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PAVEL BUREŠ
CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ
of the
human
person in general. One has to search what is still human
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in assessing
procreative rights. The role of human rights protection is definitely not to ensure
the happiness of particular human beings but the humanity of all human beings.
Even though this characteristic of human rights protection is understood rather in
the situation of massive or flagrant violations,
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it is a very natural element of
human
rights. As previously stipulated, a person is human not only
per
se, individually, but
also with respect to other persons, thus forming the
humanity
(humaneness, human
dignity) of all humanity. Human rights protection should lead to discovery of this
individual and over-all humaneness.
We will discuss, in the next part, how the European Court for Human Rights
assesses this over-all perception of human dignity in the matter of reproductive
(procreative) rights. We will try to answer a question of whether the jurisprudence
of the Court is converging rather towards this understanding of human dignity (and
procreative rights) or, unlike this, diverging from that perception through promotion
of “absolute” individual liberty.
4. Convergence or Divergence in the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights?
It is impossible to present here, in this article, a complete analysis of all (important)
cases relating to reproductive rights which were decided by the European Court of
Human Rights. So, we will limit our assessment to some (recent) cases to display the
direction the Court is heading. There is an assumption that the Court seeks to protect
human rights in their entirety, in their over-all perception, with respect to the concept
of human dignity in the sense of humaneness. Thus, its jurisprudence and reasoning
should correspond rather to a convergent movement to this over-all perception
rather than to divergence. However, it is difficult to ascertain totally the “movement”
of argumentation, as the Court plays a subsidiary role in human rights protection
in the European context produced by the mechanism of the Convention. States are
first to guarantee rights and freedoms promoted in the European Convention of
Human Rights and its protocols, which is even emphasized through the margin of
appreciation doctrine. However, the role the Court plays, thanks to authoritative
interpretation, is primordial. Its judgments may change national legislation of the
State – the respondent party to the case, and have great influence on other national
legislation of (almost) all Member States to the European Council.
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Spaemann clarifies that it would be an argumentation in a circle to contend that man should do only
those things he or she likes to do. As man is not delimited purely by instincts but is a being called to
search the limit of his or her doings with respect to humanity. See SPAEMANN, Robert. Základní
mravní pojmy a postoje. Nakladatelství Svoboda, Praha. 1995, p. 16. Individual liberty in its totality is
destructive. Liberty has to be cultivated in order to be liberty in itself.
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As international protection of human rights has arisen after all the atrocities perpetrated before and
during WW2.