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January, 1943]

The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland

35

SOLICITORS' COSTS—GROSS SUM.

General Order of 15th November, 1920.

Our attention lias been drawn to the

fact that the note in the December issue

of the Gazette on the English decision in

re

Nabarro (on the interpretation of the English

equivalent to the above Order) might suggest

without a careful perusal of the Order, that

the scope of the decision is wider than it is

in fact. The principle laid down in

re

Nabarro

in its application tc ihis country relates only

to the business specified in the Order, namely,

business the costs of which are regulated by

Clause 2 (c) of the General Order made under

the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881.

It

does not affect the principle operating in

regard to contentious business; or any non-

contentious business not covered by Clause

<.

2 (c).

It would appear that the remuneration

'/

for business not within Clause 2 (c) is still

governed by the limitation stated in Cordery,

and

that accordingly a client who has

received a bill of costs lor such business

for a gross sum may require it to be fur

nished in detail and taxed without the risk

of having to pay the excess should the

detailed bill tax to more than the gross sum.

LIABILITY OF SOLICITOR FOR HONEST

MISAPPLICATION OF TRUST FUNDS.

Solicitors acting for trustees will welcome

the decision, in Williams-Ashman

v.

Price &

Williams (1942)

1. Ch.219., in which the

Plaintiff, who was a beneficiary iinder a

trust, sought to make the Defendants, who

were Solicitors

for

a

deceased

trustee,

personally liable for an honest misapplication

of the trust funds on the instructions of their

client. The Plaintiff's argument was based

on

the

following passage

in Underbill's

" Trusts," 9th Edition, page 548—" Where

trust funds come into the custody and under

the control of a Solicitor, or indeed of any

one else, with notice of the trust, he can only

discharge himself of liability by showing

that the property was duly applied

in

accordance with the trusts." The Solicitor

defendants who, some years previously had

prepared, and still retained, the trust deed,

had forgotten

its existence, and on

the

trustee's instructions had received portion

of the trust monies and applied them for

purposes unauthorised by. the trust deed.

Bennett, J., held that although one of the

defendants had acted, perhaps, incautiously

none of them had inter-meddled by doing

acts characteristic of a trustee and outside

their duties as Agents in such a manner as

to become

trustees

de.

sow

tori,

and the

action failed.

COSTS OF SOLICITOR PRACTISING WITH-

OUT LICENCE.

Iri the case of Cooling

v.

the Minister for

Finance (as yet unreported)

the plaintiff

obtained judgment for damages with unascer

tained costs against

the defendant.

His

solicitor served the defendant with a bill of

costs and issued a summons to tax. After

the costs had been taxed and certified the

Defendant discovered that the Plaintiff's

Solicitor had not in force a practising Certifi

cate. He refused to pay the costs and by

consent the matter was brought before the

Court on Notice 'of Motion.

It was held by the President of the High

Court that an objection to the payment of

costs under Section 48 of the Solicitor's

(Ireland) Act, 1898, by a Defendant must be

made before

the

issuing of

the Taxing

Master's Certificate.

The case, he said,

turned on the meaning of the word " recover "

in Section 48 which was "recover in an

action ".

It was held that the certified costs

had merged in the judgment and that unless

the judgment was set aside it must be acted

upon.

It was too late at that stage to take

the objection.

It should be noted that the reasoning of

the decision, which was based on the merging

of the costs in the judgment already entered

in the action, is not applicable to the Taxation

of Costs by a client on a reqiiisition to tax

where there has not been previous judgment

for the costs.

Furthermore, in Cooling's case it would

appear that the judgment for the damages

and costs was in favour of the client and that

the judgment did not decide whether the

Plaintiff's Solicitor would be entitled to

enforce payment to him by his client of the

costs so recovered if paid to the Plaintiff.

y '

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