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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

62

3 - Robust Transmission Planning Under Uncertain Generation

Investment And Retirement

Lizhi Wang, Iowa State University,

lzwang@iastate.edu,

Bokan Chen

We present a new robust optimization model for transmission planning. This

model considers the addition of new renewable generation and the retirement of

existing generation capacity as sources of uncertainty, anticipates for each

transmission plan the worst scenario that would result in the highest investment

and operational cost, and identifies the most robust transmission plan with the

least costly worst case scenario. We demonstrate this approach with a case study

on the WECC 240-bus test system. Results will be illustrated with novel

quantification and visualization techniques.

4 - Data-driven Stochastic Unit Commitment For Integrating

Wind Generation

Chaoyue Zhao, Oklahoma State University,

chaoyue.zhao@okstate.edu

In this talk, we propose a data-driven risk-averse stochastic unit commitment

model, where risk aversion stems from the worst-case probability distribution of

the renewable energy generation amount, and develop the corresponding

solution methods to solve the problem. Given a set of historical data, our

proposed approach constructs a confidence set for the distributions of the

uncertain parameters using statistical inference and solves the corresponding risk-

averse stochastic unit commitment problem. The computational results

numerically show how the risk-averse stochastic unit commitment problem

converges to the risk-neutral one, which indicates the value of data.

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Music Row 4- Omni

Analytical Models in E-business

Sponsored: E-Business

Sponsored Session

Chair: Yonghua Ji, University of Alberta, School of Business,

Edmonton, AB, T6G2R6, Canada,

yji@ualberta.ca

1 - Announcing Privacy Threshold In Mobile Platform Competition

Zixuan Meng, University of Washington,

zxmeng@uw.edu

Smartphones are increasingly necessary for everyday life and consumers find it

important to prevent from privacy violations through Apps on mobiles. Android

and iOS, two of the most popular App platforms, are different in App privacy

levels. IOS, known to have a higher privacy level, chooses to make privacy

requirement public. Using vertical differentiation model, we find that when

market is fully covered, publicizing privacy threshold motivates both firms

lowering privacy level. This helps both firms generate more profit by hurting

consumers. This finding contradicts with common belief and calls for awareness

of potential harm from a policy that seems protective to consumers.

2 - How Much To Open, How Fast To Fix And Develop? Impacts Of

Openness On Software Development And Maintenance

Rakesh R Mallipeddi, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX,

77840, United States,

rmallipeddi@mays.tamu.edu

Emre Muzaffer Demirezen, Ram Gopal, Subodha Kumar

Proprietary software vendors have recently begun to emulate the open source

software community in opening up part of their software. We analyze the impact

of software openness in the context of resource allocation between bug fixing and

new version development, an important operations issue that many software

vendors face in light of prevalence of software defects. We formulate optimal

control models to examine the effects of making the software code open (fully or

partially) on the overall quality of the software and the development efforts of its

next version.

3 - Crowdfunding Mechanism Design And Its Effect On Fundraising

Aravinda Garimella, University of Washington,

aravinda.garimella@gmail.com

Our study examines how entrepreneurs’ choices of Funding Type and Rewards

Types jointly impact the outcome of crowdfunding campaigns. We begin by

providing a conceptual framework that distinguishes between Mechanism and

Non-Mechanism aspects of campaign design. We then focus on two mechanisms

at play in Reward-Based Crowdfunding platforms. First, entrepreneurs may opt

for one of two Funding Types, Fixed Funding or Flexible Funding. Second,

entrepreneurs are also heterogeneous in the mix of Reward Types they choose to

offer to their backers. Using a rich data set of daily funding information on

Indiegogo, we study how these two mechanisms influence funding outcomes and

trajectories.

4 - Dynamics And Efficiency Of a Mobile Platform

Ruibing Wang, University of Science and Technology of China,

Hefei, China,

ruibing@mail.ustc.edu.cn,

Qinglong Gou, Yonghua Ji

A mobile platform serves as a multi-sided market which connects users, app

developers and advertisers. Different from the traditional multi-sided market, the

cross-side network effects between different groups are different. It makes the

decision process on advertising investments of platform owners and app

developers more challenging. We develop a dynamic model, capturing these

impacts, to offer suggestions on their advertisement strategy. We found that

platform owners should offer app developers incentives according to the size of

their user base or their advertising expenditure. We also Investigate the impact of

different kinds of incentive on the system efficiency.

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Music Row 5- Omni

Behavioral Research on Inventory and Pricing

Sponsored: Behavioral Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Elena Katok, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX,

United States,

ekatok@utdallas.edu

1 - Negotiating Transshipments Prices For Improving Supply

Chain Coordination

Sebastian Villa, University of Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia,

villabes@usi.ch

, Elena Katok

When retailers face stochastic demand, it is often beneficial for retailers in the

same industry to buy or sell product from one another in order to better match

supply and demand. This exchange of product at the retailer level is called

transshipment. Appropriate ordering decisions and transshipment prices can

improve supply chain coordination. We create some experiments to evaluate how

subjects decisions deviate (or not) from the theoretical channel-coordinating

benchmarks. Initially, we automate the ordering decision, to evaluate how the

transshipment prices are negotiated, and then we evaluate retailers’ decisions

when they do both, negotiate transshipment prices and place orders.

2 - Newsvendors’ Decisions Revisited

Tobias Stangl, University of Cologne,

tobias.stangl@uni-koeln.de

Elena Katok, Ulrich Thonemann

In our study we revisit most of the proposed explanations for the pull-to-center

effect in newsvendor experiments. We conducted an experimental study with 620

students from a core course in operations management. Our newsvendor study

comprises two frames and seven critical ratios. In addition we collected data on

anchoring, cognitive reflection, overconfidence, and risk aversion. In our data we

find no support for assuming that context matters nor for assuming (different)

psychological costs of leftovers and stock-outs. We find a risk and gender effect

and additional evidence that low cognitive reflection and over-precision increases

the pull-to-center effect.

3 - Procurement In The Presence Of Supply Disruptions

Elena Katok, University of Texas at Dallas,

ekatok@utdallas.edu

We consider a setting with a supply disruption that may occur after a contract is

negotiated. If the disruption can be corrected at a cost, and it is more efficient for

the supplier, rather than for the buyer, to correct the disruption, a contract that

does not include the disruption contingency leads to inefficient outcome. We

examine the effect of communication and the ability to renegotiate in the

laboratory. The main finding is that informal commitments improve efficiency a

great deal.

4 - Profit-sharing Or Target-with-bonus? A Behavioral Investigation

Kay-Yut Chen, University of Texas at Arlington, UTA,

Arlington, TX, 1, United States,

kychen@uta.edu

Shan Li, Ying Rong

We experimentally study the profit sharing and the target-with-bonus mechanism

in a setting with a principal setting the parameters of the mechanism, and an

agent choosing his effort level (moral hazard) and managing a newsvendor store.

We find the presence of fairness concerns under both mechanism, and the

principal yields higher profit under target-with-bonus mechanism. A behavioral

model is constructed to explain the findings.

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