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Recent Irish Cases

Compiled by Raymond Byrne, BCL, LLM, BL, Lecturer in Law,

Dublin City University.

The following case summaries have been reprinted from the

Irish Law

Times and Solicitors Journal

with the kind permission of the publishers.

Deane and Ors v Voluntary Health Insur-

ance Board Supreme Court 29 July 1992

IOMMERCIAL LAW - COMPETITION - 'UNDERTAK-

NG' - VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE BOARD -

WHETHER ENGAGED FOR GAIN IN PROVISION OF A

SERVICE - WHETHER 'GAIN' SHOULD BE EQUATED

WITH 'PROFIT' - STATUTE - INTERPRETATION - Vol-

jntary Health Insurance Act 1957, s.4 - Competition Act

1991, s.3(1)

The plaintiffs instituted proceedings claim-

ng that the defendant Board had acted in

Dreach of its duties to the plaintiffs under s.5

)f the 1991 Act. The 1991 Act prohibits the

estriction of competition and the abuse of

Jominant positions by analogy with Articles

Í5 and 86 of the Treaty of the European

iconomic Community. The Act applies to

undertakings', defined in s.3 as, inter alia,

iny person 'engaged for gain' in the produc-

ion of goods or the provision of a service.

The defendant argued, inter alia, that it was

lot an undertaking within s.3 of the 1991

V:t since under s.4 of the 1957 Act it was

equired to fix subscriptions for health insur-

ince cover so that its revenue for any year is

ufficient, but only sufficient, to meet the

:harges properly chargeable to revenue,

"his issue was tried as a preliminary point of

aw. In the High Court, Costello J held that

he defendant was not an undertaking within

.3 of the 1991 Act. On appeal HELD by the

lupreme Court (Finlay CJ, Hederman and

gan JJ) allowing the appeal: (1) the word

gain' in s.3 of the 1991 Act connoted some-

hing obtained or acquired, and was not

imited to pecuniary gain; still less could it

>e equated with the word 'profit', and if the

)ireachtas had intended to refer only to

indertakings engaged in making profits it

/ould unambiguously have so stated.

Re

\rthur Average Association

(1875) LR 10Ch

kpp 542 approved; (2) the true meaning of

.3 of the 1991 Act was that it related to

ctivities carried on or a service supplied in

eturn for a charge or payment, which would

xclude a charitable association which spent

loney without any charge or payment; and

lat, accordingly, the defendant came within

ie 1991 Act. Per

curiam

: even if the word

gain' was ambiguous, the court would be

ntitled to have had regard to the Long Title

f the 1991 Act; and having regard to the

bject of adopting by analogy Articles 85

nd 86 of the Treaty of the European Eco-

omic Community, the argument by the

efendant would severely restrict the appli-

ation and extent of the 1991 Act in a

lanner unintended by the Oireachtas.

tesmond and Dedeir v Glackin, Minister

)r Industry and Commerce and Ors (No.2)

ligh Court 25 February 1992; Supreme

ourt 30 July 1992

OMPANY I AW - INSPECTOR - EXTENT OF POWERS

WHETHER ENTITLED TO INVESTIGATE ACTIVITIES

iF COMPANY INCORPORATED (HJTSIDF STATF -

(CHANGE CONTROl WHFTHER MINISTER FOR

NANCE FNTITI ED TO TRANSMIT EXCHANGE CON-

TROL INFORMATION FROM CENTRAL BANK TO

OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTER - CONSTITUTION -

TRIAL OF OFFENCES - FAILURE TO ANSWER QUES-

TIONS PUT BY INSPECTOR - HIGH COURT ENTITLED

TO PROCEED AS IF CONTEMPT OF COURT - WHETHER

VALID - SEVERABILITY - Exchange Control Act 1954,

s.28 - Official Secrets Act 1963, s.4 - Central Bank Act

1989, s. 16 - Companies Act 1990, ss.9, 10(5), 10 (6), 14

- Constitution, Article 38.1

The first respondent (the inspector) had been

appointed by the second respondent as an

inspector pursuant to s. 14 of the 1990 Act to

investigate the purchase of a site in Dublin

for over 4m and its sale less than one year

later to Bord Telecom Eireann for over 9m.

