The Gazette 1993

GAZETTE

and the relevant case law. About 90%

of appeals are finalised at this stage

and at minimal expense to the

appellant apart from an appeal fee of

£25.00 to £75.00. Most appeals should

be decided within six to nine months

of the date of lodgement of the appeal.

The decision of the Com-

missioner may be appealed to the

Valuation Tribunal and there is a

right of further appeal on a point

of law to the High Court.

Appeal to Valuation Tribunal

As the Valuation Tribunal is of recent

origin we will discuss it in more detail.

If dissatisfied with the decision of the

Commissioner one can appeal to the

Tribunal. There is an appeal fee of £50,

£100 or £150 depending on the amount

of the valuation. Prior to July, 1988

such appeals went to the Circuit Court

where they took their place in the

queue with the usual range of civil and

criminal cases. As this gave rise to

long delays awaiting hearings and to

inconsistency in judgments as between

one Circuit and another it was decided

to change to a specialised tribunal

which was established under section 2

of the Valuation Act, 1988.

Constitution and procedure

The Tribunal consists of a chairman

(Mr.

Henry J. Abbott,

SC), four deputy

chairmen and three ordinary members,

each appointed by the Minister for

Finance on a part-time basis for a

period of five years. The Act does not

prescribe qualifications for

membership but, of the eight members,

six are lawyers and two are

professional valuers. The Minister

should perhaps appoint additional

valuers to provide the necessary

expertise in valuation theory and

practice. The Tribunal operates in

divisions of three members including

the chairman (or a deputy chairman),

sittings are held in private and cases

may be presented in person or through

a representative. A notice of appeal

must indicate the grounds of appeal

; and the parties concerned must submit

a summary of evidence to the Tribunal

and exchange summaries in advance of

the hearing. The Tribunal may at their

discretion determine whether evidence

should be given on oath.

They are obliged to issue a written

judgment giving the reasons for their

determination and the judgment is

delivered at a sitting of the Tribunal.

The Act provides that, in general, costs

should be awarded to the successful

party but normally the Tribunal do not

award costs in cases which relate only

to quantum (the valuation assessment).

Í More detailed rules of procedure are set

out in the Valuation Act 1988 (Appeal)

Rules, 1988. In a separate set of

guidelines the Tribunal suggest that

proceedings should be as informal as

i possible and state that "hearings will, in

j general, proceed as enquiries rather than

! by an adversarial system". Parties are

encouraged to agree facts in advance of

the hearing and to submit lists of

judgments which they intend to invoke.

Progress

The Tribunal have a very satisfatory

record to date. In their first year they

delivered judgments on 90% of the

appeals lodged and they have

maintained that tempo. At present

cases are heard within six months of

lodging an appeal and adjournments

are rarely given. In the main, cases are

presented by the professional valuers

in the VO on behalf of the respondent

(the Commissioner) and by valuation

consultants on behalf of appellants but,

if the valuation quantum is very large

and/or legal issues are in dispute, the

parties have legal representation.

Appeal to High Court

Any party to an appeal who is dissatis-

fied with a determination of the

Tribunal "as being erroneous in point of

law" may appeal to the High Court by

way of case stated. Less than 2% of

Tribunal decisions are appealed to the

High Court.

Selected Cases

We may now refer to some judgments

of the Tribunal in order to get a flavour

of issues which come before them.

Initially many cases related to the

rateability of industrial installations.

Under traditional valuation law

At present cases are heard within

six months of lodging an appeal

and adjournments are rarely

given.

buildings are rateable but machinery is

not. However, with advancing

technology, the functional difference

between the two has become blurred

and this has given rise to interpretation

difficulties. For example, installations

used for bulk storage may incorporate

processing mechanisms or they may be

so closely linked with other plant as to

| form an integrated process. The

I Valuation Act of 1986 (section 8)

| attempted to resolve this particular

problem by providing that

| constructions "designed or used

! primarily for storage or containment"

are rateable while exempting those

which are "designed or used primarily

to induce a process of change in the

; substance contained".

In applying these provisions the

Tribunal have decided that grain bins

are rateable but milk tanks and whey

tanks are not (Mitchelstown

Creameries, 6 December 1988); that

sugar silos are rateable (Siuicre

Eireann, 15 October 1990) but that

lagoons forming part of an effluent

treatment plant are exempt (Golden

Vale Food Products, 12 June 1989). In

the case of Caribmolasses Company,

tanks used in the blending of molasses

were deemed exempt by the Tribunal

and by the High Court but the Supreme

Court reversed the decision on the

grounds that "no process of change is

induced. The molasses remain

molasses" (judgment of 25 May,

1993).

In other cases of interest it was held

that the exemption in the 1986 Act for

| lands developed for sport applied to a

golf course but not to the clubhouse

(Greystones Golf Club, 11 November

1988) and that a marina was exempt

as it was not a "fixed mooring"

(Kinsale Yacht Club, 31 May, 1991).

The High Court affirmed the

exemption but for a different reason

i.e. that the marina comprised a

development of land for sport. "The

floating dock is secured by means of

piles driven into the sea-bed which is

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