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PAVEL BUREŠ
CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ
can be only one conception of human dignity. If there are other ones, this means
either they are not the right ones, or they are not complete ones.
37
The concept of human dignity can evolve over time, and it certainly has evolved
throughout history. However, there is one fundamental element of human dignity
– freedom. “There is an unbreakable link between human freedom and human
dignity”.
38
However, this freedom is not attached exclusively to individuals (in their
existence with respect to State power), but to humanity, where every single person is a
part of it. Von Geusau contends that dignity belongs to humanity and is inseparable
from it.
39
If there is a rupture between freedom and truth, it undermines society
itself.
40
Human dignity is a
substance
formed simultaneously by individual human liberty
and the liberty of humanity (an over-all understanding of the human person).
41
It
means that human beings are (by and through their existence) in relation to other
human beings (and to humanity in its entirety) and are influencing (affecting and
shaping) other human beings (and humanity) there. Spaemann contends that all of
us are exploiting others as a means to reach other purposes. Nobody is in the system
only
as a means without being a purpose for itself.
42
Thus human dignity has to be understood in this over-all perception. To comprehend
human dignity (and so human liberty) only as an opposition to State power would
impair and deteriorate the concept and the substance of human dignity in its over-
all perception. The existence of State power, representing the society (and thus
humanity) in the concept of human dignity is very essential.
43
Then this understanding of human dignity should play a big (though not even
the biggest) role in human rights adjudication. This is valid not only for the “hard”
human rights (right to life, prohibition of torture, or slavery) but to other “soft”
human rights where there might be some limitation and interference of the State
power. Human dignity in this over-all perception reflects the specific elements and
issues of reproductive rights.
37
Having presented that, we do not want to usurpate the position of the only one and right one conception
of human dignity.
38
VON GEUSAU, Alting.,
op. cit.
p. 47.
39
Ibidem
, p. 46.
40
Ibidem
.
41
Clarke points out the Thomistic over-all perception of human being –
esse in substancia
and
esse in
relatio –
being in the sense of substance and in the sense of relation. CLARKE, W.Norris. Osoba a Bytí.
Krystal OP, Karmelitánské nakladatelství, 2007, 117 p.
42
SPAEMANN, Robert. Základní mravní pojmy a postoje. Nakladatelství Svoboda, Praha. 1995, p. 77-
78. Spaemann goes on in concluding: „It is why Kant contended that the person has not a value, but
dignity
. Every value has its proper quantity and can be included in a comparative calculation. Unlike
dignity, which is a characteristic.
43
In the right understanding of human dignity, society cannot limit the human liberty of individuals, but
society helps human liberty flourish.