Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites
Final report
176
256 Dutyholders should ensure that modifications or development of new control rooms or HCIs
comply with recognised industry good practice both in their design, and their development and
testing.
Availability of records for periodic review
257 Retention of relevant records is necessary for the periodic review of the effectiveness of
control measures, and the root cause analysis of those incidents and near misses that could
potentially have developed into a major incident.
Guidance
258 The following records are considered to be particularly relevant:
Stock records to demonstrate compliance with a stock control policy.
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Operational plans.
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Consignment transfer agreements.
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Local records of changes to consignment transfers.
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Stock reconciliation records.
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Incidences of high level alarm activation.
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Incidences of high-high level/trip activation.
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Maintenance/proof testing for high level trip and alarm systems.
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Faults discovered on high level alarm or protection systems.
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Communications failures between sender and receiver.
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Plant/process changes.
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Organisational changes.
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Approval/operation of inhibits/overrides of safety systems.
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Competence/training records.
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Shift work/overtime records.
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Shift handover records.
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Routine plant tour records.
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Permits to work.
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Risk assessments.
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Method statements.
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Active monitoring records.
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Summary
259 Dutyholders should identify those records needed for the periodic review of the effectiveness
of control measures, and for the root cause analysis of those incidents and near misses that could
potentially develop into a major incident. The records should be retained for a minimum period of
one year.
Measuring process safety performance
260 Measuring performance to assess how effectively risks are being controlled is an essential
part of a health and safety management system (see L111 and HSG65).
Active monitoring
provides feedback on performance before an accident or incident, whereas
reactive monitoring
involves identifying and reporting on incidents to check the controls in place, identify weaknesses
and learn from mistakes.
261 The presence of an effective personal safety management system does not ensure
the presence of an effective process safety management system.
The Report of the BP US
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel
(the ‘Baker Panel report’), following the Texas City
refinery explosion in 2005, found that personal injury rates were not predictive of process safety
performance at five US refineries.




