

Some Aspects of Irish Constitutional
Reform
Colum Gavan-Duffy, M.A., LL.B. (Editor)
LECTURE DELIVERED TO THE IRISH ASSOCIATION OF JURISTS IN MAY 1968
PART 1
It is vital for lawyers and for laymen to understand that
the Constitution is the Fundamental Law of the Land
and that it supersedes all other laws. Furthermore, any
legislative enactment that contravenes the text of the
Constitution is to the extent of such contravention
unconstitutional (Article 15, Section 4, Subsection 2).
It is necessary to insist on this in view of the fact that
lawyers when they are arguing a case are very often
inclined to leave any argument based on Constitutional
Law as what might be termed a "final resort argument"
rather than to base their main argument on the alleged
unconstitutionality of a statutory provision. Only on the
18th November 1967 an experienced parliamentary
correspondent of an Irish newspaper wrote. "In my
own experience, nothing causes Deputies collectively
greater irritation than to be told that the Constitution
prevents them from doing this or that, or that the
Courts have pronounced an action of theirs to be repug-
nant to the Constitution. In this centre of power, it is
not pleasant to find that there is an overriding power
on fundamentals, and whether consciously or not, there
is a constant striving to ease off Constitutional hand-
cuffs. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to illus-
trate this. Efforts of the High Court and Supreme Court
to uphold the Constitution are seldom, if ever, men-
tioned, and apparent disregards of Constitutional restric-
tions by the Administration are not often pursued. To
mention such a matter to a Deputy is to risk a quick
change of subject, or an impatient wave of the hand."
This quotation hardly flatters the attitude of the average
legislator and of the average layman towards the Funda-
mental Law nor to the guardian of our Constitution—
the Supreme Court. Instead of respecting it, they are
quite prepared to override it if they think they can get
away with it. The fact that in 1937 twenty-three of
the eighty-three articles of the 1922 Constitution had
been deleted and no less than forty-three articles
amended, made it necessary to enact a new Constitution.
But no less than 31 per cent of the registered voters
abstained from voting one way or another on the plebi-
scite as to whether the new Constitution was to be
accepted in July 1937; this appears to have led to some
scepticism regarding various fundamental matters in the
Constitution. As a result of abstentions, this vital docu-
ment could only muster a majority of 39 per cent as
against a minority of 30 per cent opposing it. But this
result, repeated in Continental countries, such as France
and Italy, seems to show that the Constitutional Refer-
endum, which has been inserted as a compulsory method
of amending the Constitution by submitting it to the
people, requires mature voters. It can hardly be con-
tended that we have attained the political maturity of
the Swiss mountaineers who are used to voting in refer-
endums. Yet this maturity is, nonetheless, apparent, for
not only in 1959, but also in 1966, a large majority of
the people rejected the idea that the electoral system of
proportional representation by the single transferable
vote should henceforth be replaced by single member
constituencies.
The Constitution Committee
When the late Taoiseach, Mr. Lemass, announced in
August 1966 that a Parliamentary Committee had been
appointed to revise the Constitution, this did not arouse
the interest of Constitutional lawyers, as it was under-
stood in advance that this Committee would fail to
tackle any amendments that would not be desirable by
agreement among the political parties. From the
advance scoop in
The Cork Examiner,
followed by the
publication of the Committee Report in December 1967,
there is ample evidence to suggest that the labours of
this Parliamentary Committee have been unduly con-
fined to the electoral problem and some other minor
amendments have been thrown in for make-weight. In
order to excuse their inactivity, these parliamentarians
have speciously acknowledged that, if the people were
presented with too many separate Constitutional amend-
ments at any one time, they would get confused and
fail to understand them. Let us, however, remember
that if the Constitution could be altered by an ordinary
Act, no legislation passed by the Oireachtas could
subsequently be declared invalid.
Let us not consider how should the Constitution as
Fundamental Law be construed.
It seems to me that, in the words of Mr. Justice
Megarry, one should try to construe the Constitution so
as to produce a workable and just system even if this
puts some strain on the literal meaning of the Irish or
English words in the Constitutión. As Lord Denning
has said in
Henry v Taylor
(1954; IQB), if there is to be
a fair choice between a literal interpretation and a
reasonable interpretation, we should always choose the
reasonable interpretation. Neither the Constitution nor
Acts of Parliament have been drafted with divine pre-
science and perfect clarity, and we should not presume
to construe them in that way. As O'Byrne J. delivering
the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Sullivan v
Robinson
(1954, I.R., at p. 174) said: A Constitu-
tion is to be liberally construed so as to carry into effect
the intentions of the people as embodied therein.
As Lord Justice Slesser said in
The Art of Judgement:
Since the decay of the mediaeval reference to
eternal and natural laws, we have been driven
in England to rely upon the edicts of Parliaments and
in other countriesGovernment decrees are not to
be
nuestioned
in anv
Court of Justice,
the function of the
Judge being limited to the pedestrian task of finding
facts or endeavouring to assist jurists to find them
correctlv and to interpret laws. There appears to be
little doubt that, despite the lack of strict rules of
evidence, the French Conscil d'Etat tends to protect
the individual much more efficiently.
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