vvere a danger that advantage would be taken of
such a concession to jeopardise his client’s interests.
It has always been clearly understood that such
arrangements are purely personal between counsel
who are not entitled, and do not seek, to bind
their clients by any concessions made without
express instructions.
(Irish Law Times
and
Solicitors' Journal.)
Notice to quit—Uncertainty as to commence
ment o f tenancy
I
n
Colfix (Dublin) Ltd.
v.
Hendron Bros. (Dublin)
Ltd. (88 L.L.T .R . 45), a case of ejectment for
overholding, the tenancy was created on an un
certain date in April or May, 1933, by oral agreement
between a director of the plaintiff company and a
representative of the defendant company. The
rent was payable monthly. On 17th April, 1947,
the following notice to quit was served by the
plaintiff company on the defendant company:
“ We Colfix (Dublin) Ltd., having our registered
office at East Wall Road, Dublin,
C.io,hereby
give you notice to quit and deliver up to us on the
1st day of June, 1947, possession o f all that the
yard being portion o f our premises at East Wall
Road in the City o f Dublin, on the corner o f Sheriff
Street and East Wall Road, which you now hold
from us as tenant from month to month or tenant
at will.”
The defendant company, on receipt o f the notice
to quit, served a notice of intention to claim relief
under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1931. The
plaintiffs served an ejectment civil bill for
overholding, on which the Circuit Court judge
gave a decree for possession. On appeal to the
High Court, the evidence as to the actual date of
the commencement of the tenancy was vague,
and there was no accurate written record in evidence
as to the date o f the oral letting agreement. Mr.
Justice Martin Maguire held that, in the absence of
satisfactory evidence as to the date when the tenancy
commenced, and as the notice to quit was given
for 1 st June, 1947, and no alternative date was
given, it had to be good for that date or bad
altogether. He held, that on the facts before him,
che notice to quit was bad, and reversed the order
o f the Circuit Court.
Solicitors’ application for a new lease
P
art
I of the British Landlord and Tenant Act,
1927, enables a tenant to claim compensation for
improvements and goodwill on the termination
o f a tenancy of business premises. Section 5 of
the same Act entitles the tenant to obtain a new
lease of the premises in certain cases, where he can
prove that compensation under the section would
not be adequate compensation for the loss he would
suffer if he removed to or carried on his trade or
business in other premises. Section 17(3) provides
that, for the purposes o f Part I of the Act, premises
shall not be deemed to be premises used for carrying
on thereat a trade or business
{a)
by reason o f their
being used for carrying on thereat any profession.
The solicitors applied under section 5 for a new
lease of their office premises. The County Court
judge found that a considerable amount of business,
including building society and insurance business,
was carried on by the applicants apart from their
professional activities as solicitors,, and that if the
applicants left the premises they would be worth
more to another solicitor by reason o f the tenants’
activities, and accordingly held that goodwill
attached to the premises. He found that the tenants
were entitled to a new lease under section 5 of the
Act. The landlords appealed. Counsel for the
solicitors argued that, as it had been found that
goodwill existed, it was sufficient, in order to found
the application for the new tenancy, to show that a
business, as distinct from a profession, was carried
on by the tenants, without showing that the goodwill
was referable exclusively to the business. The
Court of Appeal declined to accept this view and
held that the only way o f showing that goodwill
attached to the premises by reason of the carrying
on there of a trade or business was by bringing
evidence on which the court could ascertain what
goodwill was actually referable to that trade or
business, as distinct from what was referable to
the profession, and that the profession must not
be brought in for the purpose of the claim to
compensation or to a new lease.
This decision, although of interest to solicitors,
does not affect the legal position in Ireland, as the
term “ business ” in section 2 of the Landlord
and Tenant Act, 1931, is defined as meaning “ any
trade, profession or business carried on for- gain
or reward ” in contrast to section 17 of the British
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927.
Solicitor’s lien for costs
I
n
James Bibby, Ltd.
v.
Woods (Howard, Garnishee)
(207 L.T. 314), certain judgment creditors obtained
a garnishee order on a sum o f £90 which became
payable to the judgment debtor on the compromise
of certain actions to which he was a party. On 4th
March, on the application by the judgment creditors
to have the garnishee order made absolute, the
judgment debtor stated that his solicitor claimed
to be entitled to a charge on the garnished debt
for his costs. The solicitor knew of the garnishee
12