77 / 736
the British National Insurance (Industrial In
juries) Acts.
Contributions for occupational injuries benefit
purposes only are payable in full by employers and
no part of them is recoverable from the insured
persons.
Mise, Je meas,
P. I. COLE
Eric A. Plunkett, Esq.,
CASES
OF
THE
MONTH
Resale by Seller in Possession
Where an unpaid seller of goods in possession
of the goods resells the goods or part of them un
der section 48 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the
resale rescinds the contract. Thus the buyer is
discharged for any further liability to pay the
purchase price and the seller is entitled to retain
the proceeds of sale whether they be more or less
than the contract price. If the proceeds of sale are
less (after taking into account the expenses of re
sale), the seller is entitled to sue the buyer for
damages for non-acceptance. (Gallagher v Shil-
cock [1949] 1 AER 921 overruled). (R. V. Ward
Ltd. v Bignall [1967] 2 AER 449).
Priority Over Agent's Lien on Deposit
At an auction, V's farm was sold to P for
£30,000 and under the contract a ten per cent
deposit was paid to A, an estate agent as stake
holder. The purchase price was insufficient to1
dis
charge three mortgages on the farm and P sought
to have the deposit money used for that purpose.
A claimed a lien over the money for his charges.
Held: That since P would not be obliged to pay
the balance of the purchase price to V but could
use the money to discharge incumbrances, so also
he could use the deposit which he had paid to a
stakeholder; that stakeholder's lien would only
attach to the remainder.
(Skinner v The Trustee of the Property of Reed
[1967.1 2 AER 1286).
Cost-Taxation
In an action for damages under the Fatal Ac
cidents Acts and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1934 Karminski
J. y
approving on
behalf of an infant dependant a settlement between
the parties, gave judgement on February 16th,
1967 for the first plaintiff for agreed damages,
with costs to be taxed on a common fund basis.
On May 18th, 1967 the district registrar taxed
the first plaintiff's bill of costs and on the same
date, without informing the parties of his intention
so to do, signed a certificate of taxation. The de
fendant on May 31st took out a summons before
the district registrar for an extension of time in
which to apply for a review of taxation. That
summons was dismissed on June 2nd, 1967 and the
defendants appealed and also, on June 28th, took
out a summons before the Judge in Chambers to
set aside the certificate of taxation.
The hearing took place in chambers.
Chapman J. The proviso to Rules of the Supreme
Court Ord. 6 2 r. 33 (2) is mandatory and the cer
tificate of taxation is an absolute bar to a review
of taxation unless set aside. The proviso does not
merely impose a time limit capable of extension
under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord 3 r. 5.
As to the application to set aside the certificate of
taxation, Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 62 r.
33, contemplates that an opportunity to apply for
a review will be open. I find it surprising that the
certificate was signed immediately after taxation
which is certainly not the practice in London. In
my judgement the registrar should not do that
unless he has made it absolutely clear to the par
ties that that is what he is minded to do and they
have consented to his doing so. That is particularly
important where, as here, the solicitors on one side
are agents for London solicitors who would have
to consider whether they desire to apply for a re
view. It should be done only with the consent of
the parties because they they should have ample
opportunity to consider the matter, seeing that all
right of appeal will be precluded once the certi
ficate is signed. It would be contrary to justice
to allow the certificate to stand and the case falls
within the principle laid down in In re Furber
(1898) 42 Sol. Jo. 613, C.A.
(Brown and Another v Youde [1967]
1
WLR p.
1544).
69