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The FDLR get their main revenues by controlling the majority
of of the artisanal mines in South Kivu (casseterite, gold and
coltan) (UNSC, 2008), and some in North Kivu.
CDNP is financed by a pool system of Congolese and Rwandans.
A number of mineral-exporting companies are acting as fronts
for also CDNP (UNSC, 2008). In addition, most of the militias
also take road tolls, charcoal taxes, and bribe or threaten border
check points or local officials. CDNP, for example, had in 2008
control of the Bunagana border post at the DRC/Uganda border.
CDNP makes at least 430,000 USD a year from taxes alone
on charcoal originating inside and around Virunga, not to
mention the actual sales (UNSC, 2008). FDLR has been es-
timated to make around 2 million USD from charcoal taxes
on around half of the charcoal production, suggesting that at
least 4 million USD a year are made in taxes alone on char-
coal – in addition to the actual sales (UNSC, 2008). FDLR has
been estimated to make around 28 million USD from annual
sales of charcoal, in collaboration with the FADRC, including
from Virunga. It is also clear that FDLR have collaborated with
FADRC, in spite of being at war, including in operation against
the CDNP (UNSC, 2008). Officers from the FADRC 83rd and
9th brigades were solicit in safeguarding FDLR trucks with
charcoal on the Rutshuru road in 2008 (UNSC, 2008).
Also livestock and ranching is heavily involved in taxes and in gain-
ing land through the different militia groups, severely threatening
the wildlife through destruction of forest and heavy grazing. It also
drives away much of the wild ungulates, thus indirectly resulting
in heavier poaching on the primates, including gorillas.
NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION FOR
FINANCING WARFARE, DESTRUCTION OF
GREAT APE HABITAT AND POACHING
There are also many financiers, including through companies,
that simply pay taxes or are solicit in exploiting resources, of-
ten changing between the militia groups, dependent upon who
is in power, including opposing forces. Also governments are
involved in supporting several of the rebel groups, typically
through training or by facilitating licenses to extractive indus-
try, turning a “blind eye” or even supplying material UNSC,
2008). This includes support from Rwandan government of-
ficials to CDNP (UNSC, 2008).
Rwandan, Ugandan and Congolese officials have been involved
in stopping and removing the vehicle check points set up by the
ICCN park guards, that had reduced the illegal charcoal trans-
port substantially – and the subsequent revenues to FDLR by at
least 40% (UNSC, 2008). Again, the rangers and park guards
could and have played an important role in reducing and stop-
ping the illegal exploitation of resources impacting not only
wildlife, but also financing the war atrocities by the militias.
In spite of this, they receive minimal support and incur high
losses in rangers.
Other groups, such as the Coalition of Congolese patriotic re-
sistance (PARECO), which erupted in 2007 have fought against
CDNP, and seems to have links to FADRC (UNSC, 2008). An-
other is FPJC, formerly from FPRI, and the LRA (Lord resis-
tance Army) from Uganda. These “new” militia groups, like the
companies, appear to evolve when there is opportunity for re-
source exploitation or other militia groups are pushed. Again,
as a new group evolves, they are active in and simply take over
much of the resource exploitation routines of the former mili-
tias occupying any given area or national park.