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Virus Eradication – Considerations to 1999
Additional Global Commission sanctioned research – reflect
(new) technologies of the time
Cloning of
Variola virus
genomes in representative segments
–
Hybrid viruses* (1981): proof of recombination/“transfection”
• Scientific Advisory Group of Experts (1984)
o
Vaccine research using
Vaccinia virus
vector
Sequencing of virus genomes –
• 1993 - Two complete
Variola virus
“major” genomes available
Bioterrorism threat once vaccination program ceases
Decision to prohibit genetic manipulation of
Variola virus
,
restrict access to genomic elements and genome
Reports that Russia had attempted to “weaponize”
Variola virus
*Sam andDumbell Expression ofpoxvirus DNA in coinfected cells and marker rescue of thermosensitive mutants by subgenomic fragments ofDNA Annales de virologie, 1981
Smallpox Research Agenda: Focused on
Preparedness Needs
• Institute of Medicine (IOM) Report recommendations for
“Assessment of Future Scientific Needs for Live
Variola Virus
” (1999)
have helped to frame the research agenda.
• Protocols approved by WHO technical subcommittee
• Research updates provided annually to the WHO Advisory Committee
for
Variola Virus
Research
• Collaborative HHS (largely CDC) and DoD (largely USAMRIID)
• All U.S. work with live
Variola virus
occurs within the BSL-4
containment laboratory at the CDC
• Inspected regularly by U.S. security and biosafety authorities and WHO
biosafety teams
• Genetic manipulation of
Variola virus
not authorized by WHO
– 1994 Ad hoc
Orthopoxvirus
Advisory Committee recommendation
•
Full genomes of
Variola virus
can only be maintained at the 2 WHO CCs
•
No lab can have more than 20% of the
Variola virus
genome, except a
WHO Collaborating Center
• All research findings to be made available to the international
scientific community