GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER 1993
Recent Irish Cases
Compiled by Raymond Byrne, BCL, LLM, BL, Lecturer in Law,
Dublin City University.
The following case summaries have been reprinted from the
Irish Law
Times and Solicitors Journal
w i th the kind permission of the publishers.
The People(D.P.P.) v Diemling Court of
Criminal Appeal 4 May 1992
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - ACCOMPLICE - ACCES-
SORY AFTER FACT - WARNING TO )URY WHETHER
REQUIRED-SUGGESTION AS TO DEFENDANT'S MILI-
TARY BACKGROUND - WHETHER JURY SHOULD BE
DISCHARGED
The defendant was charged with the false
imprisonment and murder of one Evans.
Evidence was given for the prosecution by
the defendant's daughter that she was in
Ireland on holiday in 1988, that she met the
defendant and that he brought her to the
place where he was then holding Evans. She
stated that she treated Evans for the effects of
beatings inflicted on him. After a number of
days, she became aware that Evans was
dead and stated that his body was burned
beside the place where he had been held.
She did not report the matter to the Gardai
at first, but later came forward. The defend-
ant denied that these events had taken place
or that Evans was dead. In the course of
evidence, the suggestion was made that the
defendant had been a member of the SAS or
similar military unit, but this was withdrawn
by the prosecution and the trial judge di-
rected the jury to disregard this suggestion.
The defendant was found guilty on both
counts. He was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for the murder and to 7 years imprison-
ment for the false imprisonment. On appeal
HELD by the Court of Criminal Appeal
(Hederman, Carroll and Flood JJ) allowing
the appeal on the murder verdict and direct-
ing a re - trial: (1) since by her own account,
the defendant's daughter was fixed with
knowledge of Evans' death, and was aware
that he had been beaten, she was therefore
aware that the death amounted to homi-
cide; and her subsequent activities in assist-
ing concealment of evidence constituted
her an accessory after the fact; and since an
accessory can have a sufficient degree of
complicity to be an accomplice, this was a
matter which the trial judge should have left
to the jury to determine, and he should have
also warned them on the dangers of convict-
ing on the evidence of an accomplice; and
thus, the trial judge had erred in withdraw-
ing this matter from the jury, and a re - trial
would be ordered on this ground. Dicta in
The People v Carney
[1955] IR 324 fol-
lowed; (2) there was no evidence to support
the submission that the defendant's daugh-
ter was an accomplice in the unlawful de-
tention of Evans; (3) since the suggestion
that the defendant had been in the SAS had
been immediately withdrawn by the pros-
ecution, the trial judge had not erred in
refusing to discharge the jury and his warn-
ing to them was sufficient to prevent any
lack of fair procedures, and accordingly the
appeal against the conviction for false im-
prisonment would be dismissed. [Note: an
appeal against severity of sentence on the
false imprisonment conviction was with-
drawn.]
The People(D.P.P.) v Ryan Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal 30 November 1992
CRIMINAL LAW- EVIDENCE - DISCRETION TO ADMIT
- FINGERPRINTS - WHETHER IN BREACH OF STATU-
TORY REGULATIONS - NO OBJECTION TAKEN AT
TRIAL - WHETHER 'TRAWLING' OF TRANSCRIPT PER-
MISSIBLE - POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN
PRINTS ATSCENE AND WITNESS'S PRINTS-WHETHER
PARTICULAR NUMBER OF COMPARISON POINTS
REQUIRED - PROCEDURE - WHETHER CROSS - EX-
AMINATION OF DEFENCE WITNESS IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH FAIR PROCEDURES - Regulations as to the
Measuring and Photography of Prisoners 1955, Art.4
The defendant had been charged with at-
tempting to cause grevious bodily harm to a
neighbour of his. It was alleged during the
trial by the neighbour and other prosecution
witnesses that the defendant attacked the
neighbour with a sword. The defendant's
son, aged 15 years, appearing as a defence
witness, gave evidence that he had'never
seen the sword in question in the family
home. On cross - examination by the pros-
ecution, he denied ever touching the sword,
and that he could not explain how his
fingerprints had been found on it. The pros-
ecution introduced a fingerprint expert who
testified that he found 8 points of compari-
son between the son's fingerprints and the
prints found on the sword. Defence counsel
objected to the admission of this evidence
on the ground that the practice was that
there be 12 points of comparison. The trial
judge admitted the fingerprint evidence. On
appeal, in addition to challenging the ad-
missibility of the fingerprint evidence con-
cerning his son, the defendant argued that
the evidence concerning his own finger-
prints had been inadmissible as it was ob-
tained in breach of the 1955 Regulations, in
that there was no evidence adduced that the
prison officer who had taken the prints had
been authorised to do so by a Garda Super-
intendent. HELD by the Court of Criminal
Appeal (Blayney, Lynch and Lavan JJ) dis-
missing the appeal: (1) while the practice of
requiring 12 points of comparison was a
good one where it concerned an accused, in
this instance it was a witness and not the
accused who was involved, and the fact that
there were only 8 points of comparison was
a matter going to the weight of the cross -
examination rather than the admissibility of
the evidence; (2) the fact that the prosecu-
tion put a line of cross - examination to the
defendant's son without forewarning the
defence of this line of questioning did not
create unfairness to the defendant; and while
each case must be judged on its own facts,
the instant case was quite different from a
situation where the prosecution cross - ex-
amines the accused in a manner not indi-
cated in the book of evidence.