The site had been bought by a company,

United Property Holdings Ltd (UPH), in

which the first applicant (Mr Desmond) had

a beneficial interest. The site then became

vested in Chestvale Properties Ltd, a sub-

sidiary of UPH. Chestvale was then sold to

Delion Investment Dealings Ltd, a Cypriot

company, which in turn was sold to Hoddle

Investments Ltd. The main shareholder in

Chestvale and Delion appeared to be one

Pat Doherty. Finance for this aspect of the

transaction was provided by Freezone In-

vestments Ltd, a company registered in the

Isle of Man and controlled by one Colin

Probets, a resident of Jersey. Finally, Hoddle

sold the site to Telecom. The purpose of the

inspector's investigation was to examine in

particular the beneficial ownership of

Chestvale and Hoddle. In the course of his

inquiries, the inspector questioned Mr

Desmond extensively. He put to Mr

Desmond certain exchange control infor-

mation which had been given to the Central

Bank concerning the Telecom transaction.

The inspector had sought this information

from the second respondent, who in turn

had requested the Minister for Finance to

seek it from the Central Bank. The appli-

cants instituted judicial review proceedings

challenging the validity of the inspector's

appointment and also various aspects of the

investigation. A contempt of court motion

arose from the interim application for leave

to seek judicial review: see

Desmond and

Dedeir v Glackin, Minister for Industry and

Commerce and Ors

(High Court, 9 January

1992) (below). HELD by O'Hanlon J declin-

ing the relief sought, except in relation to the

constitutional validity of s.10(5) of the 1990

Act: (1) in view of the widespread knowl-

edge of the matters of public concern which

led to the appointment of the inspector

under s. 14 of the 1990 Act, the Minister was

not required to specify in the warrant of

appointment the nature of the public inter-

est which led to the appointment; (2) al-

though the inspector had questioned the

first applicant on his connection with cer-

tain companies which were incorporated

outside the State and thus were not 'related'

to Chestvale or Hoddle within s.9 of the

1990 Act, and although the inspector was

entitled to seek approval from the Minister

under s.9 of the 1990 Act to inquire into

companies which were not 'related' but had

not done so in the instant case, the inspector

had not acted ultra vires in pursuing this

aspect of the transaction because the first

applicant accepted that he had been in-

volved in the transactions involving these

companies, though not financially involved

in them; (3) the Minister for Finance had

been entitled to seek the exchange control

information from the Central Bank under

s. 19 of the 1989 Act, since the Central Bank

acted as agent for the Minister in the collec-

tion of exchange control information under

s.28 of the 1954 Act; and the Minister was,

in turn, entitled to pass on such information

to another Minister and did not act in breach

of s.4 of the 1963 Act in so doing; (4) the

applicants' common law right to privacy,

which in the instant case was probably co-

extensive with the constitutional right to

privacy, was not breached in the instant

case through the communication of the

exchange control information from the Cen-

tral Bank to the inspector since such com-

munication related entirely to the better

performance of public functions by public

bodies and the protection of a free society

would not be better served by the operation

of affairs of State in water-tight compart-

ments.

Marcel v Commissioner of Metro-

politan Police

[199111 All ER 845; [1992) 1

All ER 72 discussed; (5) in relation to s. 10(5)

of the 1990 Act, which authorised the High

Court to try a person for refusal to answer

questions put by an inspector as if the per-

son was in contempt of court, Mr Desmond

had locus standi to challenge the constitu-

tional validity of s. 10(5) since the inspector

had already invoked s.10 against Mr

Desmond and there was also the likelihood

that, having regard to the number of ques-

tions addressed to him by the inspector, the

powers in s.10 might be used in the future

against him; (6) s.10(5) of the 1990 Act was

repugnant to Article 38.1 of the Constitution

in that it permitted the High Court to try

summarily an offence which was not minor

in character, but,this, part of s.10 could be

severed from the remainder thus leaving

intact the provisions in s.10(6) of the 1990

Act which provided an alternative mecha-

nism for a person who refused to answer

questions. In re

Haughey

11971] IR 217

applied. On appeal, the issues raised were

more confined than those in the High Court.

HELD by the Supreme Court (Finlay CJ,

Hederman, McCarthy, O'Flaherty and Egan

JJ) confirming the challenged findings of the

High Court: (1) the High Court had been

correct in finding that the first applicant had

locus standi to challenge the constitutional

validity of s. 10(5) of the 1990 Act; (2) s. 10(5)

of the 1990 Act was repugnant to Article

38.1 of the Constitution for the reasons

given by the High Court, and that this part of

s.10 could be severed from the remainder

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