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GAZETTE.

SEPTEMBER 1989

Compensation Fund held

liable to bank on basis of

fraudulent undertaking.

A Solicitor obtained an advance

from a bank by way of bridging

finance on the strength of an

undertaking presented to the bank

on the notepaper of the firm of

solicitors of which he was a partner

and apparently signed by the other

partner in that firm as had been

required by the Bank. It was

represented to the bank that a

property owned by M and his wife

was being sold and another

property being purchased by them.

No sale or purchase was con-

templated and M's wi fe was

unaware of the application to the

bank for the loan and did not sign

or authorize the signing of any

application. The signature of the

partner to the letter of undertaking

was forged by M and the partner

was unaware of the application for

the loan. The bank advanced

£60,000 by way of t wo drafts

payable to the firm and the monies

were lodged into the client account

of the firm. The monies which were

to be repaid to the bank in 6

months were not repaid though

some payments of interest were

made. M on investigation by the

Law Society was found to be in

default in relation to his client

account and was struck off the

Register of Solicitors. Section 21

(4) of the Solicitors (Amendment)

Act 1960 reads:-

" ( 4) Where it is proved to the

satisfaction of the Society that

any person has sustained loss in

consequence of dishonesty on

the part of any solicitor or any

clerk or servant of a solicitor in

connection wi th that solicitor's

practice as a solicitor or in

connection wi th any trust for

which that solicitor is a trustee,

then, subject to the provisions of

this Section, the Society shall

make a grant to that person out

of the Fund and the amount of

the grant shall be such as

represents in the opinion of the

Society full indemnity for that

loss".

The Law Society contended that

practice as a solicitor involved, as

an essential ingredient, the solicitor

or his firm having in respect of any

particular activity, a client on

whose behalf that activity is carried

out. It was urged that the firm did

not have any client since the

pretence that it was carrying out

conveyancing work in connection

with the sale and purchase of

houses was entirely false.

An alternative submission was

that on the true construction of the

sub section the phrase "any person"

at the commencement of it, in the

context of loss suffered in conse-

quence of dishonesty in connection

with the solicitor's practice as a

solicitor as distinct from loss suf-

fered in consequence of dishonesty

by a solicitor as trustee, should be

construed as being confined to a

client of the solicitor. Reliance was

placed on the provisions of Section

23 of the 1960 Act which provides

for the mak i ng of reciprocal

arrangements wi th Incorporated

Law Society of Northern Ireland

(referred to in the Section as " t he

Corresponding Soc i e t y " ). Sub

section 2 of Section 23 reads:-

" ( 2) Where a scheme operated

by the corresponding Society

requires corresponding practit-

ioners controlled by that Society

to contribute to any fund or

insurance policy or to take out

any insurance policy, for the

compensation or indemnification

of clients for or against losses

due to defalcations of such

practitioners or their agents or

servants"

The Society argued that the use

of the words "for the compensation

or indemnification of clients" must

be taken as having intended that

the scheme which it had created in

the provisions of Section 24 of the

1960 Act should also be a scheme

confined to the indemnification or

compensation of clients.

The bank contended that the

words contained in Section 21 (4)

were unambiguous and must be

given their .ordinary meaning

without reliance on any of the other

provisions of the Statute. They

further argued that the provisions

contained in Section 21 (4) of the

Act dealing wi th dishonesty of a

solicitor in connection wi th any

trusts of which that solicitor is a

trustee could not be interpreted as

confining the portion of the Section

dealing with dishonesty on the part

of a solicitor in connection with that

solicitor's practice as a solicitor to

cases where the claim was made

by a client because it was clearly

a necessary provision to provide for

dishonesty on the part of a solicitor

acting as a trustee though not in his

capacity as a solicitor. Secondly,

wi th regard to the provisions of

Section 23 it was submitted they

could not be interpreted as doing

anything more than providing for

t he special s i t ua t i on of t he

corresponding Society and of

solicitors wi th practising certifi-

cates from both the corresponding

Society and the Society and as

such could not lend any aid to the

interpretation of the sub section.

In the High Court Johnson J. in

his judgment stated:-

''Initially there is no doubt that

M's dishonesty was in his private

capacity and not in his capacity

as a solicitor. In this regard, his

initial interview wi th the Bank

and the request for credit for

himself and his wife for the sale

and purchase of a house was

dishonest, we know that there

was no such intention. However,

when the Bank requested the

undertaking from M at that time

M acted dishonestly by

(1) writing an undertaking on

behalf of M's firm the contents

of which he knew to be false

(2) forging the signature of his

partner which he also knew to

be dishonest.

This he did on behalf of his firm

of which he was a practising

partner, and, in my opinion, it

would be unrealistic to force an

interpretation on the facts in this

case other than that in perpe-

t r a t i ng the falsehoods and

dishonesties in this event that M

was acting and purported to act

and held himself out as acting as

the firm and what was done was

done in the name of his practice".

The Supreme Court came to the

conclusion that Johnson J. was

correct in the decision which he

had reached and the reasons by

which he had reached it. The Court

could see no warrant for seeking to

interpret the sub section concerned

by consideration of other provisions

in the Statute.

In its judgment the Supreme

327