The People v
Coll
(1980) 2 Frewen 36 distinguished; (3)
in relation to the defendant's fingerprints,
the trial judge had a discretion as to whether
to introduce the evidence even where there
was a breach of the 1955 Regulations, par-
ticularly having regard to the fact that no
objection was taken at the trial to the admis-
sion of this evidence.
The People vMcGrath
(1965) 99 ILTR 59 applied.
Per curiam:
the
Court disapproved of trawling through a
trial transcript for errors not thought worthy
of mention during the trial itself.
The People
vCoughland
968) 1 Frewen 325 referred to.
The People(D.P.P.) v Barr (No.2) Court of
Criminal Appeal 21 July 1992
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - SEXUAL ASSAULTS -
FORM OF INDICTMENT - MULTIPLE ACTS - WHETHER
EACH TO BE INDIVIDUALLY SPECIFIED - DNA PRO-
FILING (GENETIC FINGERPRINTING)-WHETHER TRIAL
SHOULD BE USED AS TESTING GROUND FOR SUCH
EVIDENCE - PROSECUTION NOT SEEKING TO RELY
ON DNA EVIDENCE-PRE)UDICETO)URY-WHETHER
SUFFICIENT WARNING GIVEN - CORROBORATION -
WARNING - NOT MANDATORY - Criminal Justice
(Administration) Act 1924 - Criminal Law (Rape) Act
1981, s.10 - Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act
1990, s.7
The defendant was charged with indecent
assault and buggery, the indictment stating
that this was contrary to common law as
provided for in s.10 of the 1981 Act, the
particulars alleging that on a specified date
he indecently assaulted a named female. It
was accepted that the form of the indictment
conformed as nearly as possible to the re-
quirements of the 1924 Act, but the defence
argued that the prosecution was required to
specify the particular acts alleged to consti-
tute the i ndecent assault. In the course of her
evidence in the defendant's trial, the com-
plainant stated that the defendant had, inter
alia, touched her breasts and inserted a stick
into her anus and vagina. The prosecution
i ntroduced genetic fi ngerpri nti ng, also ca I led
DNA profiling, which had been conducted
on swabs taken from the complainant. After
two witnesses had been examined concern-
ing the techniques involved, it emerged that
the person who had performed the actual
DNA profile was not available to give evi-
dence. Defence counsel then applied to
have the jury discharged on the ground of
possible prejudice. Prosecution counsel
stated he would no longer be relying on the
DNA evidence, and that it had been intro-
duced primarily as a test case for DNA
profiling. The trial judge declined to dis-
charge the jury, but he ruled that the evi-
dence was not admissible and warned the
jury to ignore the DNA evidence. Headlines
in the following day's newspapers stated,
inter alia, 'Genetic printing barred in rape
trial'. Defence counsel applied again to
have the jury discharged for possible preju-
dice. The trial judge declined the applica-
tion but warned the jury to ignore the news-
paper coverage and reminded them that the
trial was not one for rape. It later emerged
that the trial judge had, on an approach from
a newspaper reporter, approved the con-
tents of the newspaper reports, but not the
headlines. In his final charge to the jury, the
judge had given a warning to the jury that it
was unsafe to convict the defendant if they
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