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negotiations for increased remuneration for
1 year were made by his union, but direct
negotiations broke down. After protracted
negotiation by the Labour Court, the
allowances were duly paid to the
professional staff but not to the technician.
The Plaintiff sued for a declaration that as a
result of a letter, technicians were entitled to
Marriage and Children's Allowance as a
package for the period ending 1 April 1971.
McWmiam J.
held
that the Plaintiff was
entitled to damages equal to the appropriate
Marriage and Children's Allowances for 2
years ending on 1 April 1971 — MARCH.
The People (D.P.P.) v. Moore and O'Sullivan
— C.C.A. Appellants, convicted of
murder, objected to statement which it was
contended should not be admitted. The
Court of Criminal Appeal per Finlay P.
held:
(1) That the function of the Court was to
consider the stenographer's report to
determine whether or not the trial was
satisfactory by reviewing matters of law and
of evidence.
(2) That all the findings made by
Hamilton J., the trial Judge, would be
supported by the evidence. There were no
grounds for setting aside the findings of fact
of Hamilton J., with regard to the voluntary
nature of the presence of the appellants in
the Garda station.
(3) There was a conflict of evidence with
regard to a file, which Moore said had been
used to shatter glass, while O'Sullivan said
he had used it to rob cars. This statement
should have been excluded, since it was
prejudicial, and did not relate to the onus of
proof on either side. Nevertheless, since no
miscarriage of justice had occurred, this
ground of appeal was disallowed by
applying S. 5 (l)of the
Courts ofJustice
Act
1928.
(4) That Hamilton J., was justified in
admitting a statement of Moore, even
though the Judge's Rules were breached, as
no note had been taken by the Gardai of this
statement at the time.
(5) The appellants contended that they
thought the deceased was dead when they
choked him. Hamilton J. had discussed in
his charge the presumption that a person
intended the natural consequences of his
acts. The Appellate Court was satisfied that
Hamilton J. was bound in law to discuss the
question of intention, and the rebuttable
presumption concerning it. Application for
leave to appeal dismissed — OCTOBER.
S.P. v. P.T. and A.T. Defendants, husband and
wife, negotiated the sale of their family
home to the Plaintiff. Wife did not sign a
standard form of consent under the Family
Home Protection Act 1976, but signed a
letter agreeing to the sale. There were
subsequent domestic difficulties between
the Defendants and the wife had a separate
solicitor, and contended that she would only
leave her home, on condition that the
husband should purchase another house,
which he had not done. It was also
contended that if the consent in writing was
necessary for the actual Conveyance to the
Plaintiff. McWniiam I.
held:
(1) That the original Consent of July
1978 was an absolutely unconditional
Consent. The dispute between the spouses
did not affect the disposition of the purchase
price.
(2) That it was not the intention of the
Legislature to require two Consents for the
completion of one Transaction. This would
leave the purchaser having to incur
unnecessary expense — NOVEMBER.
The State (Caseley) v. Dr. Daly and Justice
O'Sullivan. Gannon J.
held:
(I) That, although Caseley had been
detained by order of the Minister in the
Central Mental Hospital, Dundrum, since
12 May 1975, the order of Justice
O'Sullivan. by which the accused was
remanded due to illness on 6 November
1975. was not bad on its face, and was not
made withoutjurisdiction, as that order was
of an administrative nature, and not of a
judicial nature.
(2) As the Ministerial Order was effective
only from 12 May to the next remand on 15
May 1977. and as there was no further
Ministerial Order, the continued detention
of Caseley was not justified in law.
Accordingly an Order of Release of the
Prosecutor was made — MARCH.
State (Walsh) v. District Justice Maguire. A
person detained under Section 30 of the
Offences Against the State Act 1939 may,
notwithstanding the unreported decision of
Finlay P. in the State (Bremen) v. Mahon -
13 February 1978 — to the contrary, be
validly charged at his place of detention
during his period of detention under that
Section: it is not necessary that he be first
charged in the District Court. The
prosecutor had been charged with armed
robbery in a Garda Station, and sought to
make absolute a Conditional Order of
Certiorari which was unanimously refused
by the Supreme Court — APRIL.
Treacy v. Dwyer Nolan Developments Ltd.
Plaintiff purchaser liable to Defendant
Vendor and Builder for interest on balance
of purchase money at contract rate of 20%.
In November 1977, the plaintifTleft with the
defendant a list of defects, which defendant
claimed were not serious; the plaintiff
inspected the house in mid-December, but
no report was furnished to the defendant.
The plaintiff continued to contend that the
house was defective but, subsequent to the
Architect's certificate of the completion of
the house in May 1978, the defendant
insisted upon full payment of 20% from
November 1977. On June 25, 1977, the
plaintiff put the balance of the purchase
money onjoint deposit, and sued for specific
performance. Held by McWilliam J.:
(1) That the Defendant was entitled to
Interest at 20% from 1 January to 25 June
1978.
(2) That the Plaintiff was not entitled to
any damages — OCTOBER.
Walsh and Others v. Owners of the Motor
Vessel
M
Ora et Labora". The Plaintiffs were
the Coxwain and Crew of the Valentia
Harbour Life Boat which, in response to a
May Day call, were atsea from 9 p.m. on 3
July 1974 to 4.15 a.m. on 4 July, when they
managed to land the Defendant Motor
Vessel at Valentia. Finlay P. had held that
salvage of the vessel should be calculated on
the basis of remuneration or reward to the
lifeboat men. He had awarded £750 to the
Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court per Griffin J.
increased the award from £750 to £ 1,500
— JULY/AUGUST.
Wilson v. Shcchan. Extradition was sought on a
warrant which recited that Plaintiff had
robbed M.B. of £281 and had used personal
violence contrary to S. 8 of the Theft Act
1968. It was submitted by the Plaintiff that
under S. 50(2)oftheExtradition Act 1965,
this offence did not correspond with any
indictable offence under the law of the State.
The District Justice held that the offence in
the warrant corresponded with robbery
with violence contrary to the Larceny Act
1916. McMahon J. in the High Court held
that the specification in the warrant was not
sufficient to identify a corresponding
offence in Irish Law and ordered the
Plaintiff to be released. On appeal, the
Supreme Court per Henchy J. reversed
McMahon J. and held that the District
Justice had reached the correct conclusion,
for he only had to decide whether the charge
in the warrant would constitute an offence if
the same conduct were charged here. An
Order was made to re-arrest the Plaintiff.
Henchy J. also criticised the fact that 4}
years had elapsed between the issue of the
warrant and the final disposition of the
Extradition
proceedings.
JULY/
AUGUST.