The Gazette 1967/71

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residue and be split among all the testator's chil–
dren equally. The farm lands had potential devel–
opment value. There being disagreement on the
price for the farms, the executors petitioned the
court to declare whether the options were valid,
and if so, on what basis the properties should be
valued.
was held (C.A. : Harman, Davies and Russell
, 16th March 1967), that an option to pur–
"at a reasonable valuation" was an enforce–
able option, and if the parties could not arrive
at such a valuation, the court could determine the
reasonable value by ordering an inquiry into the
matter; the valuation should be made as at the
death of the testator, but taking into consideration
subsequent developments. Per Russell L.J. : the
option need not be exercised until the reasonable
value was ascertained. [Talbot v Talbot (1967)
3 W.L.R. 438].
Company Dissolution
In re Cornish Manures Ltd., a company went
into liquidation and transferred its undertaking to
a new company. The old company owed £8,701
to the new company, but the directors of the new
company waived the debt. The new company
went into liquidation, and the £8,701 was divided
among the only two shareholders of the old com–
pany. The liquidator of the old company retained
a sum of money to meet surtax. The final general
meeting of the old company was held on 18th
July 1964, and a day or so later the liquidator
received a surtax demand which had been delayed
in the post. The liquidator appended a note to
his return on the final winding up and explained
the position. The account and return was registered
by the Registrar of Companies on 21st July 1964.
The surtax was paid on 9th October 1964. On
18th November 1966, the liquidator of the new
company applied for a declaration under Section
352 of the Companies Act, 1948, that the disso–
lution of the old company was void.
It was held (Ch.D. : Pennycuick J. : 26th April
1967), that the declaration could not be granted;
it was out of time under Section 352 (1) because
the old company had been dissolved more than
two years previously. Section 290 (1) of the Act
stated that the affairs of the company should be
"fully wound up" before the account was made
up. In the present case, when the liquidator had
made up his account before the final general
meeting, he had fully dealt with the affairs of
the company so far as he was aware. By Section
249 (4) the company was deemed to be dissolved
on the expiration of three months from the regis–
tration of the return, i.e. it was dissolved on 21st
October 1964. Since he had applied for the
declaration on 18th November 1966, the liquidator
was out of time, and the court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the motion. [Re Cornish Manures
Ltd. (1967) 1 W.L.R. 807].
Larceny Act, 1916, Section 8 (1)
It is an offence contrary to Section 8 (1) of the
Larceny Act, 1916, if any person "steals or with
intent to steal, rips, cuts, severs or breaks (a) any
glass or woodwork belonging to any building . . ."
This offence is not committed where there is no
intent to steal the glass or woodwork ripped, cut,
severed or broken. It is not sufficient that there is
an intent to steal something else, access to which
is gained by the ripping or cutting of woodwork.
The appellants had ripped up floorboards in a
derelict house to get at the copper pipes under–
neath, when they were interrupted by a police
officer. As they had no intention of stealing the
floorboards their conviction under Section 8 (1)
was quashed. [R. v Harlow and Winstanley
(1967), 2 W.L.R. 702; (1967), 1 A.E.R. 683.
Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Parker,
C.J.. Winn L.J., and James J.].
No Case to Answer
The accused was charged on an indictment con–
taining (inter alia) count five, larceny of a driving
licence and count six, an alternative count charg–
ing receiving the licence knowing it to have been
stolen. Counsel for the accused submitted that
there was no case to answer on counts five and
six. The judge held it would not be proper to
leave count five to the jury, and they need not
concern themselves with it, but count six must
stand. Subsequently the recall of a prosecution
witness was permitted, and in view of his answers
the judge reversed his ruling in respect of count
five and the accused was convicted on that count
among others. The Court of Appeal was of the
opinion that where there are two alternative
counts of larceny and receiving, it is only if there
is, at the end of the prosecution case, no evidence
to support either count that it can be right to
withdraw the matter from the jury. However, as
count five had in fact been withdrawn, a verdict
of guilty should not have been taken on it, nor
should a witness have been recalled to give evi–
dence on count five, which was by that stage dead
and finished. The accused's conviction on count
five was therefore quashed. [R. v Plain (1967),
1 W.L.R. 565; (1967), 1 A.E.R. 614. Court of
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