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EGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT INVOLVES THE
lending of one person’s property to another when the
lender (sometimes called the “entrustor”) should know
that the receiver (sometimes called the “entrustee”) is not quali-
fied to use that property,
Zedella v. Gibson
, 165 Ill.2d 181,186
(1995). In those circumstances, the law imposes a duty not just
to the entrustee but also to the entrustor and makes the entrustor
liable for the negligent acts of the entrustee,
DuBois v. Rose
, 217
Ill.App.3d 277, 283 (1991).
Introduction to Negligent Entrustment Law in Illinois
Illinois negligent entrustment law is taken from the general rule
of liability for negligent entrustment explained in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.
It is negligent to permit a third person to use a thing or to
engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor,
if the actor knows or should know that such person intends
to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such
a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others,
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965).
Comment (a) to Section 308, further explains negligent entrust-
ment. It says:
The words “
under the control of the actor
” are used to indicate
that the third person is entitled to use the thing or engage
in the activity only by the consent of the actor, and that
the actor has reason to believe that by withholding consent
he can prevent the third person form using the thing or
engaging in the activity, Restatement (Second) of Torts §
308 (1965).
Illinois courts have adopted these Restatement sections to form
the law of negligent entrustment,
Samuels v. Checker Taxi Co.
,
65 Ill.App.3d 63, 66-67 (1978). In its most basic form, courts
require an injured victim to prove two elements to successfully
state a claim against an entrustor. First, the plaintiff must show
there was an entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality,
Allstate
Ins. Co v. Panzica
, 162 Ill.App.3d 589, 592-93 (1987). Second,
the entrustment was to a person who was reckless or inexperienced
and that entrustment caused the injury to the plaintiff. The first
element is only about conduct, the second is about conduct and
the instrumentality entrusted.
Within the first element (the “conduct” element) there are two
sub-elements that must be proven to establish that a negligent
entrustment occurred. First, the injured party must prove that the
entrustor had a superior right to control over the item,
Zedella
,
165 Ill.2d at 187. Second, it must be shown that the entrustor
knew or should have known that the individual they lent the item
to was incompetent or unfit to use the item.
The first sub-element–superior right to control–is most often
established by proving ownership of the object lent. For example,
a car owned by one can be lent to another. This ownership gener-
ally establishes a superior right of control. Thus, the owner of the
car legally has a superior right of control if he lends it to a non-
owner. This alone can establish the requisite control for a negligent
entrustment action,
Zedella
, 165 Ill.2d at 187.
Once a superior right to control is established, it must then be
determined whether the entrustor knew, or should have known, of
the entrustee’s incompetence or inexperience in using the property,
Evans v. Shannon
, 201 Ill.2d 424, 434 (2002). This is established
by offering evidence of the entrustee’s lack of competence, skill, or
experience that should have put the entrustor on notice regarding
those problems,
Lulay v. Parvin
, 359 Ill.App.3d 653, 658 (2005).
Factors often examined include age, training, certifications (or lack
of them), and prior history using the item or similar items. If the
evidence suggests that the entrustor should have had knowledge of
the entrustee’s lack of competence, skill, or experience, along with
a showing that the entrustor had a superior right to control, then
the plaintiff has fully established the first element of her cause of
action for negligent entrustment.
After the various parts of control and knowledge are established,
the focus shifts to whether the recklessness or inexperience of the
individual entrusted with the dangerous instrument proximately
caused the plaintiff’s injury,
Evans,
201 Ill.2d at 434. This is done
by offering evidence of factual and legal causation. If a causal link
can be made between the plaintiff’s injury and the entrustee’s reck-
lessness or inexperience, then a full claim for negligent entrustment
has been made. Here, it is worth remembering that questions of
causation are almost always left for the jury,
Hamilton v. Fink
, 201
Ill.App.3d 81, 84 (1990).
Pleading Requirements
Because negligent entrustment is a form of negligence, practitioners
can employ the familiar pleading rules applied to all negligence
cases for negligent entrustment claims. Legally sufficient negligent
entrustment claims must provide facts to establish the elements and
sub-elements,
Teter v. Clemens
, 112 Ill.2d 252, 256 (1986). These
include allegations of a superior right of control, entrustment of a
dangerous instrumentality, incompetence of the entrustee, that the
entrustor knew or should have known of the incompetence, and
that an injury occurred as a proximate result of the entrustment
and incompetence.
How Much Evidence is Necessary?
In nearly every negligent entrustment case, the entrustor will
claim there was not “enough” evidence to establish that they knew
or should have known of the entrustee’s lack of competence or
inexperience with the dangerous article. Most lawyers and judges
wrongfully assume that the plaintiff must provide the court with
specific and concrete examples of the entrustee’s propensities for
harm with that particular instrumentality. This is not the law in
Illinois.
Plaintiffs in negligent entrustment cases do not need to provide
specific proof that the defendant “knew of specific individual pro-
pensities for harm”
Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting
Goods Co.
, 328 Ill.App.3d 482, 488 (2002). Rather, if the entrustor
knows the entrustment might result in harm, the cause of action
can stand,
Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am.
, 328 Ill.App.3d at 488.
CBA RECORD
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