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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

134

4 - Analysis of Competitive Pricing with Multiple Overlapping

Competing Bids in Revenue Management

Goutam Dutta, Professor, Indian Institute of Management, Wing

3, PMQ Area, Roon No 3H, Old Campus, Ahmedabad, 380015,

goutam@iimahd.ernet.in

, Sumeetha Natesan

We analyze the competitive pricing situation of one company with more than one

competitor. Based on the past experience one can have some idea about what the

competitors will bid which can be described by various distributions. The prices of

company and its competitors follow independent, overlapping uniform

distribution. First we derive expression for probability of win and then, we

attempt to derive conditions for maximizing the expected contribution to profit.

5 - Data Science, Operations Research, Analytics and

Revenue Management

Jon Higbie, Managing Partner & Chief Scientist, Revenue

Analytics, 3100 Cumberland Blvd., Suite 1000, Atlanta, GA,

30339, United States of America,

jhigbie@revenueanalytics.com

The term Data Science and the job title Data Scientist are much in vogue right

now. How does Data Science relate to Operations Research? What lessons might

we learn about the past boom in Operations Research that can be applied to the

current boom in Analytics? How is the increased emphasis on Business Analytics

impacting Revenue Management? These questions will be explored through a

series of case studies, and discussion.

SD44

44-Room 103B, CC

Algorithmic Revenue Management with

Strategic Customers

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Vivek Farias, Associate Professor, MIT, 100 Main Street,

Cambridge, United States of America,

vivekf@mit.edu

Co-Chair: Yiwei Chen,

ywchen@ckgsb.edu.cn

1 - Analysis of Discrete Choice Models: A Welfare-Based Framework

Guiyun Feng, University of Minnesota, 1006 27th Avenue SE,,

Minneapolis, MN, 55414, United States of America,

fengx421@umn.edu

, Zizhuo Wang, Xiaobo Li

We propose a framework for discrete choice models through a welfare function.

The framework provides a new way of constructing choice models. It also

provides great analysis convenience for establishing connections among existing

choice models. We define a new property in choice models:

substitutability/complementarity and study conditions for a choice model to be

substitutable. We show that our framework is flexible in this property, which is

desirable in capturing practical choice patterns.

2 - Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers

Yiwei Chen, Assistant Professor, Renmin University of China, No.

59 Zhongguancun Street, Beijing, China,

chenyiwei@rbs.org.cn

,

Vivek Farias

We consider the canonical revenue management problem that a seller sells finite

number of a product over a finite horizon via dynamic pricing. We assume that

customers are forward looking with heterogeneous strategic factors (time

discount rates and monitoring costs). We propose a class of pricing policies that

achieve at least 29% of revenue under an optimal dynamic mechanism. Our

policies require no knowledge of customers’ strategic factors and ensure

customers to behave myopically.

3 - Managing Multi-period Production Systems with Limited

Process Flexibility

Yehua Wei, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100

Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, United States of America,

yehua.wei@duke.edu,

Cong Shi, Yuan Zhong

We develop a theory for the design of process flexibility in a multi-period

production system. We propose and formalize a notion of “effective chaining”

termed the Generalized Chaining Condition (GCC). We show that any partial

flexibility structure that satisfies GCC is near-optimal under a class of policies

called the Max-Weight policies. Furthermore, we show that GCC can be satisfied

using just k arcs, where k is the equal to the number of products plus the number

of plants.

4 - Optimal Dynamic Pricing with Patient Customers

Yan Liu, University of Minnesota, Room L123, ME Building, 111

Church ST, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, United States of America,

liux0984@umn.edu,

William Cooper

We consider a single-product pricing problem in which a fraction of customers is

patient and the remaining fraction is myopic. A patient customer will wait up to

some fixed number of time periods for the price to fall below his valuation, at

which point the customer will make a purchase. If the price does not fall below a

patient customer’s valuation at any time during those periods, then the customer

will leave without buying. We identify the structure of an optimal pricing policy.

SD45

45-Room 103C, CC

Pricing — Examples of Collaboration Between

Academia and Industry

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Georgia Perakis, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,

MA, 02139, United States of America,

georgiap@mit.edu

1 - Balancing Profit Maximization and Inventory for Recommending

Personalized Bundles

Anna Papush, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA,

United States of America,

apapush@mit.edu,

Georgia Perakis,

Pavithra Harsha

Market forecasts show that e-commerce stands to ultimately inherit a significant

proportion of the retail market. Gaining a competitive edge in this sector is of

utmost importance to any firm’s success. The model presented in this work

guarantees customer satisfaction by providing relevant recommendations at

personalized prices in a way that balances profit maximization with business

operations. We demonstrate its value on actual e-tailer data.

2 - Pricing for a Satellite Service Provider

Charles Thraves, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA,

02139, United States of America,

thraves@mit.edu

,

Georgia Perakis

We present a pricing optimization formulation of the data plans of a satellite

service provider. First, to estimate reservation prices for all customers (including

unobserved customers) we deal with the missing data problem. We introduce a

MIP formulation and develop properties and heuristics for the problem. We

develop analytical bounds for our heuristics and conclude that they can help the

company increase its profits by more than 10%.

3 - Scheduling Promotion Vehicles to Boost Profits

Lennart Baardman, MIT, Operations Research Center, Cambridge,

MA, 02139, United States of America,

baardman@mit.edu,

Kiran

Panchamgam, Danny Segev, Georgia Perakis, Maxime Cohen

Retailers use promotion vehicles (e.g. flyers, commercials) to increase profits. We

model how to assign promotion vehicles to maximize profits as an NLIP. The

problem is NP-hard and even hard to approximate. However, we construct an

epsilon-approximation in the form of an IP of polynomial size. Also, we propose a

greedy algorithm with a provable guarantee and on average near-optimal

performance. Finally, using supermarket data we show that our model can lead to

a significant increase in profits.

4 - Dynamic Pricing through Combinatorial Methods

Jeremy Kalas, MIT, Cambridge, United States of America,

jkalas@mit.edu,

Swati Gupta, Kiran Panchamgam,

Georgia Perakis, Maxime Cohen

We explore fast combinatorial methods for the multi-period, multi-item

Promotion Optimization Problem under general demand functions that depend

on past prices. As the problem is NP-hard for large memory, we consider an

approximation via the reference price model, and give a PTAS. We extend this

model to handle cross-item effects using a ``virtual” reference price. We report a

projected 4-6% increase in profits on real-world data sets, in collaboration with

the Oracle Retail Science group.

SD46

46-Room 104A, CC

Empirical Operations Management: Services

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Robert Bray,

robertlbray@gmail.com

1 - Free Riding and Auto Recalls: An Asymmetric Dynamic Discrete

Choice Game

Ahmet Colak, Northwestern University, 1116 W Loyola Ave

Apt 3S, Chicago, IL, 60626, United States of America, a-

colak@kellogg.northwestern.edu

, Robert Bray

We structurally study auto recalls. Two agents can initiate a recall: the

manufacturer and the federal regulator. Initiating recalls is an entry game with

optimal stopping. We unexpectedly find that the regulator has no deterrence

power over the manufacturer, and that the two agents free ride off each other’s

recall efforts. Free riding decreases the regulator’s and manufacturer’s median

recall probabilities by 2.9% and 0.7% respectively, and increases society’s

exposure to defective parts.

SD44