GAZETTE
MAY 1993
for judicial review clearly made trenchant
criticism of the Minister to which he was
entitled to reply in careful and moderate
terms; and while the Minister was ill-ad-
vised to give a response on a live radio
broadcast, the matter was of ongoing public
interest and in these exceptional circum-
stances having regard to the provisions pro-
tecting freedom of expression in Article
40.3 of the Constitution, contempt had not
been made out under this heading.
Attorney
General v Times Newspapers Ltd\
1974] AC
273 and
Times Newspapers Ltd v United
Kingdom
(1979) 2 EHRR 245 discussed.
Per
O'Hanlon J: the court should assume that
Irish law on contempt was consistent with
Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Dicta in
The State(DPP) v Walsh
|19811 IR
412 applied.
Emerald Meats Ltd v Minister for Agricul-
ture and Ors (No.2) Supreme Court 16 July
1992
PRACTICE - APPEAL - STAY ON AWARD OF DAMAGES
PENDING APPEAL - APPEAL LIKELY TO INVOLVE
DELAY OF OVER TWO YEARS - WHETHER STAY
SHOULD BE LIFTED - LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF
APPEAL
The plaintiff was a company engaged in the
meat trade. The plaintiff claimed declara-
tory relief and damages in relation to the
failure by the defendants to grant the plain-
tiff an import quota for 1990 under the terms
of EC Council Regulation 4024/89, which
concerns imports of meat from non-EC States
coming within the terms of the GATT. In the
High Court, Costello ) granted the relief
sought:
Emerald Meats Ltd v Minister for
Agriculture and Ors
(High Court, 9 July
1991). The decree for damages was for
385,922 with interest. Without objection
from the plaintiff, the defendants were
granted in July 1991 a stay on the damages
award pending appeal. In July 1992, the
plaintiff sought to have the stay removed.
HELD by the Supreme Court (Hederman,
McCarthy and Egan JJ) removing the stay:
although the plaintiff had not objected to
the stay in 1991, circumstances had changed
considerably since then, and it appeared
thatthe plaintiff was in immediate danger of
going out of business; having regard to the
issues raised in the appeal, it was possible
that a reference to the Court of Justice under
Article 177 of the Treaty of the European
Economic Community might result,- thus
postponing final judgment for a further two
years; and in the light of the trial judge's
findings, the prospects of success for the
defendants seemed slight; and in those cir-
cumstances, although the damages might
become dissipated in the company's debts,
the justice of the case lay in removing the
stay on the award.
Redmond
v
Ireland 119921
ILRM 291 applied.
Megaleasing UK Ltd and Ors v Barrett and
Ors (No.2) Supreme Court 20 July 1992
PRACTICE - DISCOVERY - DISCOVERY AS SUBSTAN-
TIVE RELIEF - HIGH COURT GRANTING SUCH ORDER
FOR DISCOVERY - WHETHER JUSTIFIED IN CIRCUM-
STANCES
The plaintiffs (the companies) instituted ple-
nary proceedings against the defendants in
which the substantive relief was for orders
of discovery concerning certain invoices
which had been paid by the companies.
Payment of the invoices had been author-
ised by certain of the defendants, who were
employees of the companies, but the com-
panies alleged that they had received no
consideration or value for the payments
made. The purpose of the discovery orders
was stated by the companies to be to facili-
tate them in bringing proceedings against
other parties whose tortious acts the compa-
nies claimed had caused them to suffer loss.
In the High Court, Costello J granted the
plaintiffs the relief sought, and refused to
grant a stay of execution upon the order. On
appeal by the defendants against the refusal
of the stay, the Supreme Court granted the
stay:
Megaleasing UK Ltd and Ors v Barrett
and Ors
[ 1992] 11R 219. On the substantive
appeal HELD by the Supreme Court (Finlay
CJ, Hederman, McCarthy, O'Flaherty and
Egan JJ) allowing the appeal: (1) it was well
established that the courts had jurisdiction
to order discovery as a substantive remedy,
in circumstances where a person who inad-
vertently became involved in tortious activ-
ity was in possession of information which
would assist the victim to obtain justice.
Orr
v Diaper (1
876) 4 Ch D 92; (2) the jurisdic-
tion of the court in such cases should be
exercised sparingly and should be confined
to cases where very clear proof of wrongdo-
ing has been established, and to seeking the
names and identities of wrongdoers rather
than factual information concerning the
commission of the wrong.
