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Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites

Final report

12

Application to existing COMAH establishments

15 Figure 1 summarises the application of this guidance to existing COMAH establishments. It

should be noted that this figure is to aid decision making rather than to set priorities.

Existing establishments with tanks storing gasoline

16 Establishments storing gasoline in bulk tanks form the highest priority for PSLG. They represent

the activities where PSLG expects to see the highest standards of control of risks of both the

integrity of plant and equipment and in process safety management. Existing establishments with

tanks falling within the definition set out in paragraph 24 should, therefore, meet this guidance in full.

17 PSLG wishes to see a rigorous approach to primary and secondary containment and to

on-site emergency arrangements within this category of establishments. This is to ensure that the

standards will be, where necessary, significantly higher than before the Buncefield incident.

18 Particular emphasis is given to overfill prevention as this is the primary means by which

another major incident can be prevented. Accordingly, Parts 1 and 2 together with Appendix 4

set a rigorous standard with fully automatic overfill protection to safety integrity level 1 (SIL 1) as

defined in BS EN 61511 as the benchmark. To limit the environmental consequences of an overfill

incident particular attention should be given to standards of secondary and tertiary containment

as set out in this guidance. The high standards of on-site emergency arrangements needed to

limit the consequence of an incident are also set out.

Existing establishments storing products that may give rise to a large vapour cloud in

the event of an overfill

19 PSLG has undertaken work to determine whether other liquids outside the criteria set out in

paragraph 24 have the potential to give rise to a large vapour cloud in similar circumstances to

those at Buncefield. The results of this work are given in Appendix 1. This methodology can be

used to determine the potential for liquids to form a large vapour cloud in the event of an overfill.

An indicative list of such substances is also provided.

20 The CA together with industry will determine the extent to which this guidance should apply to

tanks meeting the criteria in Appendix 1. Following the publication of this guidance a programme

of work will be started to establish a strategy for compliance taking account of the nature of the

risk and severity of the consequence of a major accident. In the meantime, dutyholders should

take account of this guidance in complying with their normal legal duties under COMAH.

Existing establishments with tanks falling within scope of Part 2 of the COMAH

Competent Authority Containment Policy

21 Dutyholders should comply with the recommendations in Part 4 of this guidance (Engineering

against loss of secondary and tertiary containment) so far as is reasonably practicable.

22 Dutyholders should take account of the good practice guidance in other parts of this report

when determining control measures for the bulk storage of liquid dangerous substances.

Existing establishments with other tanks falling within scope of Part 1 of the COMAH

Competent Authority Containment Policy

23 This report contains generic guidance on the storage of bulk liquids, product transfers and

management systems, including competence and human factors. Therefore, dutyholders should

take account of the good practice guidance in this report when determining control measures for

the bulk storage of liquid dangerous substances.