Most other correspondents report that their professional
bodies will not become involved in a claim by a client
that a member has acted negligently unless the negli-
gence also amounts to professional misconduct. Many
of the complaints made to these bodies show that the
lawyer may have been negligent but that otherwise he
has acted with perfect professional propriety. The com-
plainant in such cases is left to his remedy in the Courts.
As to what might constitute negligence, it is generally
agreed that a substantial body of evidence by lawyers,
that in the conduct complained of the defendant lawyer
was following a well recognised practice, would norm-
ally be sufficient to entitle him to a verdict. However, in
some places where civil actions are tried by jury, a law-
yer sued for negligence would require almost over-
whelming evidence of that nature to secure a verdict.
This is probably a factor contributing to the high cost
of professional indemnity insurance.
Division 3: Limitation
The relevance of limitation provisions to the topic, is
perhaps, incidental. It does not lie in the very wide
range of limitation periods—from the Netherlands "No
specific time limit,
ergo
thirty years", and Scotland,
where the period is twenty years from the facts coming
to the pursuer's knowledge, to South Africa where the
period is one year from the act giving rise to the claim.
The question whether the cause of action is in contract
or in tort is of real importance in relation to periods of
limitation. In some countries different periods of limi-
tation apply to contract and tort. Switzerland, for
example has a ten years period in contract (ten years,
that is, from the breach) and in tort one year from
knowledge of the damage and of the person liable; but,
in any case within ten years of the negligent act.
Where the cause of action is in contract the period of
limitation, whatever it may be, generally runs from the
breach, with a special exception in the case of fraudu-
lent concealment by the lawyer of his negligence.
The interest which the question has for lawyers is
exemplified by a letter written to the N.S.W. Law
Society
Journal
by a Sydney solicitor asking "How long
should solicitors keep their files?" and pointing out that
in some cases an action against a solicitor in respect of
his negligence might be brought many years after the
act giving rise to the claim because the period of limita-
tion would begin to run from the damage. (A claim by
a client, being based on contract, would be limited in
New South Wales to a period of six years from the act
causing damage : the only possible exception, apart from
actions in tort such as might be brought against any
person, would be a claim based on the
Hedley Byrne
principle.)
An unusual limitation applies in the United Arab
Republic, whose Mr. K. Halim reports that "the law on
the legal profession stipulates that after five years a
client cannot claim any document or right from his law-
yer and the period of limitation runs only from the
termination of the relationship between the lawyer and
his client."
It is generally thought by correspondents that suffi-
cient protection is given to a client by the stipulation
(where it exists) that time does not run in the case of
fraudulent concealment by a lawyer of his negligence.
Presumably, "fraudulent concealment" would not be
confined to its literal meaning, with the ingredients of
deceit and dishonesty. Non-disclosure of a payment
made bv a third party for the plaintiff's benefit, within
the limitation period, was held in
Kitchen v Royal Air
Forces Association
18
to be such an extension of the
word "fraud" in Section 26b of the Limitation Act, 1939
However, I have found no authority to support
an extension of 'concealment by fraud" to non-dis-
closure by a lawyer of his knowledge, acquired within
the limitation period, that his client has a cause of
action against him for negligence. As distinct from the
'passive concealment" by non-disclosure, any "active
concealment", e.g. by persuading the client not to take
out of the lawyer's custody his documents which might
reveal the negligence, would probably be held to be
fraudulent. Some correspondents suggested special pro-
tection "where a fiduciary relationship exists i.e. if the
client is an infant, very elderly or illiterate" (infancy is
generally excluded from the period of limitation). In
Germany "the lawyer has to inform his client about the
negligent act or omission, otherwise the time for limi-
tation might not start to run."
The effect of fraud on limitation
It being one of the prime ethical requirements of the
lawyer's profession that he deal fairly with his client,
one might well ask whether the rule in Germany is not
closer to the professional ideal than the exception of
concealed fraud. The lawyer is sometimes in a position
of advantage vis-a-vis his client in the matter of his
negligence. With knowledge of the negligence having
occurred, he might also be aware of circumstances likely
to delay the client's discovery of the negligence—for
example if he were holding the client's documents and
without fraud, but by not informing his client of his
negligence, he could gain the benefit of the defence of
limitation. The answer to the suggestion that his client
ought to be informed by the lawyer of the negligence
and advised that he has a right of action against the
lawyer, can only be given simply where the lawyer is
insured. He is then bound by the terms of his policy to
inform his insurer as soon as he becomes aware of the
negligence and to make no disclosure of it to his client.
As to the uninsured lawyer, mere non-disclosure should
not bar the limitation defence, as it would be unreal to
postulate different standards of conduct for insured and
uninsured lawyers.
One feature of limitation particularly concerns the
lawyer holding a professional indemnity insurance policy
who retires from practice. If he neglects to continue an
adequate insurance during the period of limitation
following his retirement he risks the consequences of his
negligence within the period.
Since the law on limitation of action is a matter of
domestic policy for each country to determine, one can
merely express the view that unduly long periods of
limitation are undesirable and unreasonable and would
appear to be a proper subject for the law reformer's
attention. The general conclusions I have formed in
regard to limitation of action against a lawyer for his
professional negligence are :
(1) that the normal period of limitation should apply
to such actions;
(2) that time should run from the commission of the
act or from the omission which constitutes the negli-
gence ;
(3) that in the case of fraudulent concealment by a
lawyer from his client of the lawyer's negligence, time
should run from the date of the client's discovery of the
negligence;
(4) that, apart from the exception in (3), no special
protection in the matter of limitation ought to be given
to a client to compensate for the lawyer's position of
advantage.
75