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217

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVENUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION…

On the other side of the spectrum, M. Messina argues that the incorporation

could take the form of either (i) a Treaty amendment in simplified revision procedure,

or (ii) EU secondary legislation based on legal basis of Art. 20 TEU and/or Art. 136

TFEU.

67

However, the second option does not seem to address the problem raised by

K. A. Armstrong with regard to the ‘balanced budget rule’; for the rest of the TSCG

provisions, this could be the feasible method to bring the fiscal coordination and

governance back into the EU legal framework.

Further, the SRF Agreement foresees a similar course of events, albeit at a later

date.

68

With these two instruments incorporated, one might ask whether the ESM,

given its close link to the TSCG, should not be taken on board of EU Treaties as

well. However, in the case of the ESM, the recourse to EU secondary legislation is

much more problematic, and enhanced cooperation cannot be used. As the CJEU

clearly stated in

Pringle

case, the EU has no competence to create a mechanism such

as the ESM.

69

For the incorporation of the ESM we would thus need a TEU/TFEU

amendment, arguably increasing the Union’s competence and thus in the form of

ordinary revision procedure.

70

In the context of the above, it seems inescapable that by 2018 the architecture

of the EMU will be once again fundamentally changed, which might trigger some

other changes once the EU primary law will be opened and subject to amendments

(e.g. certain institutional changes proposed by the European Parliament). However,

fear not the future, dear reader – the system can hardly get any more complex to

navigate than the current one, with the intergovernmental exits and parallel avenues

along the EU speedway.

equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States,

would be of

constitutional significance and would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235

. It

could be brought about only by way of Treaty amendment

.” (para. 35, emphasis added)

67

M. Messina,

op. cit.

in

supra

note 64, pp. 414-416.

68

Art. 16(2) of the SRF Agreement provides the following: “

Within ten years of the date of entry into force of

this Agreement, at the latest, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation contained

in the reports drawn up by the Board in accordance with paragraph 1, the necessary steps shall be taken, in

accordance with the TEU and the TFEU, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Agreement

into the legal framework of the Union.

” As to the foreseen entry into force of the SRF Agreement, in

Declaration no. 2, made by the Contracting Parties and Observers at the Intergovernmental Conference

and deposited with the SRF Agreement, the signatories pronounced that they

“will strive to complete

its process of ratification in accordance with their respective national legal requirements in due time so as to

permit the Single Resolution Mechanism to be fully operational by 1 January 2016”.

69

See

supra

note 41. M. Messina (

op. cit.

in

supra

note 64, p. 410) argues in the opposite direction, but

that seems to disregard the CJEU’s reasoning in

Pringle

case.

70

Unlike the TSCG and the SRF Agreement, the ESM Treaty does not contain any provision on future

incorporation into the EU legal framework.