Background Image
Previous Page  82 / 552 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 82 / 552 Next Page
Page Background

INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

80

SB43

43-Room 103A, CC

New Directions in Revenue Management

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Dan Iancu, Assistant Professor, Stanford University, 655 Knight

Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, United States of America,

daniancu@stanford.edu

Co-Chair: Omar Besbes, Professor, Columbia University, Graduate

School of Business, New York, NY, 10027, United States of America,

ob2105@columbia.edu

Co-Chair: Nikolaos Trichakis, HBS,

ntrichakis@hbs.edu

1 - Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Consumers with

Stochastically Changing Valuations

Ying Liu, Stern School of Business, New York University,

44 West 4th Street, KMC 8-154, New York, NY, 10012,

United States of America,

yliu2@stern.nyu.edu

, Rene Caldentey,

Guillermo Gallego

Motivated by Revenue Management applications, we consider a firm selling a

finite inventory of a perishable product to a population of price sensitive

customers. We consider the case in which consumers’ valuation for the product is

not static but rather changes stochastically over time after they purchase the item.

The firm can take advantage of this feature to buy back some units and resell

them to new arrivals. We investigate the structure of an optimal buy/sell dynamic

pricing strategy.

2 - Financing Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty

Francis De Vericourt, Professor, ESMT, Schlossplatz 1, Berlin,

101178, Germany,

devericourt@esmt.org

, Denis Gromb

We consider the capacity choice problem of a firm whose access to external capital

markets is hampered by moral hazard. The firm must therefore not only calibrate

its capacity investment, but also optimize its sourcing of funds. We find that when

higher demand realizations are more indicative of high effort, debt financing is

optimal. In this case, the optimal capacity is never below the efficient capacity

level but sometimes strictly above that level.

3 - Points for Peanuts or Peanuts for Points: Dynamic Management

of Loyalty Programs

So Yeon Chun, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown

University, 3700 O St. NW, Washington, DC, United States of

America,

sc1286@georgetown.edu

, Nikolaos Trichakis, Dan Iancu

We study the problem of dynamically managing a loyalty program. While

originally viewed as marketing efforts, in the last two decades loyalty programs

have grown substantially in size and scope, to the extent that they now often

significantly interact with other firm functions, including operations, accounting

and finance. We develop a dynamic programming model to study the problem of

optimally setting prices and point requirements.

4 - Dynamic Pricing under Convex Incentives

Dan Iancu, Assistant Professor, Stanford University, 655 Knight

Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, United States of America,

daniancu@stanford.edu

, Omar Besbes, Nikolaos Trichakis

We discuss optimal dynamic pricing policies when certain convex incentives

govern the terminal payoffs. These could arise in a multitude of settings, including

debt financing or sales incentives.

SB44

44-Room 103B, CC

Models of Customer Behavior

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Xuanming Su, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,

Philadelphia, United States of America,

xuanming@wharton.upenn.edu

Co-Chair: Jaelynn Oh, The University of Utah , 1655 East Campus

Center Drive , Spencer Fox Eccles Business Building, Salt Lake City UT,

jaelynn.oh@business.utah.edu

1 - Mass Customization, Externalities, and Guardrail Products: ìYou

Can’t be all Things to all Peopleî

Eren Cil, University of Oregon, 1585 East 13th Avenue,

Eugene, OR, United States of America,

erencil@uoregon.edu

,

Michael Pangburn

Firms employ mass customization to closely match customers’ taste with the

delivered product. We additionally consider the brand-level issue of mismatch

between customers’ tastes and the firm’s full range of products. We show that

such a brand-level mismatch limits the usage of mass customization, even when

costless to the firm, and makes the firm employ differential pricing.

2 - Cannibalization in Secondary Markets

Wedad Elmaghraby, Associate Professor, University of Maryland,

University of Maryland, 4311 Van Munching Hall, College Park,

MD, 20742, United States of America,

welmaghr@rhsmith.umd.edu

We present results from a field experiment conducted on the platform of a leading

business-to-business wholesale liquidators. By manipulating starting prices for

auctions of iPads, we explore the presence of cannibalization and reference price

effects in these online markets.

3 - Advance Selling with Reservations: Optimal Pricing and

Overbooking Strategies

Jaelynn Oh,

jaelynn.oh@business.utah.edu,

Xuanming Su

Customers who make reservations in advance are guaranteed service when they

show up. We study whether and how firms should charge for reservations and

relate our results to advance selling strategies.

4 - Trade-in Remanufacturing, Strategic Customer Behavior, and

Government Subsidies

Renyu Zhang, Doctoral Student, Olin Business School,

Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1133,, 1

Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO, 63130, United States of America,

renyu.zhang@wustl.edu

, Fuqiang Zhang

We study the impact of remanufacturing under strategic customer behavior and

government subsidies. We find that trade-in remanufacturing can serve as an

effective mechanism to mitigate strategic customer behavior, and that the

adoption of remanufacturing and the government subsidies for remanufactured

products may not lead to an environmentally better outcome. We also

characterize the government subsidy/tax scheme that can induce the socially

optimal outcome.

SB45

45-Room 103C, CC

Retail Pricing

Sponsor: Revenue Management and Pricing

Sponsored Session

Chair: Goker Aydin, Indiana University, 1309 East Tenth Street,

Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States of America,

ayding@indiana.edu

1 - Group Buying under Consumer’s Uncertainty

Victor Araman, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon,

va03@aub.edu.lb

, Skander Esseghaier

We develop a model of group buying under consumer uncertainty where a

consumers’ decision to acquire information and decision to share the acquired

information is endogenously determined as a result of a game between these

consumers. We determine the optimal group buying strategies and show that

when there is sufficient heterogeneity across consumers with respect to their cost

of information search and acquisition, group buying dominates the more

traditional individual selling strategy.

2 - Online Inventory Disclosure: Consumer Uncertainty

and Experience

Tolga Aydinliyim, Baruch College, One Bernard Baruch Way,

Dept of Management Box B9-240, New York, United States of

America,

Tolga.Aydinliyim@baruch.cuny.edu,

Michael Pangburn,

Elliot Rabinovich

Given varied consumer perceptions of inventory information, online retailers’

presentation of such information influences purchase behavior. We investigate

optimal inventory disclosure policies assuming two distinct consumer segments:

savvy consumers who can predict a retailer’s stock levels (even when masked)

and naïve consumers who rely on priori (stochastic) beliefs regarding inventory.

3 - Better Late than Now: Delayed vs. Instantaneous Retail

Price Discounts

Monire Jalili, University of Oregon, 1208 University of Oregon,

Eugene, United States of America,

mjalili@uoregon.edu

,

Michael Pangburn

Retailers commonly offer a percent off a purchase and apply it either immediately

or toward a future purchase. Permitting rational, forward-looking consumers, we

prove that delayed discounting can improve profitability if the market is

heterogeneous.

SB43