GAZETTE
OCTOBER 1993
quite sure that the description deceiv-
ed or misled no one; but that was not
the question. The Statute was not
complied with and he must so
decide."
14
Rarely can so much nonsense have
been crammed into such a short
judgment, although admittedly it has
been much followed. As to
Re
Swanton 's Estate,
it is true that Ross J
stated that:
"When a man has any definite trade
or profession it is very easy to tell,
and to describe such a man as a
"gentleman" would be incorrect."
15
Yet in the result he overruled the
objection.
On the face of it,
Allied Irish Banks pic
v
Griffin
is an unexceptional decision.
The authorities relied on by the plaintiff
were distinguishable, while those relied
on by the defendant were directly in
point. Nonetheless, Denham J was
wrong.
Irish Bank of Commerce v O'Hara
The plaintiff in
O 'Hara
sought a Well
Charging Order over lands of the first
named defendant described in the
affidavit as "Ashurst, Military Road,
Killiney, Borough of Dunlaoghaire,
Barony of Rathdown and County of
Dublin." The only defence of substance
was non-compliance with section 6 of
the 1850 Act. So far as relevant, section
6 required that the affidavit state:-
"The County and Barony, or the
Town or County of a City, and
Parish, of the Town and Parish, in
which the lands to which the
Affidavit relates are situate".
In far too many cases the Court has
simply decided whether section 6
requires something to be done and
whether it has been done, and struck
down or upheld the affidavit
accordingly.
There is authority that omission or
misdescription of the relevant parish
will invalidate the Judgment Mortgage,
but only if the lands are in a town.
16
The
plaintiff contended that Dunlaoghaire
was not a town within the meaning of
the 1850 Act.
In far too many cases the court has
simply decided whether section 6
requires something to be done and
whether it has been done, and struck
down or upheld the affidavit
accordingly. From time to time
however, courts have considered the
purpose of section 6 and indicated that
the substantial compliance with that
purpose is enough. Costello J chose the
latter course. He also (it seems) went
beyond any previous court in holding:-
(i) That the Act nowhere states that
non compliance with section 6 by
itself makes the affidavit invalid;
(ii) That only a non-compliance which
defeats the purpose of the Act will
have this effect.
Costello J relied on
Thorp v Browne
where the debtor's abode was stated in
the Judgment Mortgage affidavit as
"formerly of Ballina Park in the County
of Wexford and now of the City of
Dublin".
The House of Lords held that this was
sufficient. Lord Chelmsford LC said:-
"We have to look to what the object
and intention of the
legislature were in requiring that
there should be these particulars
describing the Judgment debtor . . .
it was clearly for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing him from all other
persons."
17
Thorp v Browne
was a decision on the
debtor's place of abode; but Costello J
saw no reason not to apply the same
rule to the description of the land. He
said:-
"If the Judgment Mortgage affidavit
actually filed achieved the purpose
the legislature sought to achieve
then there is no reason why the
Court should construe the section as
requiring such compliance with its
provisions . . . if non-compliance
arises from a mere omission of a
statutory requirement this will not
automatically invalidate the
Judgment Mortgage."
18
Finding that the omission, if any, could
not mislead anyone Costello J found
the Judgment Mortgage valid.
There were two issues on appeal:-
(i) Should the affidavit have stated the
parish?;
(ii) Assuming it should have, did the
omission invalidate the affidavit?
The Supreme Court found for the
plaintiff on both issues. On the first, it
approved those authorities which state
that the Judgment Mortgage affidavit
is only required to state the relevant
parish if the lands are in a town. Since
there was no evidence that
Dunlaoghaire was a town in 1850,
there was no non-compliance with
section 6.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court
identified two lines of authority: one
which Denham J had relied on in
Griffin
holding that strict compliance
was necessary, the other holding that a
commonsense approach should be
taken. The court agreed with Costello J
that the principles laid down in
Thorp v
Browne
were applicable. The Court
found the same principle in
Re Smith
and Ross
and
Re Fitzgerald",
both of
which were approved by the Court of
Appeal in
Harris v O'Loghlen
20
,
where
Naish LJ said that the Court "should
not look upon these technical
objections with any favour."
21
Most crucially, the Supreme Court in
O'Hara
noted that it had quite recently
approved this line of authority. In
Credit Finance Ltd. v Grace
22
the
defendant objected that the description
of the lands in the Judgment Mortgage
affidavit was ambiguous. Kenny J in
the High Court overruled this objection,
stating:-
"A Judgment Mortgage affidavit is
not defective, because of errors in the
description of the lands unless these
are likely to mislead."
23
The Supreme Court agreed. O'Dalaigh
CJ said:-
"Turning to the present case the
specification in the Affidavit of the
County and Barony, Town or
County of City or Parish or of Town
and Parish, serves primarily to
identify the lands with greater
certainty and secondarily to