a caravan site owned by him in the area. He did not
comply with the notice, and on the zyth March, 1961,
he began High Court proceedings against
the
Council. On the 2ist July, 1961, the solicitors to
the Council issued a writ for an injunction restraining
the defendant from keeping and maintaining the site
in such a state as to be a statutory nuisance pursuant
to section 100 of the Public Health Act, 1936. A
notice of motion asking for interim relief was served
on the same date. Three days later on the 24th July,
the Council in a meeting resolved " being of opinion
that summary proceedings would afford an in
adequate remedy to secure compliance " with the
notice served in January, to take proceedings in the
High Court for securing the abatement of the
nuisance. The defendant objected at the hearing
that the Council had no power to issue such proceed
ings since under section 100 its " opinion " had not
been expressed at the date when the writ was issued.
Widgery, J. decided that the Council did not lack
capacity to sue and the defendant appealed from his
decision.
It was held by Evershed, M.R. and
Danckwerts, L.J. (Willmor, L.J. dissenting) that
although the Council had not formally recorded its
opinion at the date of the issue of the writ it had
done so by the time the the motion came for hearing,
i.e., by the time that the first effective step in the
action had been taken. The section should not be
strictly construed so as to require that a formal
expression of the requisite opinion should precede
in time the issue of the writ. The court should hold
that an opinion formally expressed on the 24th July
had in fact been held three days before. The appeal
was therefore dismissed.
(Warwick Rural District
Court
v.
Miller Reid.) All £^.—(1962)—I—212.
Costs
Order to tax costs " of and incidental to negotia
tions leading to this order: " Trustees of the
will of a deceased were empowered by a court
order to pay to the deceased's widow a certain sum
in full and final settlement of her claim against the
estate. The order was made " to tax on the common
fund basis
the costs of the defendant of and
incidental to negotiations leading up to this order ".
One of the items was disallowed by the Taxing
Master on the grounds that the expenses included
therein related to a period before negotiations with
the trustees began and were incurred in connection
with investigation of the widow's claim.
Con
sequently they were not covered by the words " and
incidental to ". The widow took out a summons
for a review of the taxation and she contended that
the work set out in the item was " incidental " as
it had to be carried out before the negotiations
could commence. It was held by Plowman, J. that
the words " and incidental to " as used in the order
meant " costs of and consequent upon the negotia
tions," and accordingly did not cover costs incurred
before the negotiations commenced. These could
not be said to be costs incidental to the negotiations.
The summons was dismissed.
(In re Fahey's Will
Trusts.) All E.R. (1962)—I—73.
Statement of claim amended during trial.
In Pathak
v.
James Nourse Ltd., an action for
negligence taken by a sailor against shipowners
arising out of an accident it became evident during
the trial that the particulars of negligence alleged in
the statement of claim were completely incorrect.
The trial judge expressed the view that the accident
was nevertheless due to gross negligence on the part
of the defendants and he gave leave to amend the
statement of claim to substitute a different allegation
of fact and totally different allegations of negligence.
He also gave leave for consequential amendments to
the defence. The action was tried on the amended
pleadings, the defendants were held liable and
damages and costs (including the costs of the
amendments) were awarded. The defendants appealed
and the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal on the
question of liability. As regards the costs it was held
that the trial judge had erred in imposing the costs of
the amendments on the defendants. He had departed
from the exercise of proper discretion and had erred
in law by awarding the costs of the amendments
against the defendants. The Court of Appeal directed
that neither party be awarded costs up to the date of
the amendment and to that extent the appeal was
allowed.
(Solicitors' Journal,
December 22nd, page 1106.)
Stamp duty on compulsory transfer of stock under a
statutory provision.
In Ridge Nominees Ltd.
v.
Inland Revenue Com
missioners the Court of Appeal has held that where
one company has offered to take over the shares of
another, which offer has been accepted by the
majority of shareholders, a stock transfer executed by
the nominee of the offering company in respect of the
stock of a dissenting stockholder is a " conveyance or
transfer on sale " within section 54 and schedule I to
the Stamp Act 1891. This is so notwithstanding the
fact that the transferor was compelled to sell against
her will her dissent being overridden by the assent
imposed by the Companies Act 1948 (section 209).
The transfer was accordingly liable to
ad valorem
stamp duty under the head of " conveyance or
transfer on sale " in schedule I to the Stamp Act
1891.
(AH England Law Reports,
1961—III—page 1008.)
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