GAZETTE
and the relevant case law. About 90%
of appeals are finalised at this stage
and at minimal expense to the
appellant apart from an appeal fee of
£25.00 to £75.00. Most appeals should
be decided within six to nine months
of the date of lodgement of the appeal.
The decision of the Com-
missioner may be appealed to the
Valuation Tribunal and there is a
right of further appeal on a point
of law to the High Court.
Appeal to Valuation Tribunal
As the Valuation Tribunal is of recent
origin we will discuss it in more detail.
If dissatisfied with the decision of the
Commissioner one can appeal to the
Tribunal. There is an appeal fee of £50,
£100 or £150 depending on the amount
of the valuation. Prior to July, 1988
such appeals went to the Circuit Court
where they took their place in the
queue with the usual range of civil and
criminal cases. As this gave rise to
long delays awaiting hearings and to
inconsistency in judgments as between
one Circuit and another it was decided
to change to a specialised tribunal
which was established under section 2
of the Valuation Act, 1988.
Constitution and procedure
The Tribunal consists of a chairman
(Mr.
Henry J. Abbott,
SC), four deputy
chairmen and three ordinary members,
each appointed by the Minister for
Finance on a part-time basis for a
period of five years. The Act does not
prescribe qualifications for
membership but, of the eight members,
six are lawyers and two are
professional valuers. The Minister
should perhaps appoint additional
valuers to provide the necessary
expertise in valuation theory and
practice. The Tribunal operates in
divisions of three members including
the chairman (or a deputy chairman),
sittings are held in private and cases
may be presented in person or through
a representative. A notice of appeal
must indicate the grounds of appeal
; and the parties concerned must submit
a summary of evidence to the Tribunal
and exchange summaries in advance of
the hearing. The Tribunal may at their
discretion determine whether evidence
should be given on oath.
They are obliged to issue a written
judgment giving the reasons for their
determination and the judgment is
delivered at a sitting of the Tribunal.
The Act provides that, in general, costs
should be awarded to the successful
party but normally the Tribunal do not
award costs in cases which relate only
to quantum (the valuation assessment).
Í More detailed rules of procedure are set
out in the Valuation Act 1988 (Appeal)
Rules, 1988. In a separate set of
guidelines the Tribunal suggest that
proceedings should be as informal as
i possible and state that "hearings will, in
j general, proceed as enquiries rather than
! by an adversarial system". Parties are
encouraged to agree facts in advance of
the hearing and to submit lists of
judgments which they intend to invoke.
Progress
The Tribunal have a very satisfatory
record to date. In their first year they
delivered judgments on 90% of the
appeals lodged and they have
maintained that tempo. At present
cases are heard within six months of
lodging an appeal and adjournments
are rarely given. In the main, cases are
presented by the professional valuers
in the VO on behalf of the respondent
(the Commissioner) and by valuation
consultants on behalf of appellants but,
if the valuation quantum is very large
and/or legal issues are in dispute, the
parties have legal representation.
Appeal to High Court
Any party to an appeal who is dissatis-
fied with a determination of the
Tribunal "as being erroneous in point of
law" may appeal to the High Court by
way of case stated. Less than 2% of
Tribunal decisions are appealed to the
High Court.
Selected Cases
We may now refer to some judgments
of the Tribunal in order to get a flavour
of issues which come before them.
Initially many cases related to the
rateability of industrial installations.
Under traditional valuation law
At present cases are heard within
six months of lodging an appeal
and adjournments are rarely
given.
buildings are rateable but machinery is
not. However, with advancing
technology, the functional difference
between the two has become blurred
and this has given rise to interpretation
difficulties. For example, installations
used for bulk storage may incorporate
processing mechanisms or they may be
so closely linked with other plant as to
| form an integrated process. The
I Valuation Act of 1986 (section 8)
| attempted to resolve this particular
j
problem by providing that
| constructions "designed or used
! primarily for storage or containment"
j
are rateable while exempting those
which are "designed or used primarily
to induce a process of change in the
; substance contained".
In applying these provisions the
Tribunal have decided that grain bins
are rateable but milk tanks and whey
tanks are not (Mitchelstown
Creameries, 6 December 1988); that
sugar silos are rateable (Siuicre
j
Eireann, 15 October 1990) but that
lagoons forming part of an effluent
treatment plant are exempt (Golden
Vale Food Products, 12 June 1989). In
the case of Caribmolasses Company,
tanks used in the blending of molasses
were deemed exempt by the Tribunal
and by the High Court but the Supreme
Court reversed the decision on the
grounds that "no process of change is
induced. The molasses remain
molasses" (judgment of 25 May,
1993).
In other cases of interest it was held
that the exemption in the 1986 Act for
| lands developed for sport applied to a
golf course but not to the clubhouse
(Greystones Golf Club, 11 November
1988) and that a marina was exempt
as it was not a "fixed mooring"
(Kinsale Yacht Club, 31 May, 1991).
The High Court affirmed the
exemption but for a different reason
i.e. that the marina comprised a
development of land for sport. "The
floating dock is secured by means of
piles driven into the sea-bed which is
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