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237

CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ

THE USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY…

allow greater collateral damages. However, the law does not support such leniency.

Human shields must be fully taken into account when considering the legality of

the strikes regarding the principle of proportionality.

Human shields cannot be fully disregarded from the proportionality considerations

as that would go against Article 51(8) of Additional Protocol I. Attempts to justify

it for the long term goals of stopping the use of human shields fail to realize that

the shielding of military targets is not the only advantage that civilian casualties can

offer. Further, there is no need to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary

human shields as a matter of law, since being a human shield cannot offer such

direct military advantage that it would result in the civilians directly participating

in the hostilities.

Similarly, the compromise model cannot be really thought of as a compromise.

It is merely just another way of giving leeway to militaries that cannot be justified by

the law of armed conflict. Civilians do lose protection offered to them by the principle

of proportionality if said principle would be relaxed to accommodate the needs of the

military in cases where human shields are being used. Such an approach finds no basis

in the law, which does not differentiate between different types of civilians.

In the end, despite its criticism for being too strict or inflexible, the human rights

model for human shields and the principle of proportionality correspond the most

with the law of armed conflict. Therefore, the human shields have no legal significance

to the proportionality principle. Otherwise the law would sacrifice civilian lives for

a twisted “fairness” doctrine over the conflicts, where stronger parties want more

leeway to enjoy their military advantage by sacrificing civilians. Such an approach

would not be consistent with the main aim of the law of armed conflict, to balance

humanitarian concerns with military necessity.

However, the debate is likely to continue as states see the human rights model

as too strict in contemporary conflicts where there is a massive increase of use of

human shields. However, if the model is indeed too strict, the change would be

better to come not from unilateral acts of states but from a unified update of the law

of armed conflict.