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of impeding the apprehension or prosecution of the

thief, the Court said.

[Regina v. Brindley. Regina v. Long. Court of Appeal.

The Times,

24 February, 1971.]

When

dismissing

an appeal by Surenda Kumar

Sakhuja, aged 35, of Hove, against conviction at East

Sussex Quarter Sessions of driving with a proportion of

alcohol in his blood exceeding

the prescribed limit,

contrary to section 1(1) of the Road Safety Act, 1967,

the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Fenton Atkinson, Mr.

Justice Lyell and Mr. Justice Mars-Jones) granted a

certificate that a point of law of general public import

ance was involved in the decision.

The point was whether, on the true construction of

section 2(1) of the Act, in cases where a suspicion arises

with respect to a person driving while his vehicle is in

motion, that person, if immediately pursued by a con

stable in uniform, may be required to provide a speci

men of breath for a breath test, notwithstanding that

at the conclusion of the pursuit he is no longer a person

driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a road

or other public place.

[Court of Appeal.

The Times,1)

March, 1971.]

Car dealers who sold a used car with a false number

of miles shown on the milage indicator could not avail

themselves of the statutory defence to a charge under the

Trade Descriptions Ate, 1968 — that the falsity was due

to the act or default of another person — because they

had made no record of the milage when they bought

the car and had made no inquiries about the milage from

previous owners.

[Richmond upon Thames, Borough Council v. Motor

Sales (Hounslow) Ltd. Q.B.D.

The Times,

10 February,

1971.]

When giving judgment dismissing an appeal against

conviction for causing death by dangerous driving con

trary to section 1(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, the

Lord Chief Justice said that, so long as the dangerous

driving was a cause of the accident and something more

than de minimis, the statute operated. Nothing in the

statute required the manner of driving to be a sub

stantial or major cause of accident. "Substantial" was

a convenient word to use to indicate to a jury that it

must be something more than de minimis.

[Regina v. Harrigon. Court of Appeal.

The Times,

26 February, 1971.]

Death Duties

The Honourable Arthur Guinness executed two settle

ments

in October 1929 by which

the settlor, Lady

Oranmore and Browne, would have become entitled to

one third of the trust fund if she were alive in October

1954. At that time, in 1954, the settlor made a settle

ment by which she assigned and transferred to named

trustees one half of the funds to which she would have

been entitled under the 1929 settlement, therein after

calling the Trust Fund, to hold upon the trusts therein

specified —

(a) To pay the stamp duty and costs of the deed.

(b) To pay the income towards the education and

benefit of minors.

(c) To pay £50,000 to each of the children of the

settlor, Gay Kindersley (24), Garech Browne (15), and

Tara Browne (9) who shall have married before then or

before the age of 30.

(d) To pay one half of the Trust Fund to such of

the children as shall attain 30 in equal shares, the re

maining half of the Trust Fund to be paid to such of

the children as shall attain 40. If any such children

should die before attaining the ages of 30 or 40 leaving

issue, such grandchildren shall be entitled

to

their

proper share at 21 years of age. There was a clause

which permitted the Trustees to appropriate any interest

or share which the Trustee deem reasonable. Another

clause gave power to the Trustees to receive remuner

ation. Yet another clause (18) provided that all estate,

succession or other duties which may be payable on the

death of any person in respect of the Trust Fund or his

or her interest therein shall be payable out of the

capital of the Trust Fund.

On 11 October 1954, the Trustees divided the settle

ment of October 1954 into six equal parts and approp

riated these in satisfaction of the shares of the Trust

Fund to which each of the 3 children would become

entitled when the attained the ages of 30 years or 40

years respectively. Gay Kindersley married in 1956 and

was paid £50,000. On attaining 30 years on June 2, 1960,

a one sixth share was duly transferred to him. When

Tara Browne married, he was also paid £50,000. In

December 1966, Tara was killed in a motor accident,

when he was 21; he left a widow and two sons. The

Irish Revenue have claimed large sums for estate and

succession duty.

It was claimed that all these death duties should be

discharged out of the total amount of capital held by

Trustees in December 1966, and not solely out of the

two one-sixth share apropriated to Tara's interest in

1954. It was also claimed that the appropriation of 1954

had the effect of creating six separate trust funds.

Kenny J. held that Clause 18 meant that any death

duties on the death of any person payable out of the

Trust Fund was to be paid out of capital only and not

out of income. Therefore the whole Trust Fund is not

liable for death duties but only Tara's one sixth shares

duly appropriated. The costs of the summons are to be

borne as to one third by each of the children equally.

[Royal Trust Company (Ireland) Ltd. v. Gay Kinder

sley and Others. Kenny J. Unreported. 15 January 1971.]

Family

[See under Affiliation. Regina v. Gravesend. Justices.]

Gaming and Lotteries

[See under Club Tehrari and Another v Roston.

Q.B.D.

The Times,

18 February, 1971.]

Guardianship of Infants

Application in respect of the custody of three children

in a case where the parents were separated. The majority

of the Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh C. J., Walsh and

McLoughlin J. J.) affirmed Kenny J. in granting custody

of the eldest boy of 10, and the girl of 9 to the father,

while granting custody of the youngest -boy of 7 to the

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