289 / 532
273
ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BOUND BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS…
understood as
a form of permanent international cooperation, created as an organized
entity on the basis of an instrument
25
governed by international law, possessing at least one
organ with a will distinct from that of its founding members in order to achieve purposes
for which it was created
. I identify myself also with the “caveat” of
Jan Klabbers
,
according to which it is nearly impossible to define “international organisation” in a
comprehensive (and abstract) way. But, as he adds, when we see one, we usually can
identify it as such.
26
International organisations became the decisive aspect of institutionalisation of
the cooperation of States in the last century,
inter alia
, because they can be created for
nearly any purpose and endowed with competences adequate to their functions.
27
But
the post-World War II era is characterized by a remarkable shift in the understanding
of international organisations from being purely “vehicles” of their member states’
interests in narrowly determined areas
28
to multifunctional entities vested with greatly
increased functions and competences which concern many areas of vital interest for
the international community.
29
In the course of this process international organisations became more independent
from their Member States – in legal and extra-legal terms. In legal terms, they
are not anymore understood as a “speaking tube”, i.e. as an instrument used to
express the consolidated will of its members. Such an entity could be considered
to be an international collegial organ acting on behalf of its members, but not an
international organisation. Today, they are considered to be separate legal persons
under international law as they carry out activities resulting from their
own
will
created by their
own organs
. Their own will and conduct are accepted as belonging to
the group of common denominators of various definitions of the term “international
organisation”, but, more importantly, they reflect and signify the autonomy of the
organisation and its ability to conduct activities on its own. And it is this ability
other sources
cf
. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, Ignaz, LOIBL, Gerhard.
Das Recht der Internationalen
Organisationen einschliesslich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften
. 7. Auflage. Köln: Carl Heymanns,
2000, para. 0105; SCHERMERS, Henry G., BLOKKER, Niels M.
International Institutional Law:
Unity within diversity
. 4. ed. Boston/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003, pp. 26-37, paras. 33-45.
AMERASINGHE, Chittharanjan F.
Principles of the institutional law of international organizations
.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 9-11.
25
The term „international instrument“ appears more suitable as the founding instrument does not have
to constitute an international agreement. This was the case with the UNICEF, which was created by the
UN GA Resolution 57 [I] from 11. December 1946. But for example in the case of the OSCE, there
is no founding instrument at all.
26
KLABBERS, Jan.
An introduction to international institutional law
. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009, p. 6.
27
KLEIN, Eckart. Die Internationalen und Supranationalen Organisationen. In:
VITZTHUM,
Wolfgang
Graf (Hrsg.).
Völkerrecht
. 2. Auflage. Berlin: De Gryuter, 2001, p. 273.
28
Cf.
especially the forerunners of international organisations, such as the river commissions, e.g. the
Rhine Commission, European Commission for the Danube, etc.
29
With regard to the influence of international organisations on international law see for example:
BOTHE, Michael, et al.
Völkerrecht
. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (Hrsg.). 2. Auflage. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 2001, p. 279
et seq.