Informs 2015

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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015
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2 - Increasing the Quality of Agricultural Produce in
Developing Countries
Andre Calmon, Assistant Professor, INSEAD, Boulevard de
Constance, Fontainebleau, 77300, France,
, Sameer Hasija
We introduce and analyze a model to capture the interaction between farmers
and retailers in agricultural supply chains that are common in the developing
world. Namely, we discuss the problem of a retailer that sources perishable goods
from small farmers. The quality of a crop depends on the effort that the farmer
exerts and this effort is non-contractable. This problem emerged from a
collaboration with a large supermarket chain that has operations in Asia.
3 - Cooperative Approaches to Managing Supplier Quality:
Joint Auditing and Information Sharing
Xin Fang, Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University,
50 Stamford Road, #05-01, Singapore, 178899, Singapore,
, Soo-Haeng Cho
Product safety incidents in recent years have compelled manufacturers to rethink
approaches to manage product quality of their suppliers. We investigate two
cooperative approaches: auditing common suppliers jointly (“joint auditing”) and
sharing independently collected information with other manufacturers
(“information sharing”). Our analysis reveals that, while competing
manufacturers may voluntarily cooperate with each other, such cooperation does
not necessarily improve product safety.
4 - Managing a Responsible Supply Chain under Threat of
Public Disclosure
Saed Alizamir, Assistant Professor, Yale University, 165 Whitney
Ave, New Haven, CT, 06511, United States of America,
, Sang Kim
We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a downstream supply chain
member (“buyer”) is penalized disproportionately due to a compliance violation
by an upstream member (“supplier”). Buyer’s ability to audit the supplier is
limited, and she faces a risk of being publicly blamed after the supplier’s violation
is caught by a third party. Supplier exerts effort to enhance compliance in each
period, but risks having his relationship terminated due to a stochastic compliance
outcome.
SB49
49-Room 105B, CC
Understanding and Managing Risk in Extended
Supply Chains
Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Supply Chain
Sponsored Session
Chair: Robert Swinney, Associate Professor, Duke University,
100 Fuqua Dr, Durham, NC, 27708, United States of America,
1 - Disruption Cascades and Risk Mitigation in Supply Chains
Shyam Mohan, London Business School, London, NW14SA,
United Kingdom, Nitin Bakshi
Disasters such as the Tohuku earthquake in Japan and Thai floods in 2011 serve
as a reminder about the extent to which a supply chain is vulnerable to
disruptions. The resulting losses arise not only through direct damage but also
from disruptions to suppliers belonging to adjacent tiers. As per a recent study,
nearly 40% of the disruptions originate in tier 2 and beyond. In this paper, we
study the relationship between network structure and disruption cascades in
supply chain networks.
2 - Contracting for Shared Value: Efficiencies from Endogenous
Process Yield
Joann De Zegher, PhD Candidate, Stanford University,
473 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA, United States of America,
Dan Iancu, Hau Lee
We focus on agricultural value chains where farmers have an opportunity to
create value through the adoption of a new management practice, but the
economic benefit is either too small for the farmers or accrues primarily to other
parties in the supply chain. In a setting with uncertain and endogenous process
yield, we study two components of supply chain design – namely contracts and
sourcing channels – as possible mechanisms for creating shared value in
decentralized value chains.
3 - Risky Suppliers or Risky Supply Chains?
Yixin Iris Wang, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan,
701 Tappan Street R3410, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109, United States of
America, , Ravi Anupindi, Jun Li
The goal of this research is to assess interdependency of risks in supply network
and to understand the process of risk aggregation using firm-level supplier
relationship data. We concentrate on the impact of tier-2 overlapping. Our
research aims to help firms manage risks more efficiently and acknowledge sub-
tier importance.
4 - Supply Chain Disruptions: Evidence from the Great East Japan
Earthquake
Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Columbia Business School, 3022
Broadway, Uris Hall 418, New York, NY, 10023, United States of
America, , Vasco Carvalho, Makoto Nirei,
Yukiko Saito
This paper examines whether propagation of idiosyncratic, firm-level shocks
through input-output linkages can lead to sizable fluctuations at the aggregate
level. Using a large-scale dataset on supply chain linkages among Japanese firms
together with information on firm-level exposures to a large, but localized,
natural-disaster (the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011) we quantify the
earthquake’s impact on firms that were (directly or indirectly) linked to affected
firms.
SB50
50-Room 106A, CC
Designing Dynamic Markets
Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Sponsored Session
Chair: Kostas Bimpikis, Stanford GSB, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA,
94305, United States of America,
1 - Auctions for Assortments of Differentiated Products:
Design and Applications
Daniela Saban, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford,
CA, United States of America, Gabriel
Weintraub
We study the problem of a procurement agency using an auction to construct an
assortment of differentiated products, to satisfy the demand from heterogeneous
customers. This setting arises in “framework agreements” (FAs), commonly used
in public procurement. Using mechanism design and auction theory, we propose
recommendations to improve the design of FAs. We apply our results to the FAs
run by the Chilean government to buy US$2 billion worth of goods per year.
2 - Mean Field Equilibria in Competitive Exploration
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Assistant Professor, School of Operations
Research and Information Engineering, Cornell University,
225 Rhodes Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14853, United States of America,
, Pu Yang, Peter Frazier
We study a dynamic setting where multiple agents each explore a set of locations.
Each location receives stochastic rewards over time, which is shared among all
agents at that location. Based on the location’s reward level and the number of
other agents at that location, each agent decides whether to stay or switch to a
new location. We study the equilibrium behavior as the number of agents and
locations increase proportionally, and investigate the effect of information
sharing.
3 - Designing Dynamic Contests
Shayan Ehsani, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford,
CA, 94305, United States of America,
Mohamed Mostagir, Kostas Bimpikis
Tournaments are best suited for projects that feature a high degree of uncertainty.
Information about the status of competition leads to an interesting tradeoff:
participants learn about the underlying state from their competitors’ progress but
on the other hand their incentive to exert effort may weaken if they are lagging
behind. We characterize the design that maximizes the (discounted) payoff for the
principal and discuss its implications.
4 - Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers
under Non-commitment
Santiago Balseiro, Assistant Professor, Duke University,
100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, United States of America,
, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Weintraub
We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a firm repeatedly selling
items to budget-constrained buyers when the seller has no commitment power.
We argue that this problem is generally intractable. Thus motivated we introduce
a fluid model that allows for a tractable characterization of the optimal
mechanism. We leverage our characterization to provide insights into the
dynamic structure of the optimal mechanism and show that the proposed
mechanism is a good approximation in large markets.
SB49