The Gazette 1971

If the President is charged with stated misbehaviour, he

should be tried by three High Court Judges in the

Central Criminal Court with an automatic appeal to

the full Supreme Court if he were convicted. Within

their criminal jurisdiction the Courts are well used to

dealing with any charge that could be preferred against

the President. Perhaps a jury of members of the

Oireachtas could be substituted for an ordinary jury.

It is submitted that it would be unsatisfactory for the

charge to be instigated by a two-thirds majority of one

of the Houses of the Oireachtas and for the other

House to hear the case, or even to have it submitted to

ad hoc

judicial tribunal.

(2) Article 15, Section 3—Functional Councils

In view of the manner in which the Report on Voca-

tional Organisation 1943 has been pigeonholed, it

would seem that this excellent idea is but a pious aspir-

ation and unlikely to be revived in the future. Article 19

providing for a possible Senate based on vocational

councils would appear to have been shelved also.

Article 18—The Senate

One need not stress the necessity of a second revising

Chamber as a check on hasty legislation. The purported

remarks of a former vice-chairman of the Labour Party

in which he endeavoured to enlist support for the

abolition of the Second House should be entirely dis-

counted as being exceptionally ill-informed. On the

whole, legislation is considered in a much more dispas-

sionate way in the Seanad and thus receives much more

careful treatment. Furthermore, the intellectual per-

sonnel of the Seanad is normally of a much higher

calibre than that of the Dáil.

Article 18 of the Constitution deals in detail with the

Seanad but it would be tedious to examine it in detail.

The following amendments are, however, suggested.

(a)

Article 18, Section 2.

In accordance with the

practice prevailing in most Second Chambers elsewhere,

it is suggested that only citizens over thirty years of age

should be eligible to become members of the Seanad,

as against the present practice of allowing eligibility at

twenty-one years of age. It is only an exceptional person

under thirty years of age who could absorb the intri-

cacies of legislation.

(b) Article 18, Section 4. At present, this Section sets

out in detail how University Senators are to be selected

by the National University of Ireland and by Trinity

College, Dublin, respectively. Apart from other changes

it would seem necessary to make provision in the

future for university representation from the two univer-

sities in Northern Ireland, namely Queen's University,

Belfast, and the new University of Ulster in Coleraine,

by arranging that the Taoiseach should automatically

nominate someone to represent them, particularly since

their representation in Stormont was abolished. In order

to achieve this, it would seem to be necessary to draft

an amendment somewhat on these lines: "Six shall

be elected by graduates of universities in Ireland residing

in Ireland in a manner to be determined by law".

Graduate electors to the Seanad should normally be

confined to graduates resident in Ireland, as it is unlikely

that graduates residing outside the country would be

expected to take an active interest in political and

social affairs here. It would be necessary to set up a

special register in each university of graduates residing

in Ireland, but this could be achieved. Some other

changes might be necessary, but doubtless agreement

could be reached. Let us hope that the view expressed

by the late Donough O'Malley that some seats in the

Seanad should automatically be reserved for literateurs

like Micheál Mac Liammóir and the late Patrick Kava-

nagh who would presumably be nominated by the

Taoiseach, will be followed.

Article 18, Section 6

Up to now, the so-called cricket team of eleven which

the Taoiseach has nominated has often consisted of

inconsequential party stooges, who have been as little

noted for their distinction as for their learning. It is

submitted that it would be preferable if the President

were to nominate these eleven members strictly from

specified listed categories to be determine by law,

dsuch as retired Judges and Justices, retired officers in

the higher echelons of the Army, the Garda, and of the

Civil Service, retired university professors, etc. Such

nominations would at least ensure that the persons

selected would have proper standards regardless of their

party political affiliations.

Article 18, Section 8—Seanad Sessions

It is submitted that as on the Continent, every session

of the Seanad should last for a definite period regardless

of any intervening Dáil dissolution, say three or four

years. This would ensure that the Seanad would be

more independent of the Dáil which, in view of the fact

that it can in theory only delay legislation for the very

limited stated period of ninety days and can only hold

up recommendations in the case of Money Bills for

twenty-one days, would not be a serious impediment to

the enactment of legislation. Owing to its present

composition normally a majority for the Government

is ensured and this delaying power has consequently in

fact hardly ever been exercised. There is consequently

no necessity of holding a Seanad election within three

months of a Dóil dissolution, as at present.

Article 18, Section 10

The panel system of election to the Seanad, should, as

regards the professional nominated members, be re-

placed by a direct election from a representative com-

mittee of each of their number, in order to ensure

expert representation in this Chamber. This can only be

achieved by radically amending the legislation electing

panel members to the Seanad.

Article 22, Section 2, Subsection 2—Committee of

Privileges for Money Bills

This refers to the cumbrous procedure whereby the

President is asked to refer the question whether a Bill is

or is not a Money Bill to a specified Committee of

Privileges. It would seem that this complicated proce-

dure is unnecessary because as far as is known, this

power has never been exercised under the present

Constitution, and it only arose once under the Consti-

tution of

1922.

Article 24—Temporary Emergency Legislation

As far as is known, the procedure set out so elaborately

in this Article providing in the first instance for a three

months emergency, and subsequently for an indefinite

emergency if renewed, has never in fact been availed of

in practice. Is it really necessary to retain it in view of

the fact that a national emergency still exists, at any

rate on paper, and is unlikely to be altered in the fore-

seeable future? It is therefore evident that until the

present permariCTif emergency legislation is amended, it

is more than sufficient to meet any situation that may

arise, and consequently this Article appears to be

unnecessary.

Article 27—Referendum Procedure of Ordinary Bills

A very elaborate cumbrous procedure has been provided,

which is so circumscribed by restrictions that it is most