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Shipping
The Admiralty jurisdiction
in rem
may be invoked
either
against the offending ship
or
against any other
ship in the same ownership but not against both.
[The Banco. Court of Appeal.
The Times,
10 Decem
ber, 1970.]
When a ship has to call upon a tug for help a claim
subsequently made by the tug against the ship con
stitutes a general average loss as being a direct conse
quence of a general average act.
[Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v. Green
and Others. Court of Appeal.
The Times,
3 December,
1970.]
Social Welfare
Husband of plaintiff in employment of C.I.E. in June
1968 when oxyacetiline equipment, which he was using,
exploded and gave him severe burns to his hand and
arms. He claimed injury benefit under the Social Welfare
(Ocupational Injuries) Act 1966 and medical certificates
relating to his incapacity were given weekly from time
of the accident until his sudden death in October 1968;
most medical certificates diagnosed burns on the hands
but four mentioned endogenous depression; he had had
coronary heart disease and hypertension before
the
accident. The widow plaintiff claimed death benefit under
the Act of 1966 on the ground that the accident in June
produced a nervous condition
in her husband, which
was one of the reasons that caused his death. Her claim
was rejected by the deciding officer; she then appealed
to an appeals officer, who heard
the claim with a
medical assessor, in July 1969. In November 1969, she
received the decision of the appeals officer rejecting the
claim on the ground that the accident did not arise out
of and in the course of his employment. This decision
was arrived at as a result of correspondence between
the Department and a heart specialist. The specialist
stated that a psychiatrist had not diagnosed in August
1968 that as a result of this injury, the deceased had an
anxiety depressive state. The heart specialist was there
fore of opinion that there was nothing that could con
nect the accident with injury to the heart, and that there
seemed to be no sign connecting the accident with the
death from coronary thrombosis. Another doctor testi
fied to the contrary at the appeals hearing.
Claims for benefit under the Act of 1966 are regulated
by the procedural sections of the Social Welfare Act
1952. Inter alia there is an appeal from the decision of
the appeals officer to the High Court as to whether an
accident did in fact arise out of and in the course of
employment. If there is evidence to support the findings
of the appeals officer,
the High Court has no juris
diction to set them aside. But the High Court has a
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that proceedings con
form with the principles of natural justice, and that
decisions given are in accordance with the law. The
law on the admission of evidence is clearly stated by
Lord Diplock in R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Com
missioner Ex Parte Moore—(1965) 1 A.E.R. 94. Here
the plaintiff through her solicitor wished to call ad
ditional evidence before the appeals officer but with
drew the application, because that officer made a remark
which was thought to mean that he was going to decide
the case in plaintiff's favour. Through a misunderstand
ing, the requirements that the appeal officer should hear
all the relevant evidence was not pursued. Kenny J.
therefore allowed the appeal and gave a direction that
the case be re-heard before a different appeals officer
and medical assessor. The costs of the appeal, including
the transcript, were awarded to the plaintiff.
[Kiely v. Minister for Social Welfare. Kenny J. Un-
reported. 16 December, 1970.]
Solicitors
The summary jurisdiction which the courts exercise
over -solicitors under which they may be attached or
committed to prison for default in undertakings given to
the court or in their professional capacity is only to be
invoked in clear cases for disciplinary purposes. It is
quite inappropriate where there are difficult issues to be
tried and where the solicitor denies liability for under
takings given in the name of his firm by his clerk.
[Geoffrey Solver & Drake v Baines. Court of Appeal.
The Times,
11 November, 1970.]
Stamp Duties
Foster
J.,
in
a
reserved
judgment decided
that
ad valorem
stamp duty was payable on an order made
by Mr. Justice Pennycuick on July 19, 1965, as being a
"conveyance or transfer on sale" within the meaning of
Schedule 1
to the Stamp Act, 1891. His Lordship also
ruled that the judge's order was "an
instrument ex
ecuted" for the purposes of section 14(4) of the Act,
with
the startling result that,
if
the order was un
stamped, the court could not look at its own order. The
sumons on which the judge was giving judgement was
issued by the Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd against the
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and concerned Sun
Alliance's offer
to purchase
the share capital of the
London Assurance Company.
Section 14(4) provides that ". .
. an instrument executed
... in any part of the United Kingdom .
.
. shall not
... be given in evidence or be available for any purpose
whatsoever unless it is duly stamped .
.
."
[Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Com
missioners. Foster J.
The Times,
18 November, 1970.]
Tax Law
In arriving at the open market price under section
7(5) of the Finance Act 1894, for the purposes of estate
duty of property passing on death, the valuer should
look at the property as it is at the moment after death.
Thus where land owned by the deceased ceased to be
subject to the Agricultural Holdings Acts on his death
it fell to be valued on a vacant possession basis.
[Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Graham and
Others. House of Lords.
The Times,
11 December, 1970.]
Ribena, a product manufactured by Beecham Foods
Ltd., was held to be a medicine and, as such, exempt
from all purchase tax as being a preparation consisting
only of vitamin C and a vehicle therefor.
[Beecham Foods Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs
and Excise Court of Appeal.
The Times,
4 December,
1970.]
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