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mother. Budd and Fitzgerald J. J. agreed as regards the

respective custody of the boys, but would have granted

custody of the girl to the mother, after having inter

viewed her.

Per O'Dalaigh C. J.: — "In disposing of the custody

of children, a court must take parents as it finds them.

Where a marriage has broken down, temporarily or

permanently, it may be possible that the welfare of the

children requires that one or other parent should, by

reason of character or conduct, the excluded from con

sideration, as being a person unfit for custody. The

Court should, in my opinion, always be reluctant to

reach such a conclusion. If the homes of the separated

parents were close enough to a single suitable school, I

would favour maintaining the unity of the children, and

allowing them to reside for half the year with one

parent, and the other half with the other. But this is not

practiuable here.

Per Walsh I.: — "Under Section 1 of the Guardian

ship of Infants Act 1964, if one parent is given custody

of the infant to the exclusion, total or partial, of the

other parent, that does not deprive the parent who

loses the custody of the other rights which accrue to

him or her as guardian of the infant." A parent so

deyrived of custody can continue to exercise the rights

of a guardian, and must be consulted in all matters

affecting the religious, moral, intellectual, physical and

social welfare of the child. The Act does not perport to

encourage any alteration of the established practice of

the Courts that they must act very cautiously in exercis

ing their jurisdiction to interfere with parental rights, and

the Court will act in oposition to the parent or parents

onl where judicially satisfied that the welfare of the

child requires that the wishes of the parent or parents

should be over-ruled.

[B. v. B. Supreme Court. Unreported. 24 April 1970.]

The Supreme Court unanimously upheld Butler J. in

granting custody of the eldest daughter of 17, and the

youngest son of 6 to the mother, while the custody of

the eldest boy of 16 and next eldest boy of 11 was

granted to the father, as the parents were separated.

The youngest boy however, as the husband and wife

did not live far from one another, was to spend the

week-ends with his father and brothers.

[C. v. G. Supreme Court. Unreported. 8 May 1970.]

The welfare of 4 children, two girls and two boys,

aged from 6 to 10 years was at stake, whose full cus

tody Kenny J. eventually awarded to the mother, as she

had already obtained custody of them in 1966, and the

husband was allegedly unfeeling and unemotional. The

wife was living in her separate home, to which the

husband

contributed nothing, with

an

entertainer,

with whom

she

was

enamoured.

A

newspaper

report

in November

1970

stated

that

the

enter

tainer and the wife were to be married. It was also

stated that the husband had not a proper home to

bring the children to. The wife was given custody of

the children on condition that she would give a solemn

undertaking not to take the children out of the Republic,

not to sell or mortgage her house. The husband was

granted access to the children once a week. However

before the end of January 1971, the wife committed

contempt of court by fraudulently procuring passports

for the children, and absconding with them and the

entertainer, to Hawaii.

Per Kenny J.: — "Custody is not a reward for good

matrimonial behaviour, nor should the Court deprive

the parent of it as a way of showing disapproval of

conduct which most people in this community regard

as immoral. Neither the father nor the mother has a

right superior to the other to the custody of the children;

the emphasis now is on the rights of the children. I do

not accept the proposition that a parent who has been

guilty of matrimonial misconduct is necessarily unfit to

have custody, and that the "innocent party is in every

case the one who will best promote the interests of

the child. If our aim is to produce happy, balanced and

well integrated people, we should look at the condition

which will produce this result, and at the qualities which

th parents have, such as that the children should have

security. They must be given the chance to grow roots.

The element of unity of the children in this case favours

the mother."

[O'B. v. O'B. Kenny J. Unreported. 5 January 1971.]

Master

and Servant

Two school teachers in Co. Durham who were sus

pended because of their refusal to supervise school

meals were held to be entitled to recover their accrued

salary during the period of suspension.

[Gorse and Another v. Durham County Council and

Another. Q.B.D.

The Times, 6

March, 1971.]

Negligence

A person whose car was borrowed without his consent

and who told the borrower to bring it back was not

liable for damages resulting from an accident which

occurred while the borrower was returning it.

[Klein v. Celuori. Q.B.D

The Times,

18 February,

1971.]

The Post Office were held not to be liable for the

admitted negligence of a trainee employee when driving

his father's van with another trainee as passenger on

their way to their place of work. The driver was entitled

to claim milage and passenger allowance for the journey,

and the driver's liability for the passenger's injuries was

held to be covered by the father's comprehensive insur-

person "other than a passenger carried by reason of or

ance policy, which excluded liability for injury to any

in pursuance of a contract of employment."

[Nottingham v. Aldridge and Another? Prudential

Assurance Co. Ltd. (third party). Q.B.D.

The Times,

25 February, 1971.]

A groove down a highway caused by work done neg

ligently by county council workmen when removing a

double white line from the road surface was held to

have created a danger in the special circumstances of the

case so as to make the highway authority vicariously

liable to a young man who came off his motor cycle

when he went over a resulting rough patch and was

severely injured. The court in so deciding emphasized

that an uneveness in a road or pavement does not of

itself give a cause of action to everyone who falls be

cause of it.

[Bright v. Attorney General. Court of Appeal.

The

Times,

26 February, 1971.]

257