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UMBRELLA CLAUSE ȃ ADDITIONAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BY CLAUS…
or enforce any commitment or undertaking”
and “(2)
Neither Party may condition
the receipt…of an advantage, in connection with…an investment in its territory of an
investor…on compliance with any requirement”
. The “automatic” protection is given
once the host state [has] committed a breach of a special investment, despite the
fact that it is not yet clear what effect the words “commitment” and “obligation”,
as well as any nuances of these could have in their subsequent interpretation by
the international tribunal, could have
.
Therefore, the Tribunal’s interpretation and
application of particular principles of contract law to resolve the conflict between the
BIT and the contract is often mistaken, as the examples given above show.
Nevertheless, any Arbitral Tribunal has to follow the proper language of the BIT,
specifically the umbrella clause, as well as the language of an investment agreement
between the parties, with the investor and the State exercising their commercial
subjectivity, i.e,
iurie gestionis
, and not
iure imperii
,
are bound. If the text of the BIT
and the wording of the investment agreement are clear, there is no place for any
interpretation of the will of the parties. In this regard, when the ordinary meaning of
the text (of the Treaty or the contract) is clear and makes sense in its context, there
is no occasion to have recourse to other means of interpretation. In the
Phosphates in
Morocco
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice advised that, in case of
doubt, an international court should give a restrictive interpretation of a clause in a
treaty, because such a clause “must on no account be interpreted in such a way as to
exceed the intention of the States that subscribed to it.”
82
However, if the words in
their natural meaning are ambiguous or could lead to an unacceptable outcome, then
the Court, by resorting to other methods of interpretation, must seek to discover
what the parties actually meant “when they used those words”. These premises was
also confirmed in an earlier statement of the Court in the
UN Advisory Opinion
on Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations
.
83
In addition, The International Court of Justice (ICJ) drew attention to the
case
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain
84
to what it had previously declared in the Case concerning
Territorial Dispute
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad
(Judgment dated February 3, 1994): “In accordance with
customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty. As
a supplementary measure recourse may be had to means of interpretation such as
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”
85
And
finally, the ICJ reaffirmed its conclusion in the case concerning
Rights of Nationals of
82
Phosphates in Morocco Case (Italy v. France)
, PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 74, 1938, p. 14.
83
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations
, ICJ Reports, 1950,
p. 8.
84
Qatar v. Bahrain
, ICJ Reports 1995 p. 18 para. 33.
85
Territorial Dispute,
Judgment of February 3, 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, pp. 21-22, para. 41.