CDOIF Guidance

Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites

Final report

1 The main purpose of this report is to specify the minimum standards of control which should

be in place at all establishments storing large volumes of gasoline.

2 The PSLG also considered other substances capable of giving rise to a large flammable

vapour cloud in the event of a loss of primary containment. However, to ensure priority was given

to improving standards of control to tanks storing gasoline PSLG has yet to determine the scale

and application of this guidance to such substances. It is possible that a limited number of other

substances (with specific physical properties and storage arrangements) will be addressed in the

future.

3 This report also provides guidance on good practice in relation to secondary and tertiary

containment for facilities covered by the CA Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)

Containment Policy.

4 Parts of this guidance may also be relevant to other major hazard establishments.

5 Taking forward improvements in industry, PSLG built on the developments of the original

BSTG using a small, focused, oversight team to provide leadership and support to expert working

groups in developing guidance on specific topics. It was chaired by a senior member of industry

and involved representatives from the United Kingdom Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA),

the Tank Storage Association (TSA), the United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators’ Association

(UKOPA), the Chemical Industries Association (CIA), the Trades Union Congress, the Health and

Safety Executive (HSE), the Environment Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency

(SEPA). PSLG led, developed and promoted improvements to safety and environmental controls,

in particular:

demonstrating effective leadership within the sector;

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developing organisational and technical solutions;

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sharing and learning from incidents and good practice;

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driving forward research;

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monitoring compliance with the Buncefield MIIB’s and BSTG’s recommendations;

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making further recommendations where appropriate; and

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taking effective account of the findings of the exploration of the explosion mechanism.

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6 This report reflects the original scope of BSTG, incorporating the detailed guidance provided

by PSLG and its working groups. The report is structured into six parts, addressing all 25 of the

recommendations included in the Buncefield MIIB

Recommendations on the design and operation

of fuel storage sites

report:

Part 1: Systematic assessment of safety integrity level requirements

Part 2: Protecting against loss of primary containment using high integrity systems

Part 3: Engineering against escalation of loss of primary containment

Part 4: Engineering against loss of secondary and tertiary containment

Part 5: Operating with high reliability organisations

Part 6: Delivering high performance through culture and leadership

Introduction