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69

THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE

the notion “act of aggression” in the Kampala definition differs from the

jus ad

bellum

1974 Definition of Aggression and in what way the Kampala definition of the

crime of aggression departs from the

jus ad bellum

concept, including international

customary law, and which implications it has or will have in the future. It is clear

that prohibition of the “use of force” is a much broader subject than prohibition of

“aggression” only. The definition of aggression is of course closely related to armed

attack and self-defense. The focus of this work has been on aggression as an unlawful

use of force and not on international criminal responsibility of individuals for crimes

of aggression. Nevertheless the 2010 Kampala definition of the crime of aggression is

important not only for the ICC but also for

jus ad bellum

. The related issues include

the right of self-defense according to Art. 51 of the UN Charter and its relationship

with the rules of customary international law. Such items as self-defense, including

so called anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense or so called accumulation-of-events

doctrine, have been the subject of the Committee research too. The Committee has

been dealing practically with all violations of Art. 2 (4) of the UNCharter prohibiting

the use of force. Art. 2 (4) and Art. 51 as well have become the subject of permanent

controversial interpretations and even misinterpretations. Art. 2 (4) is still a

jus

of cogens

norm, despite frequent violations of it. In this connection various forms of

military interventions (humanitarian intervention, intervention on invitation or with

consent), Security Council (SC) authorization, and forcible protection of nationals

abroad, environmental protection and the use of force in cyber operations are on the

agenda of the Committee. This study does not go into the details of these problems

and does not discuss the questions of domestic criminalization of aggression and

implementation of the Kampala definition in domestic law, including the principle

of complementarities.

Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter is the basis of any definition of aggression.

Not every unlawful use of armed force, of course, necessarily equates to an “act of

aggression”. However, in the author’s view, it is rather difficult to determine any “act

of aggression” which for responsible does not constitute at the same time a “crime

of aggression” or “criminal act of aggression”. “Great Powers” will consider probably

any armed use of force not only against their land territory but also against their

ships, planes, forces etc. as a “crime of aggression”. It might be also be complicated

to credibly recognize which acts of aggression have “serious” or “substantial” impact

on violation of Art. 2 (4). The problem of the definition was and still is a matter of

great controversy (even after Kampala). Attempts at defining aggression with the aim

of prohibiting acts of aggression go back to the League of Nations and to the idea

of a collective security system in Europe. The concept of “aggression” has been used

together with the concepts of “force” and “armed attack”. The relationship between

aggression and armed attack has never been clear enough. The legal meaning of

aggression in the post-Charter era has got a new connotation. It is clear that there

exists mutual interdependence between the notions aggression and armed attack.

The term “aggression” had been considered to be too controversial even during the