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Apprentices' Applications.
THREE applications from apprentices were con
sidered and granted.
Applications under Section 47.
FOUR applications by solicitors under Section 47
for liberty to take out their practising certificates
for the present year were granted.
CURRENT TOPICS.
Costs of High Court Action—subject matter
within Circuit Court jurisdiction.
IN the case of Beaumont
v.
Figgis (79 I.L.T.R. 37)
the Supreme Court has recently decided several
important questions on
the interpretation of
O.28 r.2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and
the High Court, 1926 and section 12 of the
Courts of Justice Act, 1936. O. 28 r.2 provides
generally that, except by order of the Court,
no costs shall be allowed to a plaintiff in any action
or matter which could have been commenced in
the Circuit Court or the District Court, save such
costs as would have been recoverable by the
plaintiff had the proceedings been commenced
in the appropriate Court. Section 12 (1) of the
Courts of Justice Act, 1936, prescribes further
and stricter limits to the amount of the costs
which may be allowed to the plaintiff in seven
specified classes of action commenced
in the
High Court but which could have been com
menced in the Circuit Court. Section 12
(3)
further provides
inter alia
that it shall not be
lawful for rules of Court to impose any restrictions
on the amount of costs recoverable by any party
from any other party in any action or other
proceeding, but that nothing in the sub-section
shall prevent the insertion in rules of Court of a
restriction on the amount of the costs recoverable
which is identical with a restriction imposed by
the section. In Ulster Bank Ltd.
v.
Hassall
(1940 I.R.366) Gavan Duffy, J., held that one
effect of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936, Section
12 (3) was to annul O.28 r.2 of the 1926 Rules of
Court. As section 12 (1) of the Courts of Justice
Act, 1936, did not extend to every class of
action falling within O.28 r.3, it was argued that
the effect of the decision in Ulster Bank
v.
Hassall
was to remove any restrictions as to the costs
recoverable in actions not coming within section
12 (1) of the Act of 1936 and to enable the plaintiff
to recover High Court costs in such cases,
e.g.,
in an action for an injunction. The Supreme
Court overruled the decision in Ulster Bank
v.
Hassall and held that (1) Section 12 (3) of the
Courts of Justice Act, 1936, prescribing specified
limits to the costs recoverable in the seven classes
of action therein dealtjwith, did not revoke rule 2
of Order 28 of the rules of 1926 save in regard
to the cases specially mentioned at (a) to
(g)
in section 12 (1) of the Act; (2) accordingly the
costs recoverable in a High Court Action not
within section 12 (1) of the Act but which could
have been brought in the Circuit Court were
still subject
to O.28 r.2.;
(3) an action for
damages and an injunction in which £35 damages
had been awarded, to be taxed as if an injunction
had been granted, was not an action founded on
contract or for damages for breach of contract
within section 12 (1) (c) of the Courts of Justice
Act, 1936, and the costs should be taxed without
regard to the limits imposed by that Act but
subject to the limits imposed by O.28 r.2 of the
Rules of Court, of 1926.
Application for leave to appeal out of time.
Appellate courts do not, as a rule, look kindly
on applications to extend the time for serving
notice of appeal, particularly if made after the
time for appealing has expired, and such applica
tions are, not surprisingly, of infrequent occur
rence. In a recent English case In re Berkeley
deceased—Borrer
v.
Berkeley and others
(61
T.L.R.33) an application was made on rather
unusual grounds for leave to appeal, notwith
standing that the time for appealing had expired.
The applicants, who were the defendants in an
administration suit in the High Court, were
tenant for life and in remainder respectively
under a will, and the High Court had given a
decision affecting them adversely in regard to a
certain annuity payable under the will. In giving
his decision the judge had followed a previous
decision of the High Court. The Court of Appeal
subsequently decided in another case before it
that the case followed by the judge of the High
Court had been incorrectly decided and over
ruled it, but in the interim the time for appealing
in re Berkeley deceased had expired and notice
of appeal had not been served. In these circum
stances the defendants asked the Court of Appeal
to extend the time for appealing. The application
was granted, but not on the mere ground that
the authority followed by the High Court had
been subsequently overruled by the Court of
Appeal. It was stated by the Master of the Rolls
that this fact alone would not be sufficient to
justify the Court in extending the time. That
alone would be no ground. The Court must take
all the circumstances into consideration and has
power to enlarge the time if it is just in the