The Gazette 1961

the court hid permitted the wife arid two further

witnesses to be called and in the opinion of the

court the wife's evidence was utterly incredible.

The court had come to the conclusion early in

Mrs. Gatt's cross-examination that no jury would

have believed her. The court was of the opinion

that the appellant's counsel had used his discretion

wisely at the hearing before the jury. In the

circumstances the appeal would be dismissed.

(R.

Gatt,

The Times,

5th April, 1963.)

Meaning of the word " solicitor"—appeal from the

Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society

The appellant, who was admitted a solicitor in

1949, practised first with a firm of solicitors and

then on his own account, both addresses appearing

on the practising roll. In August, 1961, he became

bankrupt and could not hold a practising certificate,

but a month later, H, a firm of solicitors, were given

permission by the Law Society to employ the

appellant while still an undischarged bankrupt.

In April, 1962, allegations concerning the appellant

while he was in practice on his own account were

made and a hearing by the Disciplinary Committee

of the Law Society was fixed for 28th June, 1962.

Notices were sent to the two addresses appearing

on the roll and to his private address, from which

he had moved, but none was sent to him at the

address of H. The appellant's trustee in bankruptcy

informed him by telephone of the date of the

hearing but the appellant misheard it. The com

mittee found that the appellant had been in arrears

with his accounts and had misappropriated clients'

money, and ordered his name to be struck off the

roll. He appealed to the court on the ground,

inter

alia,

that he had not been properly served with the

notices under r. 30 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary

Proceedings) Rules, 1957.

Lord Parker, C.J., said that if the appellant was a

solicitor then the Law Society had complied with

r. 30, but it had been argued that for the purposes

of the rules a solicitor was a person who held a

practising certificate. The appellant had no such

certificate and it was argued that the notices should

have been sent to his last known business address,

which was the address of H. Rule 37 provided that

expressions used in the rules should have the same

meaning as in the Solicitors Act, 1957. By s. 86 of

the Act, a solicitor was defined as " solicitor of the

Supreme Court", but it had been argued that the

definition should be read with s. i, and it would then

be seen that a person had to have a practising

certificate to be a solicitor. That construction was

wrong and a person could be a solicitor without

having a certificate.

Astiworfh and Winn, jj., agreed.

Appeal

dismissed.

(In re A solicitor,

Solicitors' Journal,

March i5th,

1963, page 216.)

Private prosecutor represented by counsel—costs

The applicants carried on business as a self-

service store, where they suffered loss from a number

of shoplifters. On 2oth August, 1962, private

prosecutions were instituted against three women for

shoplifting. Upon their conviction, counsel represen

ting the applicants applied to the justices for an

order for costs against each of the three women, but

the justices refused the application. The applicants

thereupon applied for an order of certiorari to quash

the refusal of the justices to grant the applicants an

order for costs, and for an order of mandamus

requiring the justices to hear and determine an

application for such an order under s. 5 of the Costs

in Criminal Cases Act, 1952.

Lord Parker, C.J., said that any increases in cases

of shoplifting added to the work of a magistrates'

court. On behalf of the applicants it was stated that

the justices had not made an order for costs under

s. 5 of the 1952 Act since April, 1962, and that some

members of the bench had expressed strong views

about the prosecutions. The time came when the

applicants felt that they ought to be represented by

counsel in every prosecution for shoplifting. In

respect of the three cases, the justices refused the

application for costs because the trivial nature of the

cases did not warrant representation by counsel.

There was no suggestion of any improper motive

on the part of the justices in exercising their dis

cretion. Under s. 5 of the 1952 Act, justices had a

discretion to award costs occasioned by the appear

ance of counsel and solicitors, and also to meet the

expenses incurred by the prosecutor and witnesses.

It might well be that in all three cases there ought to

have been an order for some costs, to meet solicitors'

costs and expenses incurred by the prosecutor and

witnesses. The court was satisfied, however, that

the matter, as presented to the justices, related only

to costs of counsel rather than to any other costs.

The justices were entitled to say that representation

by counsel was unnecessary because of the trivial

nature of the cases, and that they would make no

order for payment of the costs thereof.

Ashworth and Winn, JJ., agreed. Application

refused.

(R.

Feltham Justices ;

ex parts

Waitrose Ltd.,

Solicitors' journal,

March 29th, 1963, page 256.)

Search warrant for solicitors' office

The Divisional Court, on an application by the

partners in Messrs. Bull & Bull, solicitors, of Stone