The Gazette 1961

Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, gave leave to apply for an

order of certiorari to quash a warrant granted by

a Bow Street magistrate on February 2 5th, 1963,

authorising the police to search for and seize any

documents reasonably suspected of having been

forged and which might be at the applicants' offices

at n, Stone Buildings, Lincoln's Inn.

Mr. Foster said that this was regarded as such an

important matter from the point of view of the

profession that the Law Society had been consulted

and the application was being made with their

encouragement. The warrant related to documents

concerning a client of the firm. The magistrate had

had before him an information sworn by a detective

superintendent to the effect that the person concerned

had been arrested. It had also been said that there

was reasonable cause to believe that forged docu

ments might be found in the custody or possession

of the firm. The warrant was invalid because the

information on which it was issued did not mention

any facts which would lead the magistrate to believe

that the firm had any forged documents without

lawful excuse. The warrant was absolutely general

in its terms and covered all documents at 11, Stone

Buildings whether they concerned clients of the

firm, the firm's own documents or those relating to

employees. The warrant was also invalid because it

disregarded the privilege of solicitors.

The Lord Chief Justice said that the Court would

grant leave to apply for an order of certiorari.

(Ex Parte

Bull and others,

The Times,

March 29th,

1963.)

Contempt by advocate

The Privy Council dismissed an appeal by an

advocate, from a judgment and decree of the Supreme

Court of Ceylon dated May 20th, 1960, whereby he

was convicted under section 40

(a)

of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1950, as amended, of contempt against

or in disrespect of the authority of an Industrial

Court and fined Rs. 500 or in default of payment

ordered to undergo six months rigorous imprison

ment.

The appellant represented the Petroleum Service

Station Workers' Union in a dispute between the

union and Mr. P. R. Perera, dealer, Shell Petroleum

Station at Minigama, whether Mr. Perera's refusal to

employ four named workmen was justified.

The rule nisi issued by the Supreme Court on the

appellant required him to show cause why he should

not be punished for contempt for having read out

in the Industrial Court the following statement:—

" In the circumstances the union having felt that

this court by its order had indicated that an impartial

inquiry could not be had before it has appealed to

the Minister to intervene in the matter. The union

therefore compelled to withdraw from these

proceedings and will not consider itself bound by

any order made

ex parte

which the union submits

would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the

Industrial Disputes Act."

The appellant after handing in the statement,

withdrew from the proceedings, and the question

in this appeal was whether the statement could

amount to contempt where it was made by the

appellant in pursuance of, or what he honestly

believed to be, his duty as counsel representing

a party to a proceeding in Court.

Section 4oA provided that: " (i) Where any

person

(a)

without sufficient reason publishes any

statement. .

. that brings any .

. Industrial Court. .

into disrepute .

. (he) shall be deemed to commit

the offence of contempt. .

Lord Guest, giving their Lordships' advice, said

that the questions before the Supreme Court were

(i) whether the statement made by the appellant

at the hearing before the Industrial Court brought the

Court into disrepute and (2) if so, whether the

statement was made without sufficient reason. The

Supreme Court held that the statement was an act

constituted to bring

the Industrial Court into

disrepute. Counsel for the appellant had difficulty in

resisting the conclusion that such a finding was

warranted.

Their Lordships agreed with

the

conclusion reached by the Supreme Court upon that

matter.

In regard to the second question, whether the

statement was made without sufficient

reason,

counsel for

the appellant argued

that, as

the

appellant acted in good faith and in accordance with

what he believed to be his professional duty in

bringing to the notice of the court that his client

had applied to the Minister of Labour to have the

court reconstituted, the statement was made with

sufficient reason.

It was not and could not be contended that

because the appellant was acting on instructions he

was entitled to any special privilege.

In reading

from the typewritten document he accepted respon

sibility for its contents. There was really no call for

any statement at all on behalf of the union.

But whether the appellant's appearance for the

union was in order or not, their Lordships considered

that there was no justification at all for his statement

that an impartial inquiry could not be expected

before the Industrial Court. That was the sting in

the contempt and it was deliberate and quite

unnecessary in the circumstances. Counsel for the

appellant argued that it could not be contempt for

counsel to allege partiality of a court as this would

unduly restrict counsel's arguments on a hearing in

certiorari proceedings. But different considerations