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DALIBOR JÍLEK – JANA MICHALIČKOVÁ CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ
In case of a conflict, precedence was given to citizenship by birth. An individual
was allowed to enjoy Roman citizenship together with his particular citizenship. If
a man held double citizenship, personal law was decided by his or her particular
citizenship rather than by the Roman one. It might have happened that a person did
not hold any citizenship. If such a person retained his domicile, then this domicile
was applicable to personal law as a consideration.
In some instances it was not clear in which place a person had his domicile. The
reason for this conflict could have been an ambiguous intent or its expression. Or
a clear intent was declared but the permanent residence remained de facto unchanged.
In other instances a person communicated his intent only after settlement in
a new residence. Likewise, a conflict situation could have arisen when a man was
conducting his business in two places equally without expressing his intent overtly.
Imperial jurists indicated different viewpoints towards questions arising out of
the concept of domicile. According to Labeo a person could retain his domicile in
one place only. In turn, a person did not need to have any domicile. In the latter
case, the origo, city of his family, became the overriding legal relationship. In this
context Ulpianus reports the argumentation line of Celsus:
Celsus libro primo digestorum tractat, si quis instructus sit duobus locis aequaliter
neque hic quam illic minus frequenter commoretur: ubi domicilium habeat, ex
destinatione animi esse accipiendum. Ego dubito, si utrubique destinato sit animo,
an possit quis duobus locis domicilium habere. Et verum est habere, licet difficile
est: quemadmodum difficile est sine domicilio esse quemquam. Puto autem et hoc
procedere posse, si quis domicilio relicto naviget vel iter faciat, quaerens quo se
conferat atque ubi constituat: nam hunc puto sine domicilio esse.
Celsus, in the First Book of the Digest, discusses the point that, if anyone should
furnish two houses alike, which are situated in two different places, and does not live
in one any less than in the other, he must be considered to have his domicile where
he himself thinks that it is. I doubt whether by changing his mind from one place to
another anyone can be considered to have his domicile in two places. Still, this may
be true, although it is a difficult thing to decide, just as it is difficult to decide that
anyone can be without a domicile. I think, however (and this can be maintained as
correct), that if a man having left his domicile, takes a sea voyage, or travels by land,
seeking some place to sojourn for a time, he will be without any domicile.11
“Cosmopolitization” of the Roman Empire. RAPP, Claudia and DRAKE Harold Allen (eds.). The City
in the Classical and Post-Classical World. Changing Context of Power and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014, p. 132.
11 SCOTT, Samuel Parsons. The Civil Law. XI, Cincinnati, 1932, Tit. 1. Concerning municipal towns
and their inhabitants, URL = >.