Norwich
Pharmacal Co and Ors v Customs and Ex-
cise Commissioners [197 4]
AC 133 referred
to; (3) in the instant case, the companies had
already established the names of the officers
in their companies who were responsible
for the issuing of the invoices in question
and, through the settlement of a number of
claims with them, had obtained statements
from them that they were unaware of the
eventual beneficiaries; and in the circum-
stances, the further claim by the companies
that they required discovery for the pur-
poses of obtaining a satisfactory explana-
tion for the payments fell far short of estab-
lishing a wrongdoing which would justify
making an order for discovery as a substan-
tive remedy.
Allied Irish Banks pic and Anor v Ernst &
Whinney (Minister for Industry and Com-
merce, Notice Party) High Court 22 Janu-
ary 1992; Supreme Court 17 July 1992
PRACTICE - DISCOVERY - THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY
- COMPLEX ACTION - SUPERVISION OF INSURANCE
INDUSTRY - VIRTUAL COLLAPSE OF MAJOR INSUR-
ANCECOMPANY - NEGLIGENCE ACTION - WHETHER
SUPERVISING GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT RE-
QUIRED TO MAKE DISCOVERY Rules of the Superior
Courts 1986, 0.31, rr.12, 21
The plaintiffs had instituted proceedings in
negligence against the defendant, a firm of
accountants. The defendant had acted as
statutory auditors for an insurance com-
pany, the Insurance Corporation of Ireland
pic. The second plaintiff, a subsidiary of
Allied Irish Banks pic, had purchased the
entire equity in the Insurance Corporation.
Subsequently, the Insurance Corporation
suffered virtual financial collapse, and an
administrator was appointed to the com-
pany under the Insurance (No.2) Act 1983.
The second plaintiff claimed that it invested
4
in the Insurance Corporation in reliance on
information provided by the defendant firm,
that the defendant had been negligent in the
putting up of that information, that it acted
in breach of its duty of care to the plaintiffs,
and that consequently the plaintiff suffered
financial loss. The defendant firm denied all
these claims. In the course of the proceed-
ings, the defendant firm sought discovery of
certain documents from the Department of
Industry and Commerce (the government
department responsible for the overseeing
of insurance companies) in particular docu-
mentation concerning the acquisition by
the second plaintiff of its equity in the Insur-
ance Corporation and of the events leading
up to the appointment of the administrator
to the Insurance Corporation. HELD by
Costello J refusing the order for discovery:
the defendant had established that the docu-
ments sought existed but had not estab-
lished that they must all be relevant to the
proceedings between the parties, and the
Court had no jurisdiction to make an order
which might uncover certain documents of
relevance to proceedings. On appeal by the
defendant to the Supreme Court, a list was
prepared of the issues in the case and of
categories of documents relevant to those
issues. HELD by the Supreme Court (Finlay
CJ, Hederman, McCarthy, O'Flaherty and
Egan JJ) allowing the appeal and ordering
discovery : (1) the jurisdiction of the Court to
order discovery in respect of persons who
were not party to proceedings under 0.31,
r.21 of the 1986 Rules differed in certain
respects from that where discovery was
directed at a party to proceedings under
0.31, r.12, but the essential purpose was
the same, namely that justice be done on the
basis of a full consideration of the evidence;
(2) the differences in an application under
0.31, r.21 is that the Court must be satisfied
from evidence adduced by the application:
(i) that the notice party is likely to have
documents in its possession and that these
documents are relevant to the issues in the
case; (ii) that discovery will not be unduly
oppressive to the notice party, although the
applicant need not establish that specific
documents are in the hands of the notice
party; and (i ii) that any order for discovery to
the notice party should indicate in simple
form the relevance to the case of the docu-
ments being sought by the applicant; (3) the
High Court had taken the correct general
approach except in relation to the onus on
the defendant to establish the relevant of
documents to the instant case, though the
Supreme Court had been in a better position
to assess the relevance of the documents
sought to the issues in the proceedings hav-
ing regard to the list prepared by the defend-
ant for the appeal hearing.
Per curiam:
a
similar list or schedule linking the issues in
proceed i ngs to the documents sought wou Id
appear an essential proof in an action in-
volving multiple issues; (4) although com-
pliance with an order for discovery would
involve the expenditure of considerable time
by officials of the Department of Industry
and Commerce, this could not be regarded
as being oppressive having regard to the
contribution towards the administration of
justice which discovery of documents made.