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198

PAVEL BUREŠ

CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ

1. Introduction

The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (hereinafter “the Court”

or “ECtHR”) has established throughout its jurisprudence a principle of evolutive

interpretation.

2

It has stipulated that the European Convention on Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter “the Convention” or “ECHR”) is a ‘living

instrument

and thus has to be interpreted in ‘present-day conditions

.

3

It has opened

a clear way for the Court to react to societal changes in countries, State-Parties to

the Convention. For these purposes, the Court often has recourse to a comparative

technique examining the state of “common values” among members of the Council

of Europe. This process is commonly labelled as the concept of European consensus.

4

This paper questions the use of the concept of European consensus by the Court

for every kind of societal issue. We claim that there are issues subject to be changed

through societal changes, and for these issues the Court should resort to European

consensus as an appropriate technique of the interpretation of the Convention in the

evolutive approach. However, other issues relating to human nature itself should be

spared from this comparative technique. The technique itself forms one of the main

interpretative techniques used by the Court when applying the Convention. Franz

Matscher

5

has even put it in first position among methods of interpretation which

the ECtHR adheres to.

6

2

In this regard, Helgesen makes a clear distinction between evolutive and dynamic interpretation when

he specifies that the former is the Court’s answer to new facts and the latter the Court’s new answer

to the old facts. See HELGESEN, Jan Erik. What are the limits to the evolutive interpretation of the

European Convention on Human Rights? In

Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ)

, Vol. 31, No. 7-12

(2011), pp. 275-281.

3

ECtHR judgement in the case Tyrer v. United Kingdom, n° 5856/72, 28 April 1978.

4

A very deep study has been presented by WILDHABER, Luzius, HJARTARSTON, Arnaldur and

DONNELLY, Stephen, No consensus on consensus? The practice of the European Court of Human

Rights,

Human Rights Law Journal

, Vol. 33, N° 7-12, 2013. Moreover, the phenomenon has been

developed in detail by DZEHTSIAROU, Kanstantsin.

European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the

European Court of Human Rights

, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

5

MATSCHER, Fran. Les contraintes de l’interprétation juridictionnelle. In: Sudre, Fréderic.

L’interprétation de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme

, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998. Where

Matscher puts among methods of interpretation: evolutive interpretation, autonomous interpretation,

comparative interpretation, the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the principle of proportionality, the

principle of subsidiarity and reference to implied powers. (Cf. MATSCHER, Fr., op. cit

.,

pp. 22-39.

6

For general works on interpretation of the Convention cf. e.g. VILLIGER, Mark, E.

Commentary on

the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

, Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, 1057 p.,

or LETSAS, George.

A theory of interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights

, Oxford

University Press, 2007, 145 p.