CYIL 2015

252 / 464

238
RALPH JANIK CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ
of a potential hierarchy between the just cause of democratization and the protection
of civilians did not arise as a matter of principle but as one of Realpolitik.
7. Conclusion
In light of the existence of countless states where violent solutions to the huge
gap between its populations and their respective governments seem all too likely,77
the interrelation between using force in the name of human rights and forcible
democratization will occupy international relations for a long while. So far, the
UN Charter is often presented as being inadequate to address the various challenges
arising out of the aspirations of peoples to free themselves from oppressive rulers,
especially since the Security Council itself is composed by two non-democratic states.
For this reason, many democracies question its role as the sole, exclusive and supreme
authority when it comes to the use of force. Instead, the discussions surrounding the
use of force show these states, in particular the US, are ever more ready to proceed on
the basis of their own assumptions.78
On the one hand, democratic and powerful states see themselves at the forefront
of new developments required by the changed circumstances in a world freed
from the yoke of the Cold War. Basically, the older notions of pluralism have been
transplanted from the inter-state level to the domestic sphere, where states may
be culturally and politically heterogeneous for as long as the arising conflicts
are dealt with by democratic means. Just war theory serves as the doctrinal tool
for establishing this particular kind of public order. Since justice knows no borders,
every non-democratic government is a potential target. For this very reason, weaker
and non-democratic states, or, rather, their governments, generally lay their hopes on
the traditional understanding of international law. They contest the assumption that
governmental legitimacy may only derive from the popular will as expressed through
polls and political parties and uphold the importance of international order while
further emphasizing the potentially destabilizing effects of democratic transition.
For the moment, none of these views prevails, and although the assumption that
the international system is at a crossroads 79 is probably overstating facts and putting
too much emphasis on the exceptional cases, it does seem clear, however, that states and
revolutionary movements are well-advised to present themselves as democratic.
77 Kalevi J Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (CUP, 1996).
78 See e.g.
79 Roth (supra n 66), 48.