The Gazette 1961

Costs incurred by- him before the receipt of notice

of payment into court. In other words, the plaintiff

could still get his costs up to the time of payment

into court; but the sanction was that thereafter he

was liable to be ordered to pay all the defendants'

costs from that date. On that interpretation of the

rules the plaintiff here would be entitled to his costs

up to the date of the payment in which he accepted

and the defendants should have their costs thereafter.

If that interpretation was not correct, this would

be a case where as the rules did not specifically

provide for what should be done about costs,

Order 47, rule i, would apply, and the Court in

the exercise of its discretion as

to costs should

make the same order in favour of the plaintiff.

The appeal should be allowed and

the Court

would order that there should be paid out to

the plaintiff the sum of £83 is. 3d. from the moneys

held in court, that the plaintiff's costs of the action

up to October 2, 1962, be paid by the defendants,

and that the defendants' costs from October 2 to the

date of the County Court hearing should be paid by

the plaintiff.

(Gold

Introductions Ltd.,

The Times,

March 19)

1963.

Solicitors Journal,

March 29, page 253.)

Wrongful dismissal—breach of principles of natural

justice

The House of Lords has allowed the appeal by

Charles Ridge, formerly Chief Constable of Brighton,

from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his

appeal against the judgment of the High Court

dismissing his action against the Brighton Watch

Committee in which action he asked for a declaration

that their termination of his appointment as Chief

Constable was illegal and for payment of his salary

from that date or, alternatively, payment of pension

and damages. The House of Lords declared that

the purported termination by the Watch Committee

of the appellant's appointment was null and void as

having been effected contrary to the principles of

natural justice and it was ordered that the matter be

remitted to the Queen's Bench Division to do as

should be just and consistent with the decision of

the House.

It was stated that Mr. Ridge did not

now seek re-instatement but sought to assert his

rights to a pension.

The appellant was appointed Chief Constable of

Brighton Police Force in 1956, the appointment

being subject to the Police Acts and Regulations-

On October 27th, 1957, he was arrested and charged

with other persons with conspiracy to obstruct the

course of justice and on October 28th was suspended

from duty by the Borough Watch Committee. On

February 8th, 1958, he was acquitted by the jury of

the criminal charge preferred against him but was

subjected to some judicial criticism by the trial

judge who was passing sentence on the other persons

prosecuted with him. Mr. Ridge applied for re

instatement and on March 7th, 1958, the Watch

Committee decided that he had been negligent in the

discharge of his duties as Chief Constable and in

urported exercise of the powers conferred on them

y section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporations

Act, 1882, they dismissed him. No specific charges

were formulated against Mr. Ridge and the committee

in arriving at their decision considered among other

things his statements in evidence at his trial and the

observations of the trial judge. An appeal by him to

the Home Secretary was dismissed.

Section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporations Act,

1882, provides that a Watch Committee may at any

time suspend and dismiss any borough constable

whom they think negligent in the discharge of his

duty or otherwise unfit for the same.

Lord Reid giving the judgment of the court said

that the authorities establish clearly that in a case of

this nature a man could not be dismissed on the

grounds of negligence without being first informed

of the nature of the charges against him and given

an opportunity to reply to them.

The appellant had also maintained that the Watch

Committee

should have proceeded under

the

regulations made under the Police Act, 1919. It was

held that a dismissal under the section already

referred to came within the ambit of these regulations

and the Watch Committee in dismissing the appellant

had not acted under them.

(The Times,

March I5th, 1963.)

Solicitor acting for both mortgagor and mortgagee

receipt of confidential information affecting security

The plaintiff in this case was an American citizen

and the defendant a Canadian barrister and solicitor.

The defendant acted on behalf of a client, a Mr.

Kerwin, president of Shannon Falls Ltd. who carried

on the business of a trout farm and fishery. The

company wished to develop the property as a motel

and restaurant and generally as a tourist resort and

the plaintiff became interested in investing money

for that purpose in the company. The plaintiff met

the defendant who was the company's solicitor and

he gave to her particulars of the lands and properties

which would be given as security for the proposed

mortgage. The plaintiff eventually agreed to take

a mortgage on the company's property for the sum

of $25,000 on the security of the parcels of land

described as parcel B and H and the defendant was

instructed by the plaintiff to act on her behalf in the

transaction.

The court was satisfied

that the