38 / 60
Small v. St. Francis Hosp.
, 220 Ill.App.3d
537, 542 (1991). There is no established
“minimum threshold” that plaintiffs must
pass to establish negligent entrustment.
Instead, determinations of the entrustor’s
notice of the entrustee’s incompetence,
inexperience, or recklessness are looked at
on a case-by-case basis.
Inevitably, defendants deny they knew
of the entrustee’s incompetence. In fact,
not a single reported Illinois case contains
a reference where the defendant entrustor
admitted he knew of the incompetence of
the entrustee. Thus, cases have considered
whether the entrusting party had a “reason
to know” of the entrustee’s deficiencies as
one possible standard,
Garland v. Sybaris
Club Int’l, Inc.
, 21 N.E.3d 24, 46 (2014).
Whether the party had a reason to know
can be proven with facts regarding the
entrustor’s knowledge of the entrustee’s
past use of the item in question,
Lulay
,
359 Ill.App.3d at 658. There are even cases
where a simple expression of concern about
the entrustee’s abilities under certain cir-
cumstances is enough to sustain the claim,
Garland
, 21 N.E.3d at 46.
Common Types of Negligent Entrustment
Cases
Motor Vehicle Cases.
One of the most
common types of negligent entrustment
cases involve entrustment of automobiles
and motorcycles to unsafe or unqualified
drivers. Within the context of negligent
entrustment, an automobile or motorcycle
is not a dangerous article
per se, Zedella
,
165 Ill.2d at 186. However, a vehicle may
become a dangerous instrument if it is oper-
ated by a person unskilled in its use. As a
result, a duty is then imposed on the owner
of a vehicle not to permit someone who
they know to be, or should know, is incom-
petent, reckless, or inexperienced to drive
the vehicle,
DuBois
, 217 Ill.App.3d at 283.
To establish that a vehicle has been
negligently entrusted, a plaintiff must first
plead that the entrustor had a superior
right of control over the vehicle,
Zedella
,
165 Ill.2d at 186-87. Superior right of
control can be established in a number of
ways, including showing that the entrustor
bought the vehicle, paid for its insurance,
had the title listed under his or her name
or if the entrustee was allowed to drive the
vehicle with express or implied permission,
Evans
, 201 Ill.2d at 434.
If the evidence provided shows that
the entrustor did indeed have a superior
right of control over the vehicle, then the
claim can proceed to a determination of
whether the entrustor knew, or should have
known, the party entrusted with the vehicle
was inexperienced, incompetent or unfit
to operate the vehicle. Incompetence or
inexperience can be shown in many ways.
For example, a history of tickets or moving
violations can demonstrate incompetence,
Northcutt v. Chapman
, 353 Ill.App.3d 970,
972 (2004). A number of prior crashes can
serve as evidence of incompetence. Experi-
ence and age can be factors,
Small
, 220 Ill.
App.3d at 542.
One potential way a plaintiff can show
that a defendant-driver is incompetent,
inexperienced or unsafe is by offering proof
that the defendant did not have a valid
driver’s license. This can be done by show-
ing the defendant either never obtained a
driver’s license or that his or her license
has been suspended for an accumulation
of driving violations or other reasons. A
number of cases have been decided where
a plaintiff alleging negligent entrustment
of a vehicle has argued that the defendant’s
lack of a driver’s license was clear proof that
he or she was incompetent, inexperienced
or unsafe behind the wheel.
Issues surrounding an entrustee’s driver’s
license status or history can be offered as
proof that an entrustor knew, or should
have known, about the entrustee’s incom-
petence, inexperience or unsafe tendencies
behind the wheel. One example is
Giers v.
Anten
, 68 Ill.App.3d 535 (1978). In
Giers
,
the plaintiff appealed a trial court ruling
that struck the plaintiff’s negligent entrust-
ment claim against defendant, Donald
Anten. On appeal, the appellate court
reviewed defendant and entrustee Donna
Anten’s driving record in an attempt to
determine if striking the claims for negli-
gent entrustment was warranted.
The court’s review included evidence
that Donna was involved in three prior
automobile accidents, including one that
occurred due to drunk driving. The drunk-
driving accident caused Donna’s license to
be suspended for just less than three years.
This suspension of her driving privileges,
along with the three accidents that caused
that suspension, were deemed sufficient
evidence to reverse the trial court’s hold-
ing that the plaintiff’s claims for negligent
entrustment should be struck.
This victory for the plaintiff is yet
another example of how issues with an
entrustee’s driver’s license can be presented
as proof of incompetence, inexperience,
or unsafe driving habits. The more glar-
ing the issue, such as a complete lack of a
driver’s license or an extended time with a
suspended license, the easier it will likely
to prove that the entrustor had knowledge
of the entrustee’s deficiencies.
Firearm Cases.
Unlike automobiles,
guns are dangerous instrumentalities by
their very nature. Several courts have
considered whether gun shop owners
could be liable for selling guns in various
circumstances or whether municipalities
or others can be held liable for entrusting
service weapons with police officers.
Johnson v. Mers
is an example of a
court reviewing the issue of whether a
municipality can be held liable for neg-
ligently entrusting a police officer with a
service weapon,
Johnson v. Mers
, 279 Ill.
App.3d 372, 378 (1996). In that case,
defendant-police officer Rena Jensen shot
plaintiff James Johnson in the head during
a drunken quarrel in the plaintiff’s mobile
home. As a result of the gunshot wound
to his head, Johnson sought recovery from
the Village of Island Lake, which employed
and issued Jensen her weapon under the
theory of negligent entrustment. The court
refused to hold Island Lake liable, however,
because Jensen had purchased the weapon
on her own. This meant that the Village
of Island Lake held no ownership in the
weapon and, therefore, the claim for neg-
ligent entrustment could not stand.
Similarly, in
Teter v. Clemens
, a five-
year-old plaintiff was struck in the left eye
by a pellet gun shot by the defendant’s
five year old grandson,
Teter
, 112 Ill.2d
252 (1986). The defendant had previously
purchased the pellet gun, and his five-year-
old grandson had obtained possession of
it without his knowledge or permission.
There was no doubt the gun was a danger-
38
SEPTEMBER 2016