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Index to Recent Irish Cases — 1980

(Cases refer to issue of Gazette where case is listed on Green Pages — No numbering of Green Pages)

In Re Section 25 of the Trade Marks Act

1963 —

Arby's Ltd. Applicants.

Additional evidence from the applicant is

not admissible in the High Court on

appeal from the Controller of Patents,

Designs and Trade Marks under S. 25 of

the 1963 Act. The High Court in such

proceedings is an Appellate Court, and

not a Court at first instance. The Supreme

Court unanimously reversed Hamilton J.,

who had admitted an additional affidavit

in order to prove that the applicant had

intended to use the trade mark in the State

— MARCH.

Bank of Ireland v. Lyons. Order made by

Master of the High Court limiting costs to

outlay and Counsel's fees and to salaried

members of the legal staff of the Bank.

Finlay

P.. having

considered

the

authorities in detail, held that the Order

made by the Master must be varied. An

order must be entered by which final

judgment be entered for the Plaintiff with

default costs, plus costs for hearings —

MAY.

Cleary v. Coffey. The Plaintiff was owner of

licensed premises in Inchicore. He was

also one of the executors who was entitled

to one twelfth share of the residuary estate

of a deceased publican who had licensed

premises on Malahide Road. The premises

in Malahide Road were sold to administer

the estate of deceased. The employees in

Malahide Road were paid full redundancy

payment, but they also claimed further

"Disturbance Claims Payments" as a

custom of the licensed trade. The Plaintiff

brought proceedings against the employee

defendants for an interlocutory injunction

to restrain the picketing of her premises in

Inchicore, on the grounds that there was no

trade dispute there.

McWilliam J. held: (1) That there was a

trade dispute between the deceased

publican and his successors in title. (2)

However, there was not at any time any

business connection between the premises

in Malahide Road and in Inchicore. There

was

consequently

no

discernible

connection between the Inchicore premises

of the plaintiff and the trade dispute which

would justify the Inchicore picketing.

Interlocutory injunction granted —

NOVEMBER.

Crowley v. Ireland, the Minister for

Education, and INTO. Strike by INTO in

Drimoleague National Schools from

March 1976. Restricted teaching and,

from January 1978, pupils transferred to

neighbouring

schools.

The

plaintiff

parents contended that their children had

a constitutional right to be provided with

free primary education in their parish. The

full

Supreme Court

upheld McMahon J.

in the High Court that the INTO were

carrying on this strike for the purpose of

infringing the constitutional right of the

children to primary education, that this

was a conspiracy and consequently

actionable.

The Majority of the Supreme Court,

Henchy J., Griffin J., and Kenny J. per

Kenny J.)

held

that, as Article 42 (4) of

the Constitution stated that the State shall

provide for

free primary education, the

evidence had failed to establish that there

had been a breach of constitutional duty

on behalf of the State. The obligation on

the State, under Article 40 (3), to defend

and vindicate the rights of the citizens is

not a general one, but only an obligation

to defend these rights by its laws enacted

by the Oireachtas.

The Minority of the Supreme Court

(O'Higgins C.J. and Park J.)

upheld

McMahon J. in the High Court in stating

that the duty imposed by the State under

Article 42 (4) was a continuing one, and

that consequently the Minister should

have acted to stop the strike. The strike

had been exercised for the purpose of

infringing the constitutional right of the

children to obtain free primary education.

Action against the State, the Minister

for Education and the Attorney General

dismissed.

Action against INTO upheld — JUNE.

D.P.P. v. John OToughlin.

Accused

convicted of larceny of a muck-spreader

in Circuit Court. Accused first denied this

in one Garda Station, but subsequently

admitted it by written statement in

another.

Held

by the Court of Criminal

Appeal:- (1) That the delay in charging

him formally was only occasioned by the

necessity for the Gardai to check his

story.

(2) That the appellant ought to have

been charged, although this had not been

done, after his story had failed to check

out.

(3) The question was not whether the

claim of right that the accused was

entitled to take the muck spreader because

the owner could not pay his debts, was

one known to the law, which the Circuit

Judge adopted, but rather whether the

accused had an honest belief which would

excuse his action. As the Judge had

declined to put this matter before the jury,

there was a miscarriage of justice.

Conviction quashed — MARCH.

Di Murro v. ChOds. Plaintiff was tenant of

restaurant and ice cream business in Fair

Green, Arklow, under a Lease for a term

of 10 years from 1 January 1977. The

Plaintiff claimed the Lease included a yard

with a store and shed at the rere of the

shop. The Court looked at the history of

the premises and the surrounding

circumstances leading to the execution of

the Lease.

Held

by McWilliam J. that

what was demised to the Plaintiff was the

same as had been let in earlier agreements,

namely the shed and store and use of the

yard — NOVEMBER.

Duffy v. Doyle and the Attorney General.

Testator had left to his wife "an average

of £1.500 per year", and £500 for

Masses in the Parish of Bray; he died in

April 1976. Construction Summons by

Executor Plaintiff as to the meaning of

these terms against first defendant, widow

of testator.

McWilliam J. held:

(1) That the testator's estate was to be

applied during the life of the widow on

trust to provide her with an income of

£ 1.500 per year, and that capital might be

applied for that purpose.

(2) That the gift of the residue to Bray

Parish was a valid charitable gift and that

the matter would stand over until the

death of testator's widow, and that the

remaining funds would be applied for that

purpose at that time — MARCH.

Dundalk Shopping Centre Ltd. v. Roofspray

Ltd. In 1974, the PlaintifTs were

constructing

a shopping centre in

Dundalk. The defendants described

themselves as specialists in the Shell

Monoform system of roofing. Although

the estimate was accepted in April, the

Defendants only commenced work on 24

September

1974.

The

Defendants

continued to work irregularly until 13

November 1974. Then the Plaintiffs

repudiated the contract and engaged

another contractor who laid an alternative

asphalt roof. The Defendants complained

that, during their absence, extensive

damage had been done to the roof. On 9

November 1974, a major leak occurred

through the roof: as a result, the Plaintiffs'

Architects advised them to engage

another contractor.

Finlay P.

held:

(1) That the change in the

fall of the roof was not unknown to the

Defendants

before

operations

commenced.

(2)

That

the

Defendants

held

themselves out to be specialists in roofing

insulation.

(3) There was an implied term that the

Defendants would use reasonable care

and skill in their work.

(4) The Defendants had failed in a

fundamental term of the contract, namely

to provide an effective waterproofing of

the roof.

(5) Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were

justified in repudiating the contract, and

were

entitled

to

Damages

JULY/AUGUST.

Finnegan v. Planning Board. Plaintiff

objected to constitutionality of Sections

15. 16 and 18 of the Planning Act 1976.

Plaintiff lived four miles from Raybestos

Manhattan plant in Co. Cork, and was

held to have sufficient standing to have

locus standi. Section 15

provided for the

lodgment by an appellant to the Planning

Board of a deposit of £10.

Held

by the

Supreme Court that the purpose of

imposing this deposit was to prevent

appeals

which

lacked

reality

and

substance and that there was no

unconstitutional discrimination involved.

Section 16

gave a discretion to the Board

as to whether the appeal should be heard

orally or otherwise.

Held

that this

submission was fallacious insofar as it was

open to the Oireachtas to prescribe that

procedure.

Section 18

allows the Board, if

it considers the appeal vexatious or

unnecessarily delayed, to determine the

appeal upon giving seven days' notice and

without hearing submissions from the

appellant.

Held

that this Section enjoyed a

presumption of constitutionality, and that

it had to be assumed that the notice would

be accompanied by an opportunity given

to the defendant to put forward his case.

Appeal dismissed — MAY.

Frigoscandia Ltd. v. Continental Irish Meat

Ltd. and Crowley. The Plaintiffs sold a

refrigerating machine for a price to be

paid in four instalments commencing with

the placing of the order and ending when

the machine was ready to operate. The

machine was duly installed, but 25% of

the purchase money remained unpaid by

the first defendant, when the second

defendant was appointed Receiver. The