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Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites

Final report

14

25 Table 1 provides a summary of the MIIB

Design and operation

report recommendations;

Parts 1 to 6 of this report provide the guidance to address each of these recommendations.

Dutyholders should already have met the recommendations within the BSTG report. The CA has

a programme of work to check compliance.

26 The information in Parts 1 to 6 of this guidance is presented in the same order as the

recommendations in the MIIB

Design and operation

report.

27 Within six months of the publication of this report, dutyholders should undertake a gap analysis of

their compliance with the revised and new guidance contained within this report for in-scope gasoline

tanks (as defined in paragraph 24) and record their findings. Within nine months of the publication of

this report dutyholders should agree with the CA an improvement plan to comply with this guidance.

28 For a number of recommendations there is a requirement to ensure that any changes are

incorporated within the safety report. For lower-tier sites, demonstrating that improvements have

been made will be achieved in the normal way by having systems and procedures in place at the

establishment to deliver the intended outcome.

Table 1

Recommendations from the MIIB

Design and operation

report

MIIB recommendation

MIIB sub-recommendation PSLG Report Reference

Systematic assessment of safety integrity level requirements

1 The CA and operators of

Buncefield-type sites should

develop and agree a common

methodology to determine

SIL requirements for overfill

prevention systems in line

with the principles set out in

Part 3 of BS EN 61511. This

methodology should take

account of:

Application of the methodology

should be clearly demonstrated

in the COMAH safety report

submitted to the CA for each

applicable site. Existing safety

reports will need to be reviewed

to ensure this methodology is

adopted.

1(a)

the existence of nearby

sensitive resources or

populations;

Part 1, paragraphs 29–33

Overfill protection systems

for storage tanks,

paragraphs 34–38

Application of LOPA to the

overflow of an atmospheric

tank, paragraphs 39–40

Incorporating the findings

of SIL assessments into

COMAH safety reports,

paragraph 41

Operator responsibilities and

human factors, paragraphs

42–43

1(b)

the nature and intensity of

depot operations;

1(c)

realistic reliability

expectations for tank gauging

systems;

1(d)

the extent/rigour of operator

monitoring.

Summary of actions required