246 / 328
and those of our own as a result of which the threat
of war might become more remote and the hope of
peace more certain of attainment.
If you should be planning a visit to the United
States and expect to be in the State of Wisconsin,
we shall be pleased to receive a communication from
you indicating the dates during which you expect
to be in our State. Upon receipt of your communica
tion we shall make arrangements for the accommoda
tion of yourself and your family in the home of a
Wisconsin lawyer whose guest you will be for the
several days of your visit. We shall, in addition,
and at your option, prepare a special programme for
you through which, it is our hope, you will be able
to become acquainted with judges of our courts,
leaders and members of the bar, the structure and
operation of our judicial system, and whatever else
of a legal nature might be of special interest to you.
If you will kindly address your communication to
Professor O'Connell at the address below, we shall
be happy to reply to you forthwith.
Yours truly,
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW
Professor Robert J. O'Connell,
Marquette University School of Law
1103 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin, U.S.A."
" OUR REF. :.............."
One of the minor irritations of life is the letter
with the caption at the top left hand corner some
thing like this :
Ourref: NX/5883/zoi.
Your ref: ..................
Government Departments, business people and
solicitors have all from time to time failed to cite the
numbers or other references of correspondents,
failing to realise that it is not only a matter of
courtesy but convenient practice for all concerned.
The Department of Finance recently issued a circular
to Government Departments drawing their attention
to the matter. The Council in turn wish to remind
practitioners that they ought in dealing with
colleagues or members of other professions to cite
the correspondent's file number or case reference
and should extend the same courtesy and facility to
Government Departments.
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST
Fixed salary
"
First Charge " on profits—partnership
agreement
By a partnership deed, made in August, 1951, the
junior partner, who was to be a salaried partner,
"shall be paid a fixed salary of £1,200 as a first
charge on the profits and in addition thereto one-
third share of the next profits arising from the
Reigate branch," the balance of the remaining
profits of the firm to belong to the senior partner.
Owing to the defalcations of a clerk the firm made
less than £1,200 profit in 1957 and 1958. The
partnership was dissolved in 1959. In a winding-up
action the judge gave the usual directions for
accounts and inquiries. On the question whether
the junior partner's salary was payable irrespective of
profits or only out of profits he held that it was
payable only out of profits, and that for those years
in which the profits were below £1,200 the junior
partner's salary should be reduced correspondingly.
The junior partner appealed. Upjohn, L.J., said
that the judge had come to the right conclusion on
the interpretation of the clause. If the junior partner
were entitled to a fixed salary of £1,200 irrespective
of profits, the words " as a first charge on the
profits " were otiose. What the clause meant was
that the junior partner was to be paid his salary out
of profits in priority to any other payments to the
other partners. It might be that the words meant
that the junior partner could recoup any deficiency
in his salary in one year out of profits made in
subsequent years when they exceeded £1,200. That
point, however, had not been taken below or in
argument on the appeal and was therefore not open
for decision. The appeal would be dismissed.
(Marsh
v.
Stacey—
Solicitors' journal,
June z8th,
page 512.)
Case not pleaded
The plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries
sustained in an accident when, in the course of his
employment by the defendants, he was helping in
the operation of a machine cutting and crushing
metal tubes. His case as pleaded and given in
evidence was that at the time of the accident he was
standing on the opposite side of the machine to
that of the operator, though there was a general
allegation that the machine was not securely guarded.
The trial judge rejected the plaintiff's evidence as to
his position at the time of the accident, and accepted
that of the defendants that he was on the operating
side of the machine. The judge held, however, that,
on the defendants' evidence, they were to blame for
the accident and that, in view of the general allega-
26