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12

Fund Family Shareholder Association

www.adviseronline.com

over time. But to paraphrase Livermore,

it wasn’t my trading that created the

long-term track record you see, but

my buying and sitting, with top-notch

managers doing the heavy lifting. In

words longtime FFSA members will

surely be familiar with, I believe in

buying the manager, not the fund. This

isn’t to say I don’t make trades in the

portfolios (I have), or that I won’t in

the future (I will), but it isn’t trading

that’s carried the day.

Another way to think of sitting rath-

er than trading is to go with a base-

ball metaphor. Rather than swinging at

every ball that comes across the plate, I

wait for the right pitch. Warren Buffett

has described investing as playing base-

ball without a called strike. In his anal-

ogy, stock prices are like pitches, and

you can let them pass you by all day,

every day without being called out—

you can wait for your perfect pitch.

While Buffett was talking about indi-

vidual stocks and individual companies,

you can certainly apply the lesson to

investing with mutual fund managers. No

one says you have to buy every manager

out there, and you certainly wouldn’t

want to. You and I can be selective and

wait for the right manager to come along

before investing. (Vanguard seems to

take a different tack, putting more and

more managers onto many of its funds,

diluting the best ideas with globs of bad

ones and, for the most part, striking out.

Maybe the firm should think about sit-

ting still and taking fewer swings.)

Partnering with a few select manag-

ers and then having the discipline to

sit on our hands and spend time in the

markets has been a successful strategy

for you and me in the long run. It is a

formula I’ll continue to follow.

Before delving into those managers

and funds that I expect will continue

to deliver for all of us, let me say right

up front that many of the funds in the

Models

(as well as the alternatives that

I’ll mention below) make up the bulk

of my investable net worth—I defi-

nitely eat my own cooking. Jeff is also

invested in these funds and with these

managers. He eats the cooking as well.

FOCUS

FROM PAGE 1

>

And we are quite satisfied with the

meals we’ve prepared.

Additionally, I should note that ever

since this newsletter’s first issue in

January 1991, I’ve kept my

Model

picks

focused exclusively on Vanguard’s

funds. While I’ve offered alternatives,

the

Models

remain Vanguard-only. And

when a fund has closed, I’ve kept it in

the

Models

that already owned it, but

haven’t added it to any of the others if

you, the Vanguard investor, couldn’t fol-

low that lead. Yes, I would prefer to put

the

PRIMECAP Odyssey

funds into my

Models

, but I haven’t, because I know

many of you want all Vanguard, all the

time. So be it. Let’s go over the funds

and managers that make up the

Models

.

Capital Opportunity

The last time I wrote a

Model

Portfolio Funds Focus

in October

2012,

Capital Opportunity

was com-

ing off a tough stretch, returning 8.4%

a year over the prior three years, lag-

ging behind

500 Index

’s 13.1% annual

return. My advice at the time: “I do not

believe the PRIMECAP Management

team has lost its mojo…If you already

own Capital Opportunity and your port-

folio is underweight large-cap growth

stocks, I’d look to add to this position,

knowing that the PRIMECAP team has

consistently followed periods of under-

performance with periods of strong

outperformance.”

Well, I hope you followed that

advice, as Capital Opportunity returned

78.3% versus 500 Index’s gain of

49.9% from the end of September 2012

through the end of 2014.

The PRIMECAP Management team

is among the best in the business—not

just in Vanguard’s stable. As I’ve dis-

cussed in the past, all managers—lousy,

mediocre and great alike—underper-

form at some point. Fortunately, the

PRIMECAP team’s periods of outperfor-

mance have more than made up for the

inevitable periods of underperformance.

The PRIMECAP team practices

growth-at-a-reasonable-price, or GARP,

investing. The managers search for tri-

ple-play companies that can grow earn-

ings at a better-than-market rate, can be

more profitable, and can be purchased

at the right price. Unlike most growth

managers, they refuse to pay high prices

for those companies’ stocks. So they

wait. Also unlike other growth managers

who constantly turn over their portfolios

looking for growth, the PRIMECAP

team is patient, often holding stocks

for years and years. The team is fairly

unique, as each manager takes a slice

of the portfolio and invests as he sees

fit. Though there is no collaboration on

holdings, per se, several managers may

find value in the same stocks.

The resulting portfolio often looks

nothing like the broad stock market.

Capital Opportunity typically holds 130

stocks or so, with the top 10 positions

soaking up about a third of assets.

Health care and technology play a

big role—combined, the two sectors

account for two-thirds of the portfo-

lio. Clearly the PRIMECAP managers

invest with conviction.

My only real disappointment with

Capital Opportunity is that it has out-

grown its original objective. What was

once a standout fund investing in small

to mid-sized companies is now a solid

fund investing in mid-sized and large

companies.

I have long advocated that inves-

tors switch to the private-label

Odyssey

funds. However,

PRIMECAP Odyssey

Aggressive Growth

(POAGX)—the

Model Portfolios Over Two Decades and Counting

5-year

10-year

20-year Since Inception

Growth Model

91.7% (13.9%)

130.5% (8.7%) 893.6% (12.2%) 1,479.8% (12.2%)

Conservative Growth Model

85.3% (13.1%) 117.02% (8.1%) 601.7% (10.2%) 993.2% (10.5%)

Income Model

71.6% (11.4%)

93.6% (6.8%)

451.5% (8.9%)

684.4% (9.0%)

Growth Index Model*

96.7% (14.5%)

126.9% (8.5%)

— 556.0% (9.9%)

500 Index

103.6% (15.3%)

107.1% (7.6%)

543.1% (9.8%) 899.7% (10.1%)

Total Bond Market

23.1% (4.2%)

56.4% (4.6%)

220.0% (6.0%)

321.8% (6.2%)

Note: Table shows cumulative and annualized (in parentheses) total returns over the periods listed through 12/31/14. I’ve compared returns to

500 Index rather than Total Stock Market since the latter did not exist at the time of the

Models

’ 1991 inception. *

Model

inception 3/95.