147 / 736
partnient of Local Government. When appear
ances were being taken a chartered surveyor inti
mated that he was appearing on behalf of some
objectors. The law agent did not object to the
appearance but made known his views that he
considered only legal representatives or an objec
tor in person could appear on behalf of an objec
tor. No ruling was made but the law agent again
raised the matter when the chartered surveyor
was about to cross-examine a witness. It was sub
mitted to the inspector that the inquiry was a
quasi judicial inquiry established by an act of the
Oireachtas with powers to issue sub poena call for
the production of documents and to deal with such
matters as contempt. The inquiry was adjourned
to enable the inspector to consult the legal advisor
of the Department of Local Government. On the
resumption of the inquiry it was held that it was a
quasi judicial inquiry which only solicitors and
counsel instructed by solicitors or people actually
interested themselves could appear. The inspector
stated
inter alia,
"The rules of court must apply
in this case, because this is a quasi judicial inquiry
at which sworn evidence is taken".
LEGAL COSTS
"Again, it is said the conveyance of land ought
to be easier than it is. In other countries you can
buy a piece of land as easily as a yard of calico.
In England the process is so expensive as to put
a few acres beyond a poor man's reach. You may
cheapen conveyancing, yet the poor man will still
not get his acres. The moree asy the transfer, the
faster the land will flow in the channels which it
tends of itself to follow.
"But the less obstruction the better. Let us have
free trade in land by all means, as in everything
else. There is but one serious objection that I
know of. I cannot tell how it may suit the lawyers.
When the Reformation began in England, the
House of Commons complained to the Crown of
the enormous expenses of the ecclesiastical courts.
The Archbishop of Canterbury said in reply, that
no doubt the proceedings in the courts were costly,
but the costs went to maintain a very excellent
class of persons, without whom the country would
be exceedingly ill off, the learned gentlemen of
the long robe. There is force in this answer. I
should be sorry to say anything against it. One of
the most valuable lessons which I have learnt in
life is the prudence of keeping on good terms with
the lawyers."—J. A. Froude.
From a
lecture delivered
to
the Edinburgh
Philosophical Institution in November 1876.
CASES OF THE MONTH
Road Traffic Act: Dangerous Driving
The defendant failed to stop at traffic lights
which were red against him and collided with a
van crossing on the green light. After the accident
he had said to witnesses that he did not know
what happened; he had felt dizzy and that he
knew the lights were red but either "I couldn't
stop" or "I didn't stop". He had an incomplete
recollection and was of opinion that he suffered
a mild blackout. No medical evidence was given.
The Justices being of opinion that on the balance
of probabilities he had been overcome by a sudden
disabling illness of short duration which had dis
abled him from applying the brakes they dismissed
the information. 1'he prosecutor appealed.
It was held on appeal that there was no burden
on a defendant in a dangerous driving case. The
burden was always on the prosecution to negative
any defence, such as latent defect which was not
the driver's fault, but before that burden arose it
was for the defendant to raise it. An excuse was
not sufficient.
Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland
[(1963) A.C. 386] was a true case of automation
as a defence to a charge of murder. In all these
cases, the question was whether the driver was in
control and whether what he did or did not do
was voluntary or involuntary. The mere fact that
the Justices thought that the respondent's evi
dence was apparently credible was not a sufficient
foundation for the defence and they had come to
the wrong conclusion. The case should be sent
back with a direction to convict.
[Cooke v Atchinson; S.J., Vol. 112, No. 12, p.
235].
Husband and Wife: Jurisdiction where applicant
is domiciled and resident in Ireland; respondent
resident in England
The parties were married in Ireland in 1942
both being Roman Catholics. In 1944 the wife left
Ireland and finally settled in England where she
now resided. The husband was born and domi
ciled in Ireland and still resided there. The hv.s-
band sought a decree of nullity in the English
Court on the ground of the wife's incapacity or,
alternatively, wilful refusal to consummate the
marriage. The petition was not defended. It was
held that a marriage wherever celebrated could
be declared null and void if the resident in the
country where the relief was sought was the party
against whom the charge was made. The residence
of the wife could be established by proof of service.