158 / 736
would be a violation of the rule of natural justice
audi alteram partem. The Court cannot give it
self jurisdiction by inviting the person (as the
prisoner was invited in this case) to make his case
as that would be an abrogation of the legal effect
of abandonment. Accordingly the Court of Crim
inal Appeal had no jurisdiction to make the order
which it made and the warrant of that Court was
not a good justification for the prisoner's detention.
In the Central Criminal Court before Mr. Jus
tice Butler the prisoner had been sentenced to 7
years penal servitude but it was ordered that if
certain conditions were fulfilled he should be re
leased after serving 3 years. The condition imposed
was that the prisoner after 36 months should enter
into a bond having observed prison discipline.
Neither the sentence of 7 years nor the sentence of
36 months could stand unless the proviso was held
good. The objections to this sentence could not
be disposed of by saying that it was valid at any
rate for 36 months; to construe it in that way
would do violence to the clear intention of the trial
judge as expressed in the form of sentence. To de
termine the duration of the prisoner's detention
under this sentence it would be necessary to de
cide whether or not he had observed prison dis
cipline during the 36 months. This decision would
have to be made by prison officials and this
amounted
to delegation of a function which
under the constitution was reserved to the Judic
iary and accordingly the sentence was bad.
The judge did not consider it necessary to deal
with the submission on behalf of W. that the Court
of Criminal Appeal was itself unconstitutional in
so far as it was the Court of Appeal from the
High Court sitting as the Central Criminal Court.
(Ex parte Woods: 30th May, 1968. Supreme
Court).
Contract—"Dispute respecting a Bid"
Property was auctioned with a reserve of £25,800.
Bidding opened at £10,000 and the only bidders
were the plaintiff and the auctioneer on behalf of
the Vendors. The plaintiff bid £26,000 and the
property was knocked down to him. Immediately
D, who was sitting at the front, below the auction
eer claimed that the property had been knocked
down to him, at £26,000 and that he had bid by
raising his catalogue. This action had been un
noticed by the auctioneer but seen by his two
clerks. The auctioneer decided that there was a
dispute respecting a bid within the meaning of
condition 2 of the National Condtioins of Sale
and he put the property up for resale. The plain
tiff eventually purchased the property for £37,500
but then refused to sign the memorandum and
the auctioneer signed it on his behalf. The plain
tiff then brought an action against the vendors,
for specific performance of the contract at £26,000
and alternatively, damages against the auctioneers
for failing to sign a memorandum of sale at
£26,000. The action against the plaintiff was dis
continued. This was an appeal against the decis
ion of the trial judge dismissing the action against
the auctioneer the grounds of appeal being there
was no dispute respecting a bid within condition
2. Held; there was a dispute within the meaning of
condition 2. The appeal was dismissed.
(Richards v. Phillips & Oats, 1968 2. WLR. 14.)
Road Traffc Act—breach of statutory duty giving
rise to Civic Liability
A car was parked without negligence by the third
party opposite a road marking in contravention
of reg. 23 (2) (a) of the Traffic Signs Regulations
and General Directions 1964, and this had a
causative effect on an accident resulting in injury
to the plaintiff a passenger in a vehicle driven
negligently by the second defendant and owned
by the first defendant. The defendants admitted
liability and claimed contribution from the third
party based on breach of statutory duty in parking
his car. No negligence at common law was found
against the third party. In his judgement Ashworth
J. referred to London Passenger Transport Board
v. Upson (1949) A.C. 155 in which is was held
that a breach of the Pedestrian Crossing Places
(Traffic) Regulations 1941 gave rise to a civil
liability to a person who was knocked down. It
was argued here that the 1941 regulations were
designed
to protect pedestrians while those of
1964 were of general application and the breach
could not give rise to civic liability at all. His
lordship took the viw that both regulations were
designed in the first place to avoid accidents and
prevent injury. Persons in breach of them must
in the nature of things be adding to the probabilit
ies that accidents would follow. Having established
the breach, the defendants were entitled to say
that the third party had contributed to the accid
ent. His lordship assessed the third party's liability
in the circumstances of accident, at a very low
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