in the
property wh i ch is not less than that of
] the Re s p o nd e n t, then such b e l i ef shall
| be a dmi s s i b le in e v i d e n c e.
Pr o v i s i on is ma de in section 4.1 for
interim Barring Orders to be ma de
I
wh e re there is (a) an i mme d i a te
risk of significant harm to the
applicant and (b) wh e re the
granting of a Protection Order
w o u ld not be s u f f i c i e nt to protect
the Applicant.
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