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EGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT INVOLVES THE

lending of one person’s property to another when the

lender (sometimes called the “entrustor”) should know

that the receiver (sometimes called the “entrustee”) is not quali-

fied to use that property,

Zedella v. Gibson

, 165 Ill.2d 181,186

(1995). In those circumstances, the law imposes a duty not just

to the entrustee but also to the entrustor and makes the entrustor

liable for the negligent acts of the entrustee,

DuBois v. Rose

, 217

Ill.App.3d 277, 283 (1991).

Introduction to Negligent Entrustment Law in Illinois

Illinois negligent entrustment law is taken from the general rule

of liability for negligent entrustment explained in the Restatement

(Second) of Torts.

It is negligent to permit a third person to use a thing or to

engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor,

if the actor knows or should know that such person intends

to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such

a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others,

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965).

Comment (a) to Section 308, further explains negligent entrust-

ment. It says:

The words “

under the control of the actor

” are used to indicate

that the third person is entitled to use the thing or engage

in the activity only by the consent of the actor, and that

the actor has reason to believe that by withholding consent

he can prevent the third person form using the thing or

engaging in the activity, Restatement (Second) of Torts §

308 (1965).

Illinois courts have adopted these Restatement sections to form

the law of negligent entrustment,

Samuels v. Checker Taxi Co.

,

65 Ill.App.3d 63, 66-67 (1978). In its most basic form, courts

require an injured victim to prove two elements to successfully

state a claim against an entrustor. First, the plaintiff must show

there was an entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality,

Allstate

Ins. Co v. Panzica

, 162 Ill.App.3d 589, 592-93 (1987). Second,

the entrustment was to a person who was reckless or inexperienced

and that entrustment caused the injury to the plaintiff. The first

element is only about conduct, the second is about conduct and

the instrumentality entrusted.

Within the first element (the “conduct” element) there are two

sub-elements that must be proven to establish that a negligent

entrustment occurred. First, the injured party must prove that the

entrustor had a superior right to control over the item,

Zedella

,

165 Ill.2d at 187. Second, it must be shown that the entrustor

knew or should have known that the individual they lent the item

to was incompetent or unfit to use the item.

The first sub-element–superior right to control–is most often

established by proving ownership of the object lent. For example,

a car owned by one can be lent to another. This ownership gener-

ally establishes a superior right of control. Thus, the owner of the

car legally has a superior right of control if he lends it to a non-

owner. This alone can establish the requisite control for a negligent

entrustment action,

Zedella

, 165 Ill.2d at 187.

Once a superior right to control is established, it must then be

determined whether the entrustor knew, or should have known, of

the entrustee’s incompetence or inexperience in using the property,

Evans v. Shannon

, 201 Ill.2d 424, 434 (2002). This is established

by offering evidence of the entrustee’s lack of competence, skill, or

experience that should have put the entrustor on notice regarding

those problems,

Lulay v. Parvin

, 359 Ill.App.3d 653, 658 (2005).

Factors often examined include age, training, certifications (or lack

of them), and prior history using the item or similar items. If the

evidence suggests that the entrustor should have had knowledge of

the entrustee’s lack of competence, skill, or experience, along with

a showing that the entrustor had a superior right to control, then

the plaintiff has fully established the first element of her cause of

action for negligent entrustment.

After the various parts of control and knowledge are established,

the focus shifts to whether the recklessness or inexperience of the

individual entrusted with the dangerous instrument proximately

caused the plaintiff’s injury,

Evans,

201 Ill.2d at 434. This is done

by offering evidence of factual and legal causation. If a causal link

can be made between the plaintiff’s injury and the entrustee’s reck-

lessness or inexperience, then a full claim for negligent entrustment

has been made. Here, it is worth remembering that questions of

causation are almost always left for the jury,

Hamilton v. Fink

, 201

Ill.App.3d 81, 84 (1990).

Pleading Requirements

Because negligent entrustment is a form of negligence, practitioners

can employ the familiar pleading rules applied to all negligence

cases for negligent entrustment claims. Legally sufficient negligent

entrustment claims must provide facts to establish the elements and

sub-elements,

Teter v. Clemens

, 112 Ill.2d 252, 256 (1986). These

include allegations of a superior right of control, entrustment of a

dangerous instrumentality, incompetence of the entrustee, that the

entrustor knew or should have known of the incompetence, and

that an injury occurred as a proximate result of the entrustment

and incompetence.

How Much Evidence is Necessary?

In nearly every negligent entrustment case, the entrustor will

claim there was not “enough” evidence to establish that they knew

or should have known of the entrustee’s lack of competence or

inexperience with the dangerous article. Most lawyers and judges

wrongfully assume that the plaintiff must provide the court with

specific and concrete examples of the entrustee’s propensities for

harm with that particular instrumentality. This is not the law in

Illinois.

Plaintiffs in negligent entrustment cases do not need to provide

specific proof that the defendant “knew of specific individual pro-

pensities for harm”

Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting

Goods Co.

, 328 Ill.App.3d 482, 488 (2002). Rather, if the entrustor

knows the entrustment might result in harm, the cause of action

can stand,

Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am.

, 328 Ill.App.3d at 488.

CBA RECORD